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THE  UNIVERSITY 
OE  CALIEORNIA 

SANTA  BARBARA 


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MRS.  MACKINLEY  HELM 


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THE  FfiENCH  REVOLUTION 


TESTED  BY  MIRABEAU' S  CAREER 


TWELVE    LECTURES    OX    THE    HISTOKY    OF     THE     FRENCH 

REVOLUTIOX,  DELIVERED   AT  THE   LOWELL 

INSTITUTE,  BOSTON,  MASS. 


H.   VON    IIOLST 


Vol.  II. 


CHICAGO 

CALLAGHAN  &  COMPANY 

1894 


Copyright,  1894, 

BY 

CALLAGHAN  &  COMPANY 


DC 
/^  / 

^  '  LIBRARY 

///  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 

SANTA  BARBARA 


5)c5icate^ 

TO 
MY  WIFE, 

ANNIE  ISABELLE,  ne'e  HATT, 

IN  TOKEN  OP  GEATITUDE 

FOR  THE  SYMPATHY  AND  AID 

GIVEN    ME    FOR  TWENTY-TWO   YEARS 

IN  MY  LITERARY  LABORS. 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS. 

Vol.  II. 


LECTURE  PAGE 

VII.   "The  Party  of  One  Man  " 1 

VIII.  The    5th    and    6th   of   October,   1TS9,   and    the 

Meraoh'  of  the  l;jth 41 

IX.  The  Decisive  Defeat  of  tlie  Tth  of  Xovember. ...  83 

X.  Other  Defeats  and  Mischievous  Victories 128 

XI.  Mirabean  and  the  Court 167 

XII.  The  End.     A  Unique  Tragedy 207 


THE  EKENCII  REYOLETION. 


TESTED   BY 


THE  CAREER  OF  MIRABEAU. 


LECTURE  VII. 

The  Party    of  One  Man. 

At  the  solemn  opening  of  the  States-General,  as 
we  heard  Mirabeau  say,  "  they  were  drunk  with 
the  desire  to  applaud,  and  they  applauded  unto 
satiety."  As  to  one  man,  however,  the  assembly 
made  an  exception.  Gouverneur  Morris,  who  was 
present,  reports,  that  when  Mirabeau  entered,  he 
was  "  hissed."  The  days  came  when  he  was  more 
thunderingly  applauded  than  any  one  else,  but  at 
the  same  time  hissing  never  ceased,  and  it  is  still 
continued,  I  am  tempted  to  say,  not  only  in 
France,  but  by  France.     Not  to  applaud  him  is 


2  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

impossible,  foi^  it  would  only  prove  that  one  is  too 
dull  to  understand  that  he  was  a  genius.  But  it 
is  with  a  kind  of  reluctance  and  a  somewhat  apolo- 
getic air  that  France  glories  in  him,  while  the 
hissing  is  not  done  with  regret.  There  is  an 
undertone  of  elation  in  the  moral  satisfaction 
derived  from  it.  It  seems  to  say  :  "  There  is,  of 
course,  no  denjdng  that  he  was  the  greatest  orator 
of  the  revolution,  but  don't  insult  me  by  supposing 
that  this  betrays  me  into  not  taking  him  at  his 
true  worth." 

This  applies  also  to  his  best  biographer.  Mr. 
Lomenie  once  calls  him  "  the  inexplicable  man."  ^ 
Some  historians  might  have  hesitated  to  write  and 
publish  several  stout  volumes  on  a  man,  so  long  as 
they  had  to  confess  to  themselves  that  they  failed 
to  understand  him.  Hapj)il3^  Mr.  Lomenie  did  not 
think  so — happily,  for  he  has  brought  many  new 
facts  to  light  and  enabled  us  to  see  in  many  re- 
spects more  clearly  and  more  correctly.  Mirabeau's 
biography,  however,  must  needs  still  be  written, 
for  it  evidently  can  only  be  written  by  a  man  who 
does  understand  him. 

That  Mr.  Lomenie  did  not  succeed  in  this  is,  in 
my  opinion,  due  to  the  following  causes  : — 
1  (Euvres.,  II.  436. 


THE   FRENCH   REYOLUTIOX.  3 

The  liistorian  lias  to  be  an  uncompromising 
searcher  for  triitli.  In  searching  for  truth  lie  lias, 
however,  not  to  be  animated  by  the  spirit  of  the 
state  attorney  working  up  a  case,  but  by  that  broad 
sympathy  capable  of  seeing  that,  if  men  and  times 
are  but  really  understood^  the  moral  guilt  of  their 
follies  and  crimes  almost  always  appears  diminished 
by  one-half.  Men,  however,  never  can  be  really  un- 
derstood, if  they  are  not  judged  as  children  of  their 
times.  T  am  far  from  charging  Mr.  Lom^nie  with 
having  overlooked  this  ;  but,  I  think,  he  has  not 
allowed  it  all  the  weight  that  must  be  accorded  to 
it.  Much  of  what  ought  to  be  charged  against  the 
times — principally  or,  at  least,  to  a  considerable 
extent — is  made  to  appear,  altogether  or  chiefly, 
an  item  of  Mirabeau's  personal  account.  He  is  a 
genuine  son  of  his  times.  Not  only  their  character- 
istic brilliant  traits,  but  their  follies  and  vices  also 
have  in  him  a  pre-eminent  representative. 

Mr.  Lom^nie,  besides,  has  not  found  his  way  out 
of  the  maze  of  contradictions  presented  by  Mira- 
beau's character.  He  has  not  kept  sufficiently  in 
mind  that  almost  all  men  are  a  compound  of  in- 
consistencies and  self-contradictions.  Trul}^  har- 
monious and  thoroughly  consistent  characters  are 
so  rare,  that  they  might  be  called    white  ravens, 


4:  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

but  with  most  men — and  especially  uncommon 
men — there  is  one  predominant  trait,  and  this 
furnishes  the  key  to  the  character.  Mr.  Lom^nie 
thinks  he  has  discovered  this  predominant  trait  in 
Mirabeau's  character,  but  having  unconsciously 
approached  his  task  with  the  spirit  of  the  state 
attorney,  he  necessarily  got  into  a  wrong  track, 
and  every  step  led  him  further  away  from  the 
correct  solution  of  the  problem.  Mirabeau's 
policy,  he  asserts,  "  is,  then  as  always,  an  essen- 
tially personal  policy,"  directed  by  the  "  passions 
and  calculations  of  personal  interest."  ^  It  is  true, 
so  long  as  Mirabeau,  to  a  great  extent  by  his  own 
fault,  practically  lives  without  any  task,  impure 
and  unscrupulous  egotism  is  indeed  to  a  revolting 
degree  the  propelling  force  of  his  life.  But  the 
more  ambition  asserts  itself  as  his  dominant 
passion,  the  more  also  purer  and  higher  motives 
contend  for  the  mastery  with  this  egotism ;  and 
when  the  revolution  at  last  furnished  him  with  a 
task  worthy  of  his  genius  and  adapted  to  his 
character,  they  are,  in  the  main,  to  such  a  degree 
in  the  ascendant,  that  the  charge  only  proves  how 
utterly  the  biographer  has,  in  fact,  failed  to  under- 
stand his  hero. 

1  Corresp.,  V.  318,  319. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  5 

Sure  enough,  Mirabeau  writes  himself  on  July 
17,  1790,  to  La  Marck  :  "If  one  has  not  more 
energy  and  does  not  dispose  of  more  means,  I 
shall  soon  be  forced  to  a  change  of  r81e  without 
a  change  of  will :  for  after  all  my  strength  is  my 
existence,  and  in  the  general  conflagration  I  must 
needs  employ  it  for  myself,  if  I  find  no  way  of 
applying  it  to  the  public  welfare."  ^  These  lines, 
however,  only  apparently  sustain  Lomenie's  accu- 
sation. If  properly  read,  they  are  a  striking  refu- 
tation of  it.  The  declaration,  that  in  future  he 
will  eventually  be  guided  by  his  personal  interests, 
manifestly  implies  the  assertion  that  this  has  thus 
far  not  been  the  case ;  and  this  declaration  is  a 
warning,  nay  a  threat,  provoked  by  deep  patriotic 
dismay,  because  the  king  had  once  more  so  piti- 
ably failed  to  improve  the  opportunities  offered 
three  days  before  by  the  Federation  festival. 
Besides,  the  emphasis  is  to  be  laid  on  the  assurance, 
that  his  will  is  not  to  change.  So  long  as  he 
lived  up  to  this  promise,  he  could  not  fail  to  find 
some  way  to  use  his  strength  for  the  public  wel- 
fare— if  no  longer  to  effect  any  positive  good,  at 
least  to  avert  greater  evils.  The  grain  of  truth, 
which  Lomenie's  assertion  contains  also  as  to  the 
'  Corresp.,  II.  102. 


6  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

period  of  the  revolution,  is  confined  to  the  confes- 
sion :  "  My  strength  is  my  existence."  Though 
liis  despondency  more  than  once  became  so  great, 
that  he  professed  to  be  longing  and  ready  to 
abandon  the  field,  he  never  could  have  done  it. 
So  long  as  things  could  become  Avorse  than  they 
were,  he  had  to  stay  in  the  thick  of  the  battle. 
With  him  it  could  be  ended  only  with  his  exist- 
ence— and  primarily,  not  because  patriotism  re- 
quired this  of  him,  but  because  his  strength  was 
his  existence.  His  father  was  right,  when  he 
wrote  as  early  as  1771  :  "  At  bottom  I  am  afraid, 
that  to  calm  him  down  and  to  extinguish  him 
would  amount  to  pretty  much  the  same  thing." 

As  Mr.  Lomenie  is  satisfied  that  personal  in- 
terest was  the  determining  element  in  Mirabeau's 
policy,  it  goes  without  saying  that  he,  like  most 
Frenchmen,  thinks  his  claim  to  greatness  rests 
principally  upon  his  eloquence.  Unquestionably, 
as  the  miraculous  lance  is  essential  to  the  Achilles 
of  the  poet,  so  his  oratorical  pre-eminence  is 
essential  to  the  historic  Mirabeau.  But  the 
oratorical  powers  of  the  Titan  of  the  first  period  of 
the  revolution,  no  more  constitute  this  Titan  than 
the  lance  of  Achilles  was  Achilles. 

Lomenie  feels  himself    that  Mirabeau  held  an 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  7 

absolutely  unique  position  in  the  Assembly,  and 
this  was  certainly  not  due  to  his  being  the  great- 
est of  its  orators.  Louis  Blanc  very  felicitously 
characterizes  this  unique  position.  He  closes 
the  description  of  the  three  main  party  groups, 
which  were  gradually  evolved  in  the  Assembly  by 
the  political  contest,  with  the  graphic  sentence : 
"  The  fourth  party  consisted  of  one  man,  Mira- 
beau." 

Yes,  and  he  not  only  was  a  party  by  himself, 
but  he  k7iew  beforehand  that  it  would  be  so,  and 
was  determined,  that  it  should  be  so.  He  writes, 
in  May,  1789  :  "  It  is  to  undertake  a  proud  and 
difficult  task  to  minister  to  the  public  welfare 
without  sparing  any  party,  without  worshipping 
the  idol  of  the  day,  without  other  arms  than 
reason  and  truth,  respecting  them  everywhere, 
respecting  nothing  but  them,  having  no  other 
friends  than  them,  no  other  enemies  than  their 
adversaries,  not  recognizing  another  monarch  than 
one's  conscience,  no  other  judge  than  time.  Well ! 
I  shall  perhaps  succumb  in  this  enterprise,  but  I 
shall  persist  in  it.  "  ^ 

This  being  the  lofty  task  he  intends  to  assume, 

'  "  Maisje  n'y  reciderai pas.'''  I  think  this  implies  more 
than  only  not  to  shrink  from  it. — Corresp.,  I.  349. 


8  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

it  could  not  be  personal  ambition  alone  that 
caused  him  to  write  to  his  father  immediately  after 
his  arrival  in  Provence  :  "  This  will  be  my  com- 
pass :  I  must  be  a  member  of  the  States-General." 
In  a  letter  to  Mauvillon  ^  he  states  his  other  con- 
sideration with  blunt  directness :  I  have  "  the 
presumption  to  believe  myself  useful  and  even 
necessary  to  them."  Necessary  in  the  strict  sense 
of  the  word,  and  he  says  with  the  same  blunt 
directness  why  so.  In  his  Note  of  June  20,  1790, 
he  urges  the  queen  to  force  Lafayette  to  conclude 
an  alliance  with  him,  by  telling  him  :  "  M.  de 
Mirabeau  is  the  only  statesman  of  this  country  ; 
no  one  else  has  his  e^isemble,  his  courage  and 
his  character."  ^  So  it  was.  Many  others  were — in 
a  high,  and  partly  even  in  a  higher  degree  than  he 
— endowed  with  this  or  that  quality  of  the  states- 
man, but  he  alone  was  a  statesman  in  the  full 
sense  of  the  word,  for  in  him  alone  all  the  re- 
quired qualities  were  combined,  and  of  the  most 
essential   ones  he  was   possessed    in    an  eminent 

1  Sept.  23,  1788.     Lettres  a  Mauvillon,  396. 

^  Corresp.,  II.  43.  To  Mauvillon  he  had  written :  "  Quand 
vous  aurez  lu  (the  papers  which  he  sends  him),  j'ose  dire  que 
votre  estime  redoublera,  et  que  vous  direz  :  Voild  enfln  un 
Frangais  qui  est  ne  avec  T&me,  la  tete  et  le  caractere  dliomme 
■public.'''' — Lettres  a  Mauvillon,  462. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  9 

degree.  Mr.  Stepliens  hits  the  nail  on  the  head  in 
saying :  "  He  was  essentially  a  practical  states- 
man, and  that  is  the  reason  why  his  character  is 
so  little  appreciated  by  Frenchmen."  ^ 

The  first  requirement  of  the  practical  statesman 
is  fully  to  understand  the  situation,  i.  e.,  to  base 
his  calculations  and  his  acts  completely  and  ex- 
clusively upon  the  stern  facts,  and  not  upon  what 
might  be  and  ought  to  be.  If  the  National 
Assembly  and  its  successors  were  wanting  in  any- 
thing it  was  this,  and  if  any  one  thing  can  be 
designated  as  the  main  root  of  the  follies,  crimes, 
and  disasters  of  the  revolution,  it  is  this.  Mirabeau 
did  not  need  the  painful  lessons  of  experience  to 
learn  this  truth,  and  to  realize  its  overshadowing 
import.  And  if  he  could  be  justly  charged  with 
inconsistency  in  every  other  respect,  unswerving 
and  relentless  consistency  characterizes  his  politi- 
cal career  in  the  application  of  this  truth.  Half 
a  3^ear  before  the  States-General  meet,  he  writes 
to  Mauvillon :  "  Three  roads  must  lead  us  to  the 
most  inalterable  indulgence  :  the  consciousness  of 
our  own  shortcomings,  the  discretion  which  is  afraid 
to  be  unjust,  and  the  desire  to  do  good,  which,  as  it 
cannot  recast  either  men  or  things,  must  try  to 
'  Hist,  of  the  Fr.  Rev.,  I.  430. 


10  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

derive  advantage  from  all  that  is,  as  it  is."  ^  And 
ere  the  organization  of  the  Assembly  is  effected, 
he  rebukes  Siej^es  and  warns  the  deputies  of  the 
third  estate,  saying :  "  There  is  this  essential 
difference  between  the  metaphysician,  who,  in  the 
meditation  of  the  study,  grasps  the  truth  in  its 
energetic  purity,  and  the  statesman  who  has  to 
take  into  account  the  antecedents,  the  difficulties, 
the  obstacles  ;  there  is,  I  say,  this  difference  be- 
tween the  instructor  of  the  people  and  the  political 
administrator,  that  the  one  thinks  exclusively  of 
ivhat  is,  and  the  other  occupies  himself  with  what 
can  6e."  2 

Now  what  was  the  situation  at  the  meeting  of 
the  States-General  ?  Its  determining  features  can 
be  stated  in  three  sentences.  A  revolution  was 
not  impending,  but  the  country  was  in  the  midst 
of  a  revolution ;  in  certain  directions  this  revolu- 
tion had  to  be   radical,  if  the  political  and  social 

'  Oct.  22,  1788.  Lettres  a  Mauvillon,  416.  In  the  same 
letter  he  says  :  "  En  verite,  dans  un  certain  sens  tout  m'est 
bon  ;  les  evenemens,  les  hommes,  les  choses,  les  opinions  ; 
tout  a  une  anse,  une  prise.  Je  deviens  trop  vieux  pour  user 
mon  reste  de  force  a  des  guerres  ;  je  veux  la  mettre  a  aider 
qui  aident.  .  .  N'exconimunions  personne  et  associons-nous 
a  quiconque  a  un  cote  sociable.  Mai  est  ee  qui  nuit,  Men  est 
ce  qui  sert.  Nous  devons  nous  garder  d'etre  ennemis  des 
autres  ecoles  ;  c'est  la  posterite  qui  marquera  les  rangs." 

2  CEuvres,  1.  237. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  11 

regeneration  of  the  commonwealth  was  to  be 
effected ;  if  proper  measures  were  not  taken  at 
once,  the  revolution  was  sure  to  rush  beyond  the 
proper  limits  and  thereby  itself  put  its  achieve- 
ments into  the  greatest  jeopardy.  From  the  out- 
set Mirabeau  consciously  plants  his  feet  firmly  and 
squarely  upon  these  three  basal  facts. 

As  to  the  first,  sufficient  proof  has  already  been 
adduced  by  some  quotations  I  had  to  give  in 
former  lectures.  In  a  few  minutes  I  shall  offer 
one  more. 

As  to  the  second,  he  wrote,  on  the  16th  of 
August,  1788,  to  Levrault :  ^  "  War  against  the  priv- 
ileged classes  and  against  privileges,  that  is  my 
device."  And  when,  in  January,  1789,  a  Paris 
paper  called  him  "  a  mad  dog,  upon  whom  the 
Provenpaux  could  not  bestow  the  slightest  confi- 
dence," he  replied :  "  If  I  am  a  mad  dog,  that  is 
an  excellent  reason  to  elect  me,  for  despotism 
and  privileges  will  die  of  my  bite."  ^  His  revolu- 
tionary programme  is  comprised  in  these  two  sen- 
tences. He  never  extended  it  beyond  them.  But 
from  the  first  it  was  perfectly  clear  to  him  that 
the  revolution  would  be  more  than  loth  to  stop 
there.  Malouet,  who  is  not  subject  to  the  suspi- 
'  Memoires,  V.  187-189.  •^  lb.,  V.  269. 


12  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

cion  of  being  biased  in  his  favor,  testifies  in  his 
Memoirs :  "  He  is  perhaps  the  only  one  in  the 
Assembly  who  has  seen  from  the  beginning  the 
revolution  in  its  true  spirit — that  of  a  total  subver- 
sion." Indeed,  from  the  beginning.  More  than 
four  months  before  the  meeting  of  the  States-Gen- 
eral, he  wrote  to  the  minister  Montmorin :  ^  "I,  as 
citizen,  tremble  for  the  royal  authority,  which  is 
more  than  ever  necessary  at  the  moment  that  it  is 
at  the  verge  of  its  ruin.  Never  was  a  crisis  more 
embarrassing  and  presented  more  pretexts  for 
license ;  never  was  a  coalition  of  the  privileged 
classes  so  menacing  to  the  king,  so  dangerous  to 
the  nation ;  never  did  a  national  Assembly 
threaten  to  be  so  stormy  as  that  which  is  going  to 
decide  the  fate  of  the  monarchy,  and  to  which  one 
comes  with  so  much  precipitation  and  mutual  dis- 
trust." 

Why  he  is  determined  to  wage  a  war  of  exter- 
mination upon  the  privileges  is  distinctly  stated 
in  the  before-mentioned  letter  to  Levrault  : 
"  The  privileges  are  useful  against  the  kings,  but 
they  are  detestable  against  the  nations,  and  ours 
will  never  have  any  public  spirit  as  long  as  it  is 
not  delivered  of  them.  For  this  reason  we  ought 
'  Dec.  28,  1788.     Corresp.,  I.  340. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  13 

to  remain,  and  I,  personally,  shall  be  very  monarch- 
ical.^ Ah,  forsooth,  what  would  a  republic  be, 
composed  of  all  the  aristocracies  that  gnaw  us  ? 
The  abode  of  the  most  active  tyranny." 

And  in  the  same  letter  he  states,  as  succinctly, 
why  he  confines  his  revolutionary  programme  to  a 
war  of  extermination  upon  the  privileges  and 
despotism.  "  Do  not  let  us  undertake  too  much. 
Concurrence  (of  the  States-General)  in  regard  to 
taxes  and  loans,  civil  liberty,  periodical  assemblies, 
those  are  three  capital  points  which  must  be  based 
upon  an  explicit  declaration  of  national  rights. 
The  rest  will  come  quick  enough." 

"  Do  not  let  us  undertake  too  much  !  "  In  Octo- 
ber, 1790,  he  writes  :  "  Because  the  Assembly  has 
got  stuck  fast  by  doing  too  much,  it  is  crushed  by 
the  ruins  it  has  heaped  up."  ^     And  in  December 

'  Je  vous  suppli  de  m'engager  envers  M.  de  Montmorin  (in 
soliciting  his  support  to  get  Mirabeavi  elected  to  the  States- 
General)  a  tout  ce  a  quoi  vous  vous  engageriez  vous-nieme  a 
ma  place,  et  a  rien  de  j)lus.  Je  puis  promettre  d'epargner 
I'individu  (Necker).  Je  ne  puis  pas  promettre  de  respecter 
ou  menager  d'autres  principes  que  les  miens.  Mais  ce  qui 
est  tres-vrai,  et  ce  qu'on  pent  croire,  c'est  qvie  je  serais  dans 
I'Assemblee  nationale  tres-zele  monarchiste,  parce  que  je 
sens  profondement  combien  nous  avons  besoin  de  tuer  le 
despotisme  ministeriel,  et  de  relever  I'autorite  royale." — 
Mirabeau,  Nov.  16,  1788,  to  the  Due  de  Lauzun. — Memoires, 
V.  200. 

^Corresp.,  I.  214. 


14  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

of  tlie  same  year  :  "  The  work  (of  the  Assembly) 
in  its  entirety  presents  to  the  eyes  of  the  observer 
only  an  inextricable  chaos,  in  which  the  legisla- 
tor has  lost  himself  by  doing  too  much."  ^  But 
it  did  not  take  him  until  the  fall  of  1790  to  see 
that  the  Assembly  realized  every  day,  more  and 
more,  what  he,  before  the  meeting  of  the  States- 
General,  perceived  to  be  the  greatest  danger. 
F]-om  the  first  moment  he  was  fully  aware  of  it, 
and  therefore  from  the  first  moment  he  threw  him- 
self with  equal  energy  into  the  two  antagonistic 
parts,  which  the  circumstances  compelled  him  to 
play  to  his  last  hour. 

He  was  universally  looked  upon  as  the  very  im- 
personation of  the  fierce  and  implacable  revolu- 
tionary spirit.  And  that  he  was — to  the  extent  of 
his  own  revolutionary  programme.  Irrevocably 
he  was  resolved  to  caviy  this  out  at  any  cost,  to 
break  down  at  any  risk  every  resistance  to  it,  from 
whatever  quarter  it  be  offered,  for  not  to  do  so 
was  Avith  him  to  renounce  with  full  consciousness 
the  regeneration  of  France  and  to  abandon  her  to 
her  fate.  It  was  he  who,  on  the  23d  of  June,  after 
the  stance  royale,  without  any  authority  from  his 
co-deputies,  dared  to  speak  in  their  name  and  tell 
1  Corresp.,  II.  443. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  15 

the  master  of  ceremonies,  that  the  order  of  the 
king  would  not  be  obeyed.  Whether  he  did  it  in 
the  exact  words  handed  down  by  tradition  is  a 
very  irrelevant  question,  of  importance  is  only  the 
incontestable  fact,  that  he  took  the  initiative  and 
forced  his  colleagues  to  the  alternative,  either  to 
cover  themselves  with  inextinguishable  shame  by 
shrinking  from  the  task  they  had  sworn  in  the 
tennis  court  to  fulfil,  or  to  challenge  the  govern- 
ment and  the  conservatives  of  the  upper  orders  to 
appeal  to  force.  And  when,  in  the  beginning  of 
July,  the  concentration  of  troops  around  Versailles 
and  Paris  indicates,  that  a  new  coup  d'etat  is  con- 
templated, it  is  again  he  that  steps  forward,  mov- 
ing an  address  to  the  king,  not  only  praying,  but 
also  warning  him  to  desist. 

"  Have  they  foreseen,  the  advisers  of  these 
measures,  have  they  foreseen,  what  consequences 
they  must  have  even  for  the  safety  of  the  throne  ? 
Have  they  studied  in  the  history  of  all  nations, 
how  the  revolutions  have  commenced,  how  they 
have  been  brought  about  ?  Have  they  observed 
by  what  a  pernicious  concatenation  of  circum- 
stances, the  most  moderate  minds  are  thrown  out 
of  the  bounds  of  all  moderation,  and  by  what  a 
terrible   impulse   an   intoxicated   people    plunges 


16  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

into  excesses,  the  first  idea  of  which  would  have 
made  it  tremble  ?  "  ^  And  with  a  lucidity,  which 
ought  to  have  carried  conviction  even  to  the  dull 
intellect  of  Louis  XVI.,  he  states  the  reason  why 
the  crown  would  stake  its  very  existence  in  an 
attempt  to  prevent  the  Assembly  from  carrying 
out  his  programme. 

"  How  can  the  people  fail  to  become  agitated,  if 
one  awakens  its  apprehensions  in  regard  to  the 
only  hope  that  is  still  left  to  it?  Does  it  not 
know  that,  if  we  do  not  break  its  chains,  we  shall 
have  rendered  them  heavier,  we  shall  have  riveted 
oppression,  unshielded  we  shall  have  delivered 
our  fellow-citizens  to  the  pitiless  rod  of  their 
enemies,  we  shall  have  increased  the  insolence  of 
the  triumph  of  those  who  rob  and  insult  them  ?  " 
So  it  unquestionably  was ;  and  therefore  no  choice 
was  left  to  the  Assembly.  If  the  government 
once  more  threw  the  glove  into  its  face,  it  had 
to  pick  it  up  and  fight  to  the  bitter  end,  or  the 
people  w^ould  put  their  heel  upon  it  as  upon  the 
government. 

That  people,  who  were  too  obtuse  or  too  much 
enwrapped  in  their  passions  to  realize  the  force 
of  these  arguments,  did  not  see  that  his  left  was 
1  CEuvres,  I.  305. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  lY 

reining  in  as  strongly  as  his  right  vigorously 
applied  the  lash,  can  hardly  astonish  one.  Still 
it  was  quite  as  patent.  From  the  first  hour,  he 
sets  himself  with  all  his  strength  against  every- 
thing that  goes  beyond  his  own  programme. 

Even  his  colleagues  of  the  third  estate  appre- 
hend that  "  he  will  ruin  the  public  cause  by 
excess  of  zeal ;  "  ^  and  it  is  he  who  keeps  them 
down  to  the  policy  of  "  masterly  inactivity." 
"  The  impetuosity  of  this  incendiary,"  he  writes, 
referring  to  himself,  "  has  produced  what  ? — The 
doing-nothing  of  the  commoners  who,  if  they  had 
done  anything  before  having  a  plan,  accord, 
cohesion  (de  V ensemble),  harmony,  would  have 
got  stuck  fast  at  every  step,  become  the  laughing- 
stock of  Europe,  the  scourge  of  the  realm,  im- 
potent as  to  everything  except  to  do  harm."  ^ 
Not  for  a  moment  does  the  idea  enter  his  head, 
that  the  commoners  should  confine  themselves  to 
passive  resistance,  but  he  sees  that  everything 
would  be  lost  by  precipitation.  "  In  a  word,"  he 
concludes  the  sentence  just  quoted,  "  they  would 
have  left  the  government  no  resource  but  their 
dissolution."  On  the  18th  of  May,  he  presents 
both  sides  of  the  question  with  equal  clearness. 

'  Lettres  a  Mauvillon,  463,  sq.  '^  Corresp.,  I.  349. 

2 


18  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

"  Let  us  not  encourage  the  intriguers,  not  expose 
the  weak  ones,  not  lead  astray,  not  alarm  public 
opinion,  let  us  go  ahead  with  provident  circum- 
spection, but  let  us  go  ahead."  ^ 

The  government  at  once  furnished  him  an 
opportunity,  pointedly  to  call  attention  to  the  fact, 
that  such  "  provident  circumspection  "  implied  the 
imperative  necessity,  not  to  identify  the  king  with 
the  government.  With  a  view  towards  initiating, 
promoting,  and  directing  the  crystallization  of  the 
unconnected  particles  constituting  the  States- 
General,  he  undertook  the  publication  of  a  jDaper, 
called  Etats  Creneraux.  Prompted  by  its  hatred 
and  fear  of  him,  the  government  at  once  suppressed 
it.  In  a  letter  to  his  constituents  he  fiercely  de- 
nounced the  order.  "After  a  deceitful,  crafty 
toleration,"  he  exclaims,  "  a  cabinet,  pretending 
to  have  the  cause  of  the  people  at  heart,  has  the 
hardihood  to  seal  up  our  thoughts,  to  grant  free- 
trade  to  lies,  and  to  forbid  as  contraband  the 
necessary  export  of  truth."  ^  But  at  the  same 
time  he  says  :  "  Everybody  knows  to-day,  that 
such  false  measures  proceed  at  the  most  from  the 
cabinet ;  that  the  king  has  no  part  in  them."     As 

'  CEuvres,  I.  191. 

■^  Ire  lettre  du  comte  de  Mirabeau  a  ses  commettans,  p.  5. 


THE   FRENCH   EEVOLUTION.  19 

yet,  the  attitude  of  public  opinion  towards  him  was 
such,  that  the  incident  excited  comparatively  l)ut 
little  indignation,  because  it  was  he  that  had  been 
struck.  But,  although  he  again  and  again  re- 
peated the  warning,  neither  public  opinion  nor 
the  Assembly  ever  learned  to  understand  that,  if 
France  was  to  remain  a  monarchy,  it  was  indis- 
pensable thus  to  distinguish  between  the  king  and 
the  government. 

When  he,  like  the  other  deputies  of  the  third 
estate,  is  of  opinion  that  the  time  for  action  has 
come,  he  still  insists,  and  even  more  emphatically 
than  before,  that  one  must  proceed  with  painfully 
discreet  circumspection.  "  All  conciliatory  means 
are  exhausted,"  he  says,  on  the  15th  of  June,  "  all 
conferences  are  at  an  end  ;  we  can  only  take  de- 
cisive and  perhaps  extreme  resolutions.  .  .  Ex- 
treme !  Oh,  no,  gentlemen,  justice  and  truth  are 
always  in  a  wise  medium ;  extreme  resolutions 
are  always  but  the  last  resources  of  despair ;  and 
who  could  reduce  the  French  people  to  such  a 
situation  ?  "  ^  "  Our  course,"  he  says,  "  must  be 
equally  judicious,  legal  and  graduated."  ^ 

Legal !  The  impetuous  tribune,  whom  the 
father  appropriately  called  ^'  Monsieur  I'Ouragan," 
1  GEuvres,  I.  223.  "■  lb.,  I.  228, 


20  THE   FREXCH   REVOLUTION. 

Mr.  Cyclone,  pleads  for  legality,  and  lie  is  in  dead 
earnest  about  it.  As  the  upper  orders  persist  in 
refusing  to  join  the  third  estate,  he  urges  the 
deputies  to  proceed  alone,  but  to  remain  scrupu- 
lously within  the  bounds  of  legality  in  constituting 
themselves.  Therefore  he  entreats  them :  "  Do 
not  assume  a  name  that  frightens.  Devise  one 
that  cannot  be  contested,  which,  milder  and  not 
less  imposing  in  its  plentitude,  is  adapted  to  all 
times,  is  susceptible  of  all  the  developments  which 
the  events  will  put  within  your  reach."  ^  There- 
fore he  insists  that,  whatever  name  be  chosen,  the 
sanctions  of  the  king  cannot  be  dispensed  with. 
Therefore  he  contends  with  all  his  might  against 
the  third  estate  alone,  calling  itself  "  National 
Assembly,"  before  having  been  joined  by  the 
upper  orders,  for  there  is  a  tremendous  force  in 
names — this  name  ignores  the  existence  of  the 
upper  orders,  which  is  not  merely  a  fact,^  but  also 
the  law  of  the  land — therefore  its  assumption  at 
this  juncture  virtually  subverts  the  existing  legal 
order  of  things  and  passes  with  the  ploughshare 
over  it — by  a  purely  revolutionary  act  it  radically 
and  by  principle  severs,  in  regard  to  questions  of 
the  greatest  moment,  the  present  and  the  future 
1  GEuvres,  I.  227.  -  lb.,  I.  244 


THE   FRENCH    REVOLUTION.  21 

from  the  past.  He  suffered  his  first  portentous 
defeat,  not  because  the  third  estate  intended  to 
plunge  into  a  radical  revolution,  but  because  he 
had  spoken  a  language  as  unintelligible  to  most  of 
the  deputies  as  if  it  had  been  a  foreign  idiom. 

When  clergy  and  nobility,  partly  upon  a  direct 
order  of  the  king,  had  joined  the  Assembly,  this 
was  considered  irrefutable  proof  that  he  had 
seen  spectres  in  broad  daylight.  His  lips  dis- 
covered a  bitter  drop  in  the  sweet  cup  of  universal 
rejoicing.  "  The  23d  of  June,"  he  said,  "  has 
made  upon  this  people — agitated  and  suffering — 
an  impression  the  consequences  of  which  I  fear. 
Where  the  representatives  of  the  nation  saw  only 
an  error,  the  people  believed  to  see  a  conscious 
purpose  to  attack  their  rights  and  powers."  ^ 
When  the  urgent  remonstrances  against  the  con- 
centration of  troops  were  cast  to  the  winds  by  the 
government,  and  Necker  was  dismissed,  the  people 
proved  that  Mirabeau  had  read  their  minds  cor- 
rectly. They  rose  in  open  rebellion,  stormed  the 
Bastille,  and,  after  the  victory,  soiled  their  hands 
by  a  number  of  atrocious  murders.  Mirabeau 
bluntly  told  the  government  and  its  instigators, 
that  they  were  "only  harvesting  the  fruits  of 
1  Oiuvres,  I.  363. 


22  THE   FRENCH  REVOLUTION. 

their  own  iniquities.  One  despises  the  people 
and  wants  it  to  be  always  mild,  always  impassible ! 
No ;  here  is  a  moral  to  be  derived  from  these  sad 
events ;  the  injustice  of  the  other  classes  towards 
the  people  lets  it  find  justice  even  in  its  barbar- 
ism." But  again  with  the  same  intrepidity  he 
exposes  also  the  other  side  of  the  picture  to  the 
light.  "I  make  haste  to  say  that  the  whole 
National  Assemblj^  has  well  felt  that  the  continua- 
tion of  this  fearful  dictatorship  exposes  public 
liberty  as  much  as  the  plots  of  its  enemies.  So- 
ciety would  soon  he  dissolved  if  the  multitude,  get- 
ting accustomed  to  blood  and  disorder,  would  put 
itself  above  the  magistrates  and  bid  defiance  to 
the  authority  of  the  laws;  instead  of  marching 
towards  liberty,  the  people  would  soon  throw 
themselves  into  the  abyss  of  servitude  ;  for  but 
too  often  danger  causes  men  to  rally  round  the 
flag  of  absolutism,  and  in  the  midst  of  anarchy 
even  a  despot  appears  a  saviour."  ^  The  end  of  the 
story  of  the  revolution  gives  no  doubtful  answer 

'  CEuvres,  I.  349.  A  few  weeks  later  he  writes  :  "Qui  ne  le 
sait  pas  ?  le  passage  du  mal  au  bien  est  souvent  plus  terrible 
que  le  mal  lui-meme:  1' insubordination  du  peuple  entraine  des 
exces  affreux  ;  en  voulant  adoucir  ses  maux,  il  les  augmente; 
en  refusant  de  payer,  il  s'appauvrit ;  en  suspendant  ses  tra- 
vaux,  il  prepare  vine  nouvelle  famine." — Courrier  de  Pro- 
vence, No.  23,  3d  to  5th  of  Aug.,  1789. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  23 

to  the  question,  whether  he  was  right  or  not. 
Others  were  as  deeply  impressed  by  this  side  of 
the  picture.  After  the  brutal  murder  of  Toulon 
and  Berthier  by  the  populace,  Lally-Tollendal 
moved  that  the  Assembly  put  a  stop  to  the  horrors 
by  issuing  a  proclamation  to  the  people.  Mira- 
beau  commenced  his  comments  upon  the  motion 
with  the  enunciation  of  the  weighty  truth : 
"  Small  means  would  uselessly  comprom-ise  the 
dignity  of  the  Assembly.''  ^  It  was  but  another 
formulation  of  Washington's  well-known  senten- 
tious remark  :  "  Influence  is  not  government." 

One  of  the  main  causes  of  the  disastrous  devel- 
opment of  the  revolution  was  that  the  Assembly 
utterly  failed  to  comprehend  this  all-important 
truism.  Mirabeau  never  lost  sight  of  it  for  a 
single  moment,  and  he  fully  understood  that  the 
maintenance  of  a  real  arid  strong  government 
was  quite  as  much  as  a  revolution,  a  si7ie  qua 
non,  for  the  regeneration  of  France.  Therefore 
he  opposed  Lafayette's  motion  to  commence  the 
work  of  reconstruction  by  formulating  a  declara- 
tion of  the  rights  of  man.  "  The  statesman,"  he 
says,  "  furnishes  arms  to  the  people  only  in  teach- 
ing it  to  use  them,  for  fear  that  in  a  first  fit  of 
'  CEuvres,  I.  342. 


24  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

intoxication  it  might  rush  into  horrors,  turn  them 
against  itself,  and  then  cast  them  away  with  as 
much  remorse  as  fright.  Therefore  it  is  abso- 
lutely necessary  that  a  declaration  of  rights  do 
not  precede  the  constitution  of  which  it  is  the 
basis,  in  order  that  the  principles  of  liberty,  ac- 
companied by  the  laws  which  are  to  direct  its 
exercise,  be  a  benefit  to  the  people  and  not  a 
snare  and  a  torment."  ^  Again  he  was  defeated, 
and  again  the  course  of  events  is  one  uninter- 
rupted succession  of  stunning  proofs  that  he  was 
right,  if  ever  a  statesman  was. 

He  was  capable  of  looking  beyond  the  day,  and 
his  eye  pierced  through  the  most  dazzling  and 
seductive  appearances  to  the  sober  and  harsh 
essence  of  things.  Therefore  he,  who  has  sworn 
that  privileges  shall  die  of  his  bite,  calls  the 
famous  night  of  the  4th  of  August,  which  at 
one  stroke  shattered  feudalism  in  France,  "  an 
orgy."  "  There  you  have  our  Frenchmen,"  he 
says  in  bitter  irony ;  "  here  they  have  been  " 
— alluding  to  the  discussion  on  the  rights  of 
man — "  a  whole  month  disputing  over  syllables, 
and  in  one  night  they  subvert  the  whole  old 
order  of  the  monarchy."  He  was  not  recreant 
1  Courrier  de  Provence,  No.  28. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  25 

to  the  faith  he  had  professed  for  many  years, 
but  he  reproved  the  Assembly  for  acting  as  if 
it  thought  the  arduous  work  of  the  political  and 
social  reconstruction  of  a  great  state  could  be 
done  to  advantage  in  the  spirit  of  a  crowd  of  half- 
grown  girls,  carried  away  by  a  sudden  paroxysm 
of  enthusiasm.  "  If  one  had  properly  discussed 
the  propositions,"  he  writes  to  his  uncle,^  "  one 
would  have  destroyed  less,  but  susceptibilities 
would  have  been  excited  in  a  less  degree ;  every 
party  would  have  regained,  by  the  fusion  of  minds, 
what  it  would  have  lost  by  sacrifices ;  one  would 
at  least  have  avoided  the  danger  of  crushing 
under  a  heap  of  ruins  the  nascent  edifice  of 
liberty." 

There  is  in  the  utterances  I  have  mentioned — 
and  if  time  allowed  I  could  add  an  almost  infinite 
number  of  similar  character — something  that  is 
common  to  all  of  them.  He  does  not  strive — and 
that  is  the  second  indispensable  requirement  for  a 
true  statesman — for  what  is  in  itself  desirable,  but 
confines  himself  to  what  will  be,  under  the  given 
circumstances,  a  real  achievement,  because  it  does 
not  go  beyond  what  is  adapted  to  the  times  and 
the  people.  In  other  words :  Mirabeau  wants  a 
'  Oct.  25,  1789.     Menioires,  VI.  176-181. 


26  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

revolution  only  so  far,  and  in  such  a  way,  tliat  it 
can  and  will  result  in  a  reform,  and  lie  fully 
understands  that  to  determine  what  will  con- 
stitute a  genuine  reform  one  has  to  ascertain 
not  only  what  needs  reforming,  but  also  how 
far  the  capacity  for  reform  goes.  Whatever  lies 
beyond  the  limits  of  this  capacity,  must  neces- 
sarily work  harm,  though  it  be  ever  so  unques- 
tionably a  reform  if  considered  independently  of 
the  given  circumstances. 

Now  we  have  seen  what  the  ancien  regime  had 
made  of  the  people.  If  this  be  kept  in  view,  it  is 
patent  that  the  capacity  for  reform  was,  of  neces- 
sity, as  limited  ^  as  the  need  of  it  was  boundless  ; 


'  It  is  this  basal  fact  which  so  many  people  still  fail  to 
understand.  The  National  Assembly  could  enact  any  laws, 
but  its  fiat  could  not  render  the  people  over  night  fit  for  the 
laws  it  enacted.  Mirabeau  writes  :  ' '  Nous  perirons  par  la 
partie  honteuse  des  finances,  nous  et  notre  magnifique  revo- 
lution, si  nous  ne  nous  resolvons  pas  a  circonscrire  rigou- 
reusement  ce  que  nous  pouvons.  .  .  .  Cependant  changez 
votre  systeme  d'impots,  et  laissez  a  I'industrie  et  au  com- 
merce, abandonnes  au  regime  de  la  liberte,  a  reparer  les 
plaies  de  la  fiscalites  et  a  fournir  des  moyens  de  reconstitvier 
et  d'amortir  votre  dette,  et  vous  verrez  ce  que  deviendra  en 
quinze  ans  votre  empire  frangais  constitue.  Je  dis  quinze 
ans,  parce  que  rien  ne  prendra  de  veritable  racine  que  par 
vm  bon  systeme  d'education  publique,  et  certainement  il 
faut  au  moins  quinze  ans  pour  planter  des  hommes  nou- 
veaux." — Lettres  a  Mauvillon,  504. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTIOX.  27 

for,  as  Mirabeau  said,  "  Liberty  never  was  the  fruit 
of  a  doctrine  elaborated  by  philosophical  deduc- 
tions, but  of  every-day  experience  and  the  simple 
reasonings  elicited  by  the  facts."  Therefore, 
whatever  broke  loose  from  the  past  in  such  a  way 
as  completely  to  cut  the  ligaments  of  historical 
continuit}^,  went  necessarily  too  far.  This  tlie 
revolution  utterly  failed  to  understand,  and  to 
Mirabeau  this  was  from  the  outset  a  self-evident 
truth.  "We  are  not  savages,"  he  said,  "  coming 
naked  from  the  shores  of  the  Orinoco  to  form  a 
society.  We  are  an  old  nation,  and  undoubtedly 
too  old  for  our  epoch.  We  have  a  pre-existing  gov- 
ernment, a  pre-existing  king,  pre-existing  preju- 
dices. As  far  as  possible  one  must  adapt  the  things 
to  the  revolution  and  avoid  abruptness  of  transi- 
tion." 2  From  the  beginning  this  was  the  very  basal 
idea  of  his  policy.  As  early  as  the  16th  of  June, 
the  day  on  which  the  third  estate  constituted 
itself  as  National  Assembly,  he  writes  to  Mauvil- 
lon :  "  The  fermentation  is  prodigious,  and  one  is 
irritated  that  I  am  always  with  the  moderates.  .  . 
It  is  certain  that  the  nation  is  not  mature.  The 
excessive  inexperience,  the  terrible  derangement 
of  the  government  have  put  the  revolution 
'  CEuvres,  11.  18.  '  lb.,  il.  U8. 


28  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

into  a  hot-house.  It  has  gone  beyond  our  apti- 
tude and  instruction.  I  conduct  myself  accord- 
ingly."  1 

There  are,  however,  very  different  types  of 
moderates.  Not  only  in  the  Constituent,  but  also 
in  the  Legislative  Assembly,  and  even  in  the  Con- 
vention, the  majority — measuring  with  the  stand- 
ard of  the  times — were  moderates,  and  yet  the 
greatest  responsibility  for  the  disasters  of  the 
revolution  rests  in  a  way  upon  them,  because  they 
were  only  moderates  in  a  general  kind  of  way  and 
therefore  ever  liable  to  be  completely  swayed  by 
the  impulse  of  the  moment,  thereby  themselves 
forging  the  fetters,  with  which  the  radical  minority 
chained  them  to  their  chariot.  Mirabeau's  modera- 
tion bore  no  more  resemblance  to  this  kind  of 
moderation  than  the  granite  rock  resembles  the 
quicksand.  It  rested  upon  a  simple  notion,  which, 
with  him,  was  an  unshakable  conviction.  What- 
ever, according  to  the  logic  of  facts,  followed  from 
these  premises,  implicitly  imposed  moderation 
upon  him  and,  at  the  same  time,  fixed  the  limits 
of  it,  provided  always  that  the  superior  consid- 
eration of  carrying  out  his  own  revolutionary  pro- 
gramme did  not  force  him,  against  his  will,  tem- 
1  Lomenie,  IV.  280. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  29 

porarily  and   in   regard  to  specific  questions,   to 
disregard  its  behests. 

"  When,"  he  said,  on  the  7th  of  August,  1789, 
"  the  royal  prerogative,  that  is  to  say,  as  I  shall 
show  in  due  time,  the  most  precious  possession  of 
the  people  is  discussed,  one  will  see  whether  I 
know  the  extent  of  it.  Ah,  I  defy  beforehand  the 
most  respectable  of  my  colleagues  to  surpass  the 
religious  respect  in  which  I  hold  it."  ^  Nothing 
is  to  make  him  swerve  by  a  hair's-breadth  from 
fulfilling  to  the  letter  his  promise,  that  despotism 
and  absolutism  shall  die  from  his  bite ;  but  never- 
theless the  ceterum  censeo  of  the  arch-revolutionist 
is,  that  the  royal  prerogative  must  be  maintained, 
not  only  in  form,  but  also  in  substance  and  as  an 
all-permeating  fact.  For  if  anything  is  clear  to 
him  it  is  this,  that,  while  the  French  people  never 
can  dispense  with  a  strong  government,  they  now 
stand  more  than  ever  in  need  of  it,  partly  because 
everything  is  in  a  state  of  disintegration  and  dis- 
solution, and  partly  because,  more  than  by  any- 
thing else,  the  issuing  of  the  revolution  in  a  reform 
is  imperilled  by  the  danger  that  all  powers  will  be 
usurped  by  the  National  Assembly.  In  the  great 
debate  on  the  question,  what  name  the  deputies  of 

1  CEuvres,  I.  385. 


30  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTIOX. 

tlie  third  estate  should  assume  in  constituting 
themselves,  he  replies  to  Thouret :  "  He  answers 
to  what  I  have  said  on  the  necessity  of  the  royal 
approval,  that  he  does  not  deem  it  necessary  when 
the  people  have  spoken.  And  I,  gentlemen,  be- 
lieve the  royal  veto  to  such  a  degree  necessary 
that  I  should  rather  live  at  Constantinople  than  in 
France,  if  he  were  not  to  have  it ;  yes,  I  declare 
that  I  should  know  nothing  more  terrible  than  the 
sovereign  aristocracy  of  six  hundred  persons,  who 
could  render  themselves  to-morrow  irremovable, 
the  day  after  to-morrow  hereditary,  and  would 
end,  as  the  aristocracies  of  all  the  countries  of 
the  world,  by  encroaching  upon  everything."  ^ 
"  Here,"  says  Ludwig  HtBusser,  "  the  history  of 
the  Convention  is  written  in  three  sentences." 
Indeed,  the  worst  form  of  absolutism  is  that  exer- 
cised by  a  numerous  assembly  claiming  to  be  in- 
vested with  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  and,  con- 
sequently, arrogating  to  itself  all  governmental 
powers,  including  the  judicial,  the  executive, 
and  the  constituent.  This  holds  good  for  all  times 
and  all  peoples.  And  in  France  it  had  necessarily 
to  come  to  this,  unless  the  royal  prerogative  was 
maintained,  for  according  to  the  whole  historical 
1  CEuvres,  I.  243. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  31 

evolution,  and  according  to  the  habits  and  customs 
of  the  people,  which  are  a  stronger  force  than  even 
the  law,  there  was  for  the  time  being  but  the  al- 
ternative :  either  to  have  no  strong  government,  or 
to  let  it  rest  with  the  king. 

That  is  the  reason  why  Mirabeau  was  deter- 
mined from  the  outset  to  be  "  very  monarchical," 
and  why  he  unflinchingly  stuck  to  this  resolution 
to  the  last.  He  was  simply  in  an  eminent  degree 
possessed  also  of  the  third  indispensable  quality  of 
the  true  statesman :  he  understands  that  only 
what  can  Ije  effected  with  the  means  already 
existing  or  capable  of  being  created  is  attainable. 
Therefore  he  sees  his  task  in  ascertaining  what 
these  are  and  making  the  best  of  them,  without 
stopping  to  ask  whether  thc}^  are  what  he  would 
like  them  to  be,  or  starting  with  laying  down  a 
policy  at  the  risk  of  finding  out,  when  it  is  too 
late,  that  it  cannot  be  carried  out,  because  the 
means  required  for  it  are  not  procurable.  "  One 
must  accommodate  oneself  to  the  circumstances, 
and  use  the  instruments  which  fate  has  given  us,"  ^ 
he  said  on  the  15th  of  June. 

Of  all  the  circumstances  by  far  the  most  impor- 
tant, however,  was  that,  if  left  to  itself,  this 
1  CEuvres,  I.  224. 


32  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

Assembly  would  inevitably  drift  under  the  propel- 
ling influences  of  the  other  circumstances  into 
such  a  condition  that,  as  he  said  on  the  27th  of 
June,  ^  "  the  representatives  of  the  nation  would 
no  more  be  the  masters  of  their  movements  .  .  . 
and  would  be  reduced  to  the  worst  of  all  calami- 
ties, that  of  having  only  the  choice  between  mis- 
takes," until  they  finally  became  "  a  legislative 
body  .  .  .  which  does  everything,  except  what  it 
ought  to  do." 

There  was  only  one  way  to  prevent  this :  the 
government  had  to  take  the  lead.  This  also  was 
perfectly  clear  to  Mirabeau  even  before  the  States- 
General  met.  In  the  remarkable  letter  of  Decem- 
ber 28,  1788,  to  Montmorin,  which  I  quoted  be- 
fore, he  says :  "  Does  the  cabinet,  which  has  rushed 
into  this  fatal  defile  by  trying  to  postpone  the 
convening  of  the  States-General  instead  of  getting 
ready  for  them,  occupy  itself  with  the  means  how 
not  to  have  to  fear  their  control,  or  rather  to  ren- 
der their  co-operation  useful  ?  Has  it  a  fixed  and 
solid  plan,  which  the  representatives  of  the  nation 
would  only  have  to  sanction  ? 

"  Well,  I  have  this  plan,  Count.  It  is  connected 
with  that  of  a  constitution  which  would  save  us 
1  CEuvres,  I.  266. 


THE   FRENCH  REVOLUTION.  33 

from  the  plots  of  the  aristocracy,  from  the  excesses 
of  democracy,  from  the  profound  anarchy,  into 
which  the  government,  by  wanting  to  be  absolute, 
has  plunged  with  us."  ^ 

Impudent  fool !  He,  upon  whose  garments  the 
dust  and  mould  of  half  the  state  prisons  lay  thick, 
daring  to  volunteer  his  advice  to  the  government ! 
He  had  the  effrontery  to  renew  the  attempt,  ^  when 
the  States-General  had  met,  requesting  Malouet 
to  act  as  mediator  between  him  and  the  ministers. 
Malouet  thus  tells  the  story  of  his  interview  with 
him.  "  I  distrusted  him  as  much  as  I  was  preju- 
diced agfainst  him.  I  thoucfht  him  one  of  the 
most  dangerous  innovators,  and  therefore  I  was 
very  much  astonished  by  his  dehut  with  me.  '  I 
have  desired  an  interview  with  you,'  he  said, 
'  because  I  see  that  with  all  your  moderation  you 
are  a  friend  of  liberty,  and  because  I  am,  perhaps 
even  more  than  you,  alarmed  by  the  fermentation 
I  see  in  the  heads,  and  by  the  calamities  to  which 
it  may  lead.  I  am  not  the  man  to  sell  myself 
ignominiously  to  despotism ;  I  want  a  free,  but 
monarchical  constitution,  I  do  not  want  to  under- 
mine the  monarchy,  and  if  measures  be  not  taken 
betimes,  I  see  so  many  giddy  heads  in  this  Assem- 

•  Corresp.,  I.  341.  ^  In  the  last  days  of  May. 

3 


34  THE   FEENCH   EEVOLUTION. 

bly,  so  much  inexperience  and  exaltation,  and  in 
the  privileged  orders  such  inconsiderate  acrimony 
and  resistance,  that  I  apprehend,  with  you,  terrible 
commotions.  I  appeal  to  your  uprightness  ;  you 
are  in  touch  with  Necker  and  Montmorin,  you 
must  know  what  their  intentions  are  and  whether 
they  have  any  programme  at  all.  If  this  pro- 
gramme is  sensible,  I  shall  defend  it."  Mont- 
morin peremptorily  declined  to  see  him,  Necker 
reluctantly  consented,  but  received  him  with 
haughty  rigidity,  as  if  the  count  was  a  lackey, 
obsequiously  soliciting  to  be  taken  into  the  service 
of  the  gracious  lord.  That  was  just  the  right 
tone  to  assume  towards  a  Mirabeau.  A  cutting 
remark,  turning  on  his  heel  and  leaving  the  room 
was  the  work  of  a  minute.  Mirabeau  told 
Malouet :  "  Your  man  is  a  dunce ;  he  shall  yet 
hear  from  me." 

We  do  not  know  the  details  of  the  plan,  which 
the  ministers  refused  to  receive,  but  the  leading- 
idea  of  it  is  clearly  indicated  in  the  letter  to 
Montmorin,  and  his  subsequent  speeches  and 
writings  are  a  running  commentary  upon  it.  Tlie 
government,  which  has  already  virtually  renounced 
absolutism  by  convening  the  States-General,  shall 
unite  with  them  in  destroying  the  privileges  and 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTIOX.  35 

establishing  a  moderately  liberal  constitutional 
monarchy,  governed  in  ever}^  respect  by  law,  and 
only  by  law.  "  This  coalition  between  the  executive 
and  legislative  power,  without  which  a  state  like 
France  cannot  last,  without  which  an  ever  stormy 
liberty  leaves  only  the  alternative  between  des- 
potism and  anarchy."  ^  That  he  repeats  again  and 
again  in  innumerable  variations.  Upon  this  un- 
questionabl}^  everything  ultimately  depended. 
But  no  more  liopeless  task  could  be  conceived  than 
to  make  either  the  people,  the  Assembly,  or  the 
court  understand  just  this.  As  to  the  two  former 
he  says :  "  There  is  no  power  that  does  not  go  too 
far,  when  it  throws  off  oppression  and  dictates  the 
law  after  the  victory.  In  the  heat  of  discontent 
one  hardly  thinks  that  one  can  give  sufificient 
extent  to  one's  means  and  erect  enough  barriers 
asrainst  one's  adversaries,  and  at  the  return  of  the 
calm  one  perceives  that  one  has  been  betrayed  into 
imprudence  by  fear."  ^  And :  "  Victim  of  the 
evil,  the  nation  has  only  been  struck  by  the 
necessity  of  preventing  its  return  ;  and  its  rep- 
resentatives, in  the  midst  of  the  crisis,  have  taken 


'  Corresp.,  I.  380. 

'^  Nouveau  coup  d'ceil  sin*  la  sanction  royale. — INIemoires, 
VI.  435. 


36  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

all  at  once  all  the  measures  suggested  to  them  by 
a  too  just  resentment,  and  one  experience  which 
was  not  counterbalanced  by  any  other."  ^  He, 
however,  through  all  mutations,  held  immovably 
aloft  as  the  banner  around  which  all  true  patriots 
must  rally  to  avert  utter  ruin,  the  principle  of  an 
honest  and  close  alliance  between  the  executive 
and  the  legislative  powers." 

No  mean  courage  was  required  to  do  this,  for 
every  day  the  people  and  the  Assembly  more 
implicitly  recognized  as  an  axiomatic  truth  which 
only  irredeemable  fools  and  conscious  knaves  could 
contest,  Mably's  doctrine  :  "  Every  legislator  must 
start  from  the  principle  that  the  executive  power 
has  been,  is,  and  will  be  unto  eternity  the  enemy  of 
the  legislative  power."  If  so,  then  Mirabeau,  as 
nobody  could  take  him  for  a  fool,  evidently  was  a 
conscious  knave  and  a  traitor  in  addition,  and 
more  than  one  gory  head  told  what  fate  might  be 
in  store  for  a  man  on  whose  forehead  the  populace 
was  made  to  see  this  double  brand.  More  than 
once  Mirabeau  was  told  that  his  past  services  to  the 
revolution  only  rendered  his  crime  more  unpardon- 
able, and  not  a  few  considered  it  a  crime  in  the 
fullest  sense  of  the  word,  because  he  did  not 
1  lb.,  Memoires,  VI.  434. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  3Y 

confine  himself  to  preaching  the  alliance  between 
the  two  powers  as  the  correct  doctrine,  but  insisted 
upon  its  being  consistently  applied  and  even  dared, 
when  its  proper  apf)lication  seemed  to  him  to 
require  it,  to  champion  openly  the  executive 
against  the  legislative.  Marat  demanded  that  the 
highest  among  all  the  gallows,  which  he  wanted  to 
have  erected,  be  assigned  to  the  "  accursed  "  Mira- 
beau.  But  if  he  was  not  the  man  "  to  sell  himself 
ignominiously  to  despotism,"  he  was  no  more  the 
man  to  be  cowed  ignominiously  by  the  clamoring 
of  the  populace  and  its  demagogical  leaders.  If 
there  was  a  man  in  the  Assembly  who  was 
possessed  of  the  fourth  indispensable  quality  of 
the  true  statesman,  courage,  then  it  was  he.  He 
himself  repeatedly  and  emphatically  asserts  it,^ 
and  his  father  fully  endorses  him  in  this  respect. 
"  Since  Caesar,"  as  his  father  wrote  in  1782, 
"there  never  was  such  audacity  and  temerity." 
One  scene  will  suffice  to  show  whether  there  was 
truth  in  the  assertion.  He  is  stubbornl}^  contend- 
ing for  the  royal  prerogative  in  regard  to  the 
right  of   peace  and  war.     The  enraged  Jacobins 

1  On  the  24th  of  April,  1789,  he  writes  to  Montniorin  : 
"  Uaucun  mortel,  en  dignite  ou  non,  la  menace  envers  moi 
nepeut  avoir  ni  grdce,  ni  convenance." — Corresp.,  I.  347. 


38  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

are  determined  to  carry  their  point  at  whatever 
cost.  A  vast  excited  crowd  is  collected  before  the 
hall  of  the  Assembly,  listening  eagerly  to  the 
reading  of  an  article  bearing  the  significant  title  : 
"  The  great  treason  of  Count  Mirabeau  disclosed." 
Two  sentences  will  abundantly  characterize  it. 
"  Take  care  that  the  people  do  not  pour  gold,  the 
burning  nectar,  into  thy  viper's  gullet  to  quench 
forever  the  thirst  for  it  which  consumes  thee  ; 
take  care  that  the  people  do  not  carry  thy  head  in 
procession  as  that  of  Toulon,  whose  mouth  they 
filled  with  hay."  When  he  enters  the  Assembly 
a  friend  warns  him  of  the  danger  and  shows  him 
the  article.  He  replies  :  "  One  will  carry  me  away 
from  here  triumphant  or  in  shreds,"  delivers  one 
of  his  greatest  speeches  and  conquers  in  the 
main. 

Neither  the  Assembly  nor  the  populace  can 
make  him  wince.  But  he  has  not  only  the  animal 
courage,  which  braves  physical  danger.  Highly 
as  he  prizes  popularity,  not  only  for  its  own  sake, 
but  above  all  because  it  is  power,  he  does  not 
Hindi  before  unpopularity  either.  "  I  did  not 
need  this  lesson,"  he  says  in  the  speech  just  men- 
tioned, "  that  it  is  but  a  small  distance  from  the 
capitol  to  the  Tarpeian  rock.     But  the  man  who 


THE   FRENCH    REVOLUTION.  39 

contends  for  reason,  for  his  country,  does  not  so 
easily  acknowledge  himself  vanquished  ;  who  is 
conscious  of  having  rendered  good  service  to  his 
country  and  principally  to  be  still  useful  to  it,  who 
is  not  satiated  by  vain  renown,  and,  compared  to  true 
glory,  holds  the  success  of  a  day  in  contempt ;  who 
is  intent  upon  telling  the  truth,  who  wants  to 
effect  the  public  welfare  independently  of  the  ever 
vacillating  opinions  of  the  masses,  finds  in  himself 
the  reward  of  his  services,  the  charm  of  his  troubles, 
the  price  of  his  dangers ;  he  may  expect  his  har- 
vest, his  fate,  the  only  one  that  is  of  interest  to 
him,  the  fate  of  his  name,  only  from  time,  the  in- 
corruptible judge,  who  does  justice  to  all.  Let  .  .  . 
them  abandon  to  the  fury  of  the  deceived  people 
him  who  for  twenty  years  wages  war  upon  every 
oppression,  and  who  spoke  to  the  people  of  France 
of  liberty,  constitution,  resistance,  at  the  time 
when  these  vile  calumniators  lived  in  all  the  pre- 
vailing prejudices.  What  do  I  care  ?  Such  blows, 
dealt  by  such  hands,i  will  not  check  my  course. 
I  tell  them,  answer,  if  you  are  able  ;  then  calumni- 
ate as  much  as  you  like."  ^ 

I  ask,  does  a  man,  whose  policy  is  always  deter- 
mined by  essentially  personal  interests,  speak  and 

'  "  Ces  coups  dehas  en  haul"      ^  CEuvres,  III.  356,  357. 


40  THE   FEENCH   REVOLUTION. 

act  thus  in  such  a  situation  ?  I  ask,  does  he  on  this 
occasion  merely  brave  physical  danger  and  cast 
popularit}^  to  the  winds,  or  must  what  he  says  and 
what  he  does  be  acknowledged  to  be  a  magnificent 
display  of  that  highest  courage  of  the  true  states- 
man, to  take  the  initiative  and  assume  responsi- 
bility? And  his  whole  course  in  the  National 
Assembly,  from  beginning  to  end,  is  one  continu- 
ous string  of  manifestations  of  this  greatest  and 
most  indispensable  quality  of  the  true  statesman. 
Ah  indeed,  he  must  be  hard  of  hearing,  who  can- 
not discern  throughout  this  course  the  ring  of  the 
proud  and  stern  declaration  with  which  he  an- 
nounced his  intention  to  go  himself  to  rebellious 
Marseilles :  "  Marseilles  will  submit,  or  I  shall 
perish ! "  ^ 

>  Corresp.,  II.  413. 


LECTURE  VIII. 

The  Sth  and  6th  of  October  and  the  Memoir 
of  the  15th. 

"  Consummatum  est.,  all  is  consummated.  .  . 
We  can  tell  the  National  Assembly :  Now  you 
have  no  more  enemies,  no  opponents,  no  veto  to 
fear ;  you  have  but  to  govern  France,  to  render 
her  happy,  and  to  give  her  such  laws  that  the 
nations,  following  our  example,  shall  make  haste 
to  transplant  them  and  to  make  them  flourish 
with  them."  ^  Thus  Camille  Desmoulins  and  the 
other  statesmen  of  the  Palais  Royal  judged  the 
5th  and  the  6th  of  October.  The  revolutionary 
storm  had  run  its  race.  The  goal  was  reached ; 
the  sky  swept  clean  of  all  clouds.  Henceforth 
the  sun  of  liberty  would  shed  its  glorious  light 
in  dazzling  effulgence  on  a  peaceful  and  happy 
country. 

If   so,  the  millennium  verily  had   come,  when 

'  Revolutions  de  France  et  de  Brabant,  No.  1. 

41 


4:2  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

figs  shall  be  gathered  from  thistles  and  the  briar 
bushes  bend  low  with  the  weight  of  grapes. 
"  Consummahim  est^  Ah,  yes,  there  was  but  too 
much  truth  in  these  first  two  words.  But  what 
was  consummated?  The  correct  answer  to  this 
question  must  be  found  in  the  true  story  of  those 
two  portentous  days,  unless  France  was  exempt 
from  the  law,  that  no  less  in  the  moral  than  in  the 
physical  order  of  things  the  fruit  corresponds  to 
the  seed. 

On  the  14th  of  July  the  nobodies  of  Paris  had 
learned  to  know  their  strength.  They  had  acted 
an  independent  and  decisive  part,  relegated  the 
National  Assembly  to  the  second  place,  and  put, 
with  crushing  effect,  their  heel  upon  the  neck  of 
the  old  government  and  the  partisans  of  the  past. 
Under  the  ancien  regime  the  government  had 
monopolized  all  political  power,  arrogating  to  itself 
the  r61e  of  irresponsible  political  providence  ;  from 
the  storming  of  the  Bastille  it  ceased — not  legally, 
but  in  fact — to  be  at  all  a  determining  political 
factor,  while  public  opinion  held  it  ever  more  and 
more  exclusively  responsible  for  all  real  and  sup- 
posed grievances.  The  authority  of  the  National 
Assembly  had  apparently  suffered  no  detriment 
from  its  having  played  but  a  secondary  and,  in  the 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  43 

main,  even  only  passive  part  in  the  catastrophe 
overwhehning  the  government  on  that  decisive 
day.  On  the  contrary.  In  the  provinces,  public 
opinion  was  practically  unanimous  in  sustaining 
the  Assembly  as  the  legal  enunciation  of  the 
nation's  sovereign  will.  And  between  Paris  and 
the  Assembly  there  was  seemingly  no  antagonism, 
because  the  Assembly  had  strongly  disapproved 
of  the  policy,  which  Paris  had  forced  the  govern- 
ment to  retract.  They  were  virtually  in  accord  as 
to  the  What,  though  their  disagreement  as  to  the 
How  might  be  in  truth  somewhat  greater  than  the 
Assembly  cared  to  acknowledge  after  the  accom- 
plished fact.  Paris  had  not  merely  acted  as  the 
arm  striving,  though  not  directly  bidden  by  the 
liead,  yet  in  conformity  with  its  will ;  but,  having 
acted  upon  a  sudden  impulse,  it  did  not  at  once 
fully  realize  to  what  an  extent  it  had  really 
emancipated  itself  from  the  National  Assembly, 
and  as  yet  it  was  not  in  the  least  consciously 
tempted  to  supersede  the  legitimate  head,  or  even 
to  usurp  the  character  of  a  rival  or  co-ordinate 
head.  According  to  all  appearances,  therefore, 
the  14th  of  July  had  inured  altogether  to  the 
benefit  of  the  Assembly.  The  government  having 
been   compelled   to   surrender   at   discretion,  and 


44  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

there  being  no  other  rival  power,  it  held  uncon- 
tested and  absolute  sway  over  the  whole  countr3^ 
Nor  was  there  now  any  reason  to  let  the  nobodies  of 
the  capital  have  it  all  their  own  way  again,  in  case 
they  should  try  once  more  to  lead  in  the  dance  as 
they  saw  fit.  On  the  14th  of  July  they  had  had  to 
deal  only  with  half-hearted  bungling  "  minions  of 
despotism,'*  commanding  troops  upon  whom  there 
was  no  reliance  in  such  a  fight.  Now  the  sub- 
stantial classes  of  the  population,  whose  personal 
interests  v/ere  at  stake  in  an  attempt  to  subvert 
law  and  order,  were  perfectly  organized  and  well- 
armed.  Surely,  the  National  Assembly  and  the 
nation  might  rely  upon  the  national  guard  to  nip 
in  the  bud  any  serious  danger  eventually  arising 
from  that  quarter. 

There  were  many  flaws  in  this  reasoning,  and 
soon  but  little  perspicacity  was  required  to  discern 
them.  At  the  beginning  of  August  feudalism  was 
broken  down  by  the  National  Assembly,  and 
before  the  end  of  the  month  the  first  attempt  was 
made  to  do  open  violence  to  it.  The  marquis  St. 
Huruge  started  at  the  head  of  a  mob  for  Versailles, 
to  bring  the  obnoxious  representatives  of  the  right 
to  their  senses  by  the  application  of  the  lynch-law 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  45 

cure.i  Though  he  was  foiled  in  such  a  way  as  to 
render  him  ridiculous  and  contemptible,  the  vista 
into  the  future  was  none  the  less  ominously  dark. 
What  had  failed  now  misfht  succeed  the  next  time. 
The  essential  fact  was,  that  France  had  been  noti- 
fied not  merely  by  empty  words,  but  by  a  deed, 
that  her  regeneration  was  not  to  be  left  exclusively 
to  the  National  Assembly.  The  Palais  Royal  was 
going  to  lend  it  a  helping  hand  in  the  arduous 
task,  and  it  considered  it  its  incontestable  right, 
as  well  as  its  patriotic  duty,  to  do  so  whenever  and 
howsoever  it  should  deem  meet.  One  lived  and 
learned  fearfully  fast  in  those  days.  By  this  time 
the  revolutionary  catechism  of  the  spokesmen  of 
the  Palais  Royal  was  already  reduced  to  the  simple 
maxim  :  Whatever  love  of  liberty  and  ardent  patri- 
otism dictate  is  manifestly  paramount  duty,  and 
every  duty  presupposes  the  right  to  do  what  it 
bids  one  do.     Their  followers  were  fully  equal  to 

•  The  resolutions  passed  at  the  Cafe  Foy,  of  which  I  shall 
soon  have  to  speak  in  another  connection,  very  ingeniously 
reconciled  the  recourse  to  this  infallible  remedy  with  a 
commendable  respect  for  the  law  :  "  Les  citoyens  reunis  au 
Palais  Royal  pensent  que  Ton  doit  revoquer  les  deputes 
ignorans,  corrompus  et  suspects. 

"  La  personne  d'un  depute  etant  inviolable  et  sacree,  leur 
proces  sera  fait  apres  leur  revocation." 

St.  Huruge  went  to  execute  these  resolutions. 


46  THE   FRENCH  REVOLUTION. 

this  logic  and  their  belief  in  the  self-evident  dogma 
was  more  honest  than  that  of  many  of  their  leaders. 
As  to  them,  therefore,  Mirabeau  certainly  preached 
to  deaf  ears,  when  he  wrote :  "  The  success  of  the 
project  would  have  been  a  thousand  times  more 
disastrous  than  the  dissolution  of  the  Assembly  by 
astroke  of  despotism.  .  .  .  The  Assembly  dissolved 
by  citizens  !  dispersed  by  a  faction  !  A  civil  war 
and  a  sea  of  blood  would  have  been  the  least  terri- 
ble of  the  consequences.  The  constitution  was 
about  to  perish  before  being  born  ....  you  prom- 
ise victims  to  popular  fury,  outrages  to  justice, 
blood  and  cruelties  to  the  fatherland.  Poor  mad- 
men !  what  more  could  you  do  if  you  were  its 
enemies?  .  .  .  All  the  strength  of  the  National 
Assembly  is  in  its  liberty ;  liberty  resides  in  the 
combat  of  opinions.  If  there  the  opinions  should 
be  enslaved,  the  nation  would  be  reduced  to 
bondage.  .  .  Your  club  is  not  France,  and  France 
would,  after  all,  rather  receive  laws  from  her  king 
than  obey  the  National  Assembly  subjected  to 
your  threats  and  the  docile  instrument  of  your 
sovereign  pleasure."  ^ 

There   is   an  undertone   of   anxious   misgiving 
bordering  upon  despair  in  the  impassionate  solem- 
1  Courrier  de  Provence,  No.  34  ;  Aug.  30,  1789. 


THE   FRENCH  REVOLUTION.  4Y 

nity  of  this  adjuration,  and  yet  the  last  sentence 
was  too  optimistic.  If  France  were  now  forced  to 
the  alternative  he  indicated,  and  if  it  were  done  in 
such  a  way  that  the  plainest  mind  could  not  fail 
correctly  to  understand  the  issue,  she  would  un- 
questionably choose  as  he  thought.  But  would 
she  do  so,  in  case  it  was  done  gradually  and  so  as 
to  obscure  more  or  less  the  true  issue  ?  And  sup- 
posing that  even  then  her  inclinations  should 
prompt  her  to  make  the  same  choice,  would  she 
know  how  to  assert  her  will  ?  Would  she  still  be 
able  to  do  so  ?  But  howsoever  the  future  might 
answer  these  questions,  his  main  assertion  Avas 
irrefutable :  France  will  have  exchanged  the  abso- 
lutism of  the  ancien  regime  for  a  worse  despotism, 
if  the  self-appointed  avengers  of  liberty  of  the  capi- 
tal be  allowed  to  speak  the  decisive  word.  They 
scuttle  the  ship  ere  it  is  fairly  launched. 

On  the  5th  of  October  they  knocked  the  bottom 
out  of  it,  in  a  somewhat  different  manner  from 
that  intended  by  St.  Huruge  and  his  prompters 
and  backers,  but  even  more  effectively. 

According  to  the  revolutionary  legend  the 
poorer  classes  of  Paris  were  reduced  to  a  condition 
verging  upon  famine.  That  is  a  gross  exagger- 
ation.    The   situation   was  sufficiently  serious  to 


48  THE    FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

throw  the  masses  into  a  state  of  unrest  and  keep 
them  excited  without  the  aid  of  designing  agitators. 
But  this  spontaneous  fermentation  was  due  much 
more  to  the  apprehension  of  future  distress  than 
to  the  actual  suffering  of  want.  Bread  was  scarce, 
but  thus  far  there  had  always  been  yet  enough  of 
it  to  keep  maddening  hunger  from  the  door.  In 
politically  quiet  times  the  public  peace  would  not 
have  been  disturbed.  But  now  all  the  demao-oo-ues 
needed  to  do  to  make  the  smouldering  coals  blaze 
up  in  a  fierce  flame  was  to  let  in  a  little  air.  The 
government  helped  them  by  daring  to  call  into 
question  the  wisdom  of  some  of  the  provisions  of 
the  laws  framed  by  the  National  Assembly  in 
pursuance  of  the  resolutions  of  August  4th.  The 
court,  as  usual,  did  the  best  to  work  the  destruc- 
tion of  what  it  wanted  to  preserve.  The  mines, 
which  blew  up  the  foundations  of  the  old  order  of 
things  on  the  23d  of  June  and  the  14th  of  July, 
had  been  dug  and  charged  by  itself.  Now  it 
furnished,  by  an  utterly  insane,  because  wholly 
purposeless  demonstration,  the  fuse  to  the  dema- 
gogues to  blast  their  mine. 

On  the  first  of  October  the  officers  of  the  gardes- 
du-corps  gave  a  banquet  to  the  officers  of  the  regi- 
ment of  Flanders  in  the  theatre  of  the  royal  palace 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  49 

at  Versailles.  Under  the  influence  of  the  liberal 
potations  many  a  bold  sarcasm  and  denunciation 
was  launched  against  the  National  Assembly  and 
the  revolution  in  general.  Court  ladies  stimulated 
the  royalistic  enthusiasm  of  the  valiant  knights  by 
decorating  them  with  white  cockades — white  being 
the  color  of  the  Bourbons.  The  assertion,  that 
cockades  in  the  three  colors  adopted  by  the  resolu- 
tion 1  were  insultingly  torn  off,  was  a  malicious 
invention  of  the  revolutionists.  It  could  not  be 
done,  because  no  such  cockades  were  in  the  room. 

The  time  was  certainly  well  chosen  to  indulge 
in  such  aimless  provocations,  for  Loustalot  had 
just  proclaimed  in  his  Revolutions  de  Paris :  "  A 
second  revolutionary  onset  is  needed ;  everything 
is  getting  ready  for  it." 

When  he  wrote  those  words  it  was  not  wholly 
inconsistent  with  the  facts  to  put  the  second  half 
of  the  sentence  into  the  impersonal  form.  This 
was  completely  changed  by  the  banquet.  The 
provocation  was  after  all  not  demonstrative  enough 
to  cause  a  spontaneous  uprising  of  the  masses. 
P>ut  those  who,  for  one  reason  or  another,  wished  a 
second  revolutionary  onset,  saw  the  excellent  op- 

'  Strictly  speaking  they  were  as  yet  only  the  colors  adopted 
by  revolutionary  Paris. 
4 


50  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTIOX. 

portunitj"  it  afforded  them,  their  numhcr  was  con- 
siderable, and  among  them  was  one  man  wlio  had 
the  means,  when  he  chose  to  engage  in  operations 
of  this  kind,  to  do  it  on  a  large  scale.  From  the 
first  there  is  system  and  purposeful  direction  in  the 
agitation.  The  masses  seem  to  have  been  slower 
to  M^arm  up  to  the  proper  temperature  than  one 
had  expected.  To  quicken  the  flow  of  their  blood 
they  had  to  be  told  that  that  of  every  true  patriot 
was  boiling.  It  is  significant  that  the  weekly 
papers  had  to  tell  of  many  dramatic  and  exciting 
occurrences,  of  wliicli  no  mention  whatever  is 
made  in  the  dailies.  The  suspicion  is  naturally 
awakened  that  the  stirring  stories  are  partly  the 
product  of  the  fertile  editorial  brain,  or  that  at 
least  gnats  are  made  to  do  service  as  elephants,  in 
order  to  "  fire  "  the  heart  of  the  unsophisticated 
patriots.  Enough  conscious  lying  has  been  done 
in  the  revolution  to  keep  the  furnaces  of  hell  aglow 
for  many  a  3^ear,i  ^nd  the  story  of  this  banquet  has 
come  in  for  its  due  share.  The  alleged  outrage 
upon  the  revolutionary  cockade  received  a  proper 
setting  by  a  sinister   tale  of   a   treacherous  plot 

'  Cam.  Desmoulins  frankly  confessed  :  "  La  fable  aida  un 
soulevement  general  aussi  bien  que  la  verite,  et  la  terreur  et 
les  oui  dire  aussi  bien  que  les  faits  notoires." — Revolutions 
de  France  et  de  Brabant,  IV.  363. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  51 

hatched  and  about  to  be  carried  out  by  the  court 
party.  The  king,  it  was  asserted,  was  to  be 
brought  to  Metz  for  the  purpose  of  calling  the 
partisans  of  the  ancien  rerjime  to  arms  and  setting 
France  ablaze  with  the  torch  of  civil  war.  In  this 
story  also  there  was  a  grain  of  truth.  There  were 
persons  urging  the  king  to  yield  no  more,  but  to 
offer  resistance  to  further  encroachments  of  the 
revolution,  and,  in  order  to  be  able  to  do  so,  to  get 
out  of  the  centre  of  the  storm  and  to  go  to  the 
eastern  frontier.  Louis  XVI.,  however,  was  far 
from  lending  a  willing  ear  to  these  counsellors.  On 
the  evening  of  the  5th,  when  the  women  were 
already  for  hours  in  possession  of  Versailles,  he 
still  declared  in  a  letter  to  Count  d'Estaing  that 
he  would  not  fly,  because  to  do  so  would  be  to  in- 
augurate civil  war  ;  he  even  declined  to  do  any- 
thing that  might  be  interpreted  as  an  intention  to 
defend  himself.^ 

'  ' '  Vous  voulez  .  .  .  que  je  prenne  un  parti  violent ;  que 
j'emploie  une  legitime  defense,  ou  que  je  ni'eloigne  de 
Versailles.  .  .  La  fuite  me  perdrait  totalement,  et  la 
guerre  civile  en  serait  le  resultat.  .  .  Dieu  veuille  que  la 
tranquillite  publique  soit  retablie  ;  mais  point  d'agression, 
point  de  mouvement  qui  puisse  laisser  croire  que  je  songe  a. 
me  venger,  menie  a  me  defondre." — Correspondance  inedite, 
I.  159,  (luotod  by  Buchez  et  Roux,  Histoire  pai'lementaire  de 
la  Revolution  frangaise,  III.  111. 


52  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

Resentful  suspicion  and  fear  were  strong  levers 
to  work  upon  the  imagination  and  the  feelings  of 
the  masses,  but  the  banquet  furnished  still  another 
of  even  much  greater  power.  "  While  the  people 
are  starving,  the  myrmidons  of  despotism  spin 
treason,  gorging  themselves  at  Lucullian  orgies  !  " 
That  was  a  crushing  argument  in  the  ears  of  ex- 
cited under-fed  masses,  fearing  soon  to  see  the 
wolf  at  their  doors.  And  to  persuade  them  that 
it  was  high  time  for  them  once  more  to  act,  was 
all  that  was  needed.  If  they  could  be  goaded  into 
taking  matters  into  their  own  hands,  they  were 
also  sure  to  do  what  they  were  wanted  to  do. 
According  to  their  reasoning,  it  was  self-evident 
that  to  get  the  king  to  Paris  was  in  itself  an  in- 
fallible and  lasting  cure  of  their  grievances.  The 
plotting  aristocrats  would  be  left  out  in  the  cold, 
and  the  king,  whether  he  liked  it  or  not,  would 
have  to  do  what  they  wished  to  be  done.  That 
he  would  be  able  to  do  it,  was  not  subject  to  any 
question.  The  notion  of  the  omnipotence  of  gov- 
ernment, bred  by  the  anclen  regime^  had  not  been 
eradicated  by  the  revolution ;  it  had,  on  the  con- 
trary, cast  deeper  root.  It  was  not  a  pleasantry, 
when  the  king  upon  his  forced  entrance  into  Paris 
was  jubilantly  hailed  as  the  "  baker  ;  "  these  chil- 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  53 

dren  of  all  ages  were  fully  satisfied  that  they  had 
now  secured  the  baker,  at  whose  bidding  the  bins 
had  always  to  stay  filled  with  flour  and  the  ovens 
full  of  loaves. 

The  Mercure  de  France  of  September  5th  re- 
ports, that  already,  on  the  30tli  of  August,  they 
spoke  at  the  Palais  Royal  "  of  bringing  the  king 
and  the  dauphin  to  Paris.  All  virtuous  citizens, 
all  incorruptible  patriots  were  exhorted  to  start 
forthwith  for  Versailles."  ^  So  the  first  attempt 
to  effect,  by  mob  violence,  the  transfer  of  the  royal 
residence  to  Paris  antedated  the  realization  of  the 
idea  by  fully  five  weeks.  Now,  however,  the 
prompters  of  the  masses,  as  it  seems,  kept  their 
ulterior  purpose  more  in  the  background.  It  is 
true,  Camille  Desmoulins  states,  that  on  the  even- 
ing of  October  4th — a  Sunday — "  the  women  " 
agreed  "  to  meet  the  following  morning  at  the  foot 
of  the  lantern  to  go  from  there  to  Versailles."  ^ 
he  wrote  his  narrative  nearly  a  year  after  the  Oc- 
tober events.     But  that  is  no  reason  to  doubt  its 

'  Quoted  by  Taine,  La  Revolution,  I.  127.  The  two  projects 
of  expelling  the  obnoxious  deputies  and  of  bringing  the  king 
to  Paris,  "  pour  y  demeurer  en  surete  au  milieu  des  fideles 
Parisiens,"  were  combined  in  the  motion  discussed  and 
adopted  by  this  meeting  in  the  famous  Cafd  Foy. — See  Moni- 
teur,  I.  399,  417.     The  king  was  to  be  "requested." 

*  Revolutions  de  France  et  de  Brabant,  III.  365. 


54  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION, 

correctness  in  this  particular.  He  cannot  be  sus- 
pected of  having  indulged  in  an  invention,  because 
it  could  serve  no  conceivable  purpose  ;  there  were 
few  men  in  Paris,  if  any,  in  a  better  situation  to 
be  well  informed  about  a  fact  of  this  kind,  and  it 
was  of  a  character  so  to  impress  itself  upon  the 
mind,  that  his  memory  could  not  fail  him  after  so 
short  a  time.  The  letter,  however,  with  which 
the  municipal  council  sent  a  delegate  at  about 
noon,  on  October  5th,  to  the  National  Assembly 
and  the  ministers  declared :  "  The  representatives 
know  of  no  other  pretext  for  this  revolt  than  the 
sudden  fermentation  caused  by  cockades  in  colors 
different  from  those  of  the  HOtel  de  Ville,  a  fer- 
mentation which  the  fear  of  lacking  bread  has  ren- 
dered more  dangerous."  ^  It  has  been  inferred, 
from  the  wording  of  this  declaration,  that  at  this 
hour  the  council  was  still  ignorant  of  any  inten- 
tion to  make  an  exodus  to  Versailles  for  the  pur- 
pose of  bringing  the  king  to  Paris.  If  this  be 
correct,  the  council  can  hardly  have  been  informed 
of  the  agreement  made  the  evening  before  by  the 
women.  That  they  would  have  known  of  it,  if 
secrecy  had   not  been  enjoined    upon    tliose    Avho 

'  Proces  verbal  de  la  Commune,  lundi,  5  octobre.     Bucliez 
et  Roux,  III.  120. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  55 

were  parties  to  it,  is,  however,  all  the  more  certain, 
because  tlie  councilmeii  had  just  proved  by  some 
extraordinary  measures  that  their  eyes  were  widely 
open  to  the  danger  of  a  move  in  that  direction.^ 
The  objection,  that  the  fairies  of  the  rear  streets, 
garrets,  and  cellars  were  not  likely  to  plan  such  a 
movement  in  secret,  has  no  weight.  The  scheme 
did  not  originate  with  them  ;  they  were  mere  tools, 
and  it  was  sufficient  to  instruct  a  comparatively 
small  number  of  leaders.  There  is  abundant  evi- 
dence that  the  5th  of  October  was  not  a  sponta- 
neous revolutionary  upheaval,  but  a  well-laid  plot. 
The  official  minutes  of  the  council  say :  •'  It 
seems  that  the  people  have  made  the  insurrection 
at  the  same  time  in  the  different  quarters  of  the 
city,  and  that  this  insurrection  was  premedi- 
tated." 2 

At  dawn  the  women  commenced  marching  to 
the  Hotel  de  Ville.  "  On  the  way,"  says  Camille 
Desmoulins,  "  they  recruit  among  their  sex  travel- 

'  Loustalot  reports,  in  the  above  quoted  number  of  the 
Revolutions  de  Paris :  "Desle  meme  sou-,  les  repi-esentans 
de  la  commune  repandirent  dans  les  districts  qu'il  y  aui-ait 
a  craindre  que  le  peuple  ne  se  portat,  la  nuit,  dans  les  corps- 
de-garde  pour  desarmer  la  garde  nationale,  afin  de  partir 
aussitot  pour  Versailles ;  on  doubia  les  postes,  les  patrouilles, 
et  la  nuit  se  passa  tranquillement." 

^  Buchez  et  Roux,  III.  123. 


56  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

ling  companions  as  one  recruits  sailors  in  London  : 
women  are  pressed  into  service."  At  the  Place 
de  G-reve,  "  these  women  begin  to  let  down  the 
lantern  religiously,  as  in  great  calamities  the  reli- 
quary of  Sainte-Genevieve  is  let  down."  Ere  the 
guillotine  became  the  centre-piece  in  the  coat-of- 
arms  of  French  liberty,  the  lanterns  served  the 
people  as  ever-ready  gallows.  The  letting  down 
of  the  lantern,  therefore,  was  a  most  emphatic 
announcement  that  serious  business  was  in- 
tended. 

The  gallows  put  into  proper  trim,  the  women 
tried  to  penetrate  into  the  H6tel  de  Ville.  Lafay- 
ette, writes  Camille,  "  was  advised  of  this  move- 
ment ;  he  knew  that  all  insurrections  were  com- 
menced by  women,  whose  maternal  bosom  is 
respected  by  the  bayonets  of  the  satellites  of  des- 
potism." You  see,  there  is  no  lack  of  cool  and 
shrewd  reflection  in  these  revolutionary  fire-eaters. 
When  Camille  takes  the  witness-stand  in  regard 
to  such  a  fact,  he  can  hardly  be  challenged,  and 
according  to  him  the  women  did  not  lead  to  quite 
the  extent  they  are  generally  supposed  to  have 
done.  The  men  used  them  as  an  impenetrable 
shield.  Quite  an  ingenious  idea!  But  is  a 
charge  with  the  bayonet  the  only  way  in  which  a 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  57 

large  armed  force  can  disperse  a  crowd  of  women  ? 
Was  it  lack  of  judgment,  lack  of  skill,  or  lack  of 
will,  that  prevented  tiie  general,  who  was  "  advised 
of  the  movement,"  to  act  while  the  mob  could 
have  been  easily  scattered  to  the  four  winds  with- 
out shedding  one  drop  of  blood  ?  Upon  the  un- 
paid national  guard  he  could  implicitly  rely.  The 
rioters  knew  it  well.  It  was  believed  that  it  had 
been  contemplated  to  disarm  them  by  a  sudden 
night  attack  upon  their  guard-rooms,  and  Loustalot 
states,  that  "  the  people  relied  more  upon  the  fidel- 
ity of  the  paid  "  national  guard.i  His  great  aston- 
ishment at  this  most  significant  fact  is  wholly 
feigned.  The  paid  national  guard  consisted  of 
former  soldiers  of  the  regiment  that  had  set  the 
example  of  riotous  insubordination,  and  of  other 
elements  that  were,  if  not  exactly  riff-raff,  at  least 
first  and  second  cousins  of  riff-raff.  They  were 
natural  allies  of  the  mob,  and  the  5th  of  October 
was  entirely  a  day  of  the  mob  instigated  by  self- 
seeking  demagogues.     The  unpaid  national  guard 

'  "  Ce  qui  est  incroyable,  c'est  que  le  peuple  comptait  plus 
sur  la  fidelite  de  la  troupe  soldee  que  sur  celle  de  la  troupe 
non  soldee  :  probleme  etrange,  et  qu'on  ne  peut  expliquer 
que  par  la  foule  d'inconsequences  et  de  vexations  que  se  sont 
permises  et  les  coniites  des  districts  et  les  conimandans  de 
patrouilles." 


58  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION, 

consisted  of  the  bourgeoisie^  and  tlio  bourgeoisie  was 
a  perfect  stranger  to  the  plot.  As  j^et  the  condi- 
tions were  such,  that  it  was  only  the  fault  of  the 
man  if  he  could  not  find  in  this  the  necessary 
strength  to  frustrate  it. 

Not  many  persons  who  have  cut  a  prominent 
figure  in  great  times,  have  lost  so  much  by  having 
the  search-light  of  critical  history  turned  upon 
them  as  Lafayette.  As  to  the  part  he  played  on 
the  5th  of  October,  he  himself  has  always  seen  a 
halo  around  his  head.  But  even  the  most  favor- 
able interpretation  of  it  at  all  compatible  witli  the 
hard  facts,  turns  the  streaming  light  of  this  halo 
into  very  dingy  yellow.  He  seems  to  be  quite 
unconscious  that  there  are  not  only  sins  of  com- 
mission, but  also  of  omission.  Yes,  sins  of  omis- 
sion. He  was  the  responsible  guardian  of  the 
public  peace.  Therefore  it  was  his  bounden  duty 
to  act  at  once  and  in  such  a  manner,  that  a  riotous 
demonstration  of  some  hundreds  of  women  could 
not  develop  into  an  irresistible  uprising.  He, 
however,  practically  remained  a  passive  looker-on, 
i.  e.,  wasted  hour  after  hour  in  fine  speeches  and 
unavailing  entreaties,  until,  as  he  himself  told  the 
king,  "  the  will  of  an  immense  crowd  commanded 
the  armed  force   and  there  was  no  possibility  of 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  59 

preventing  their  going  to  Versailles."  ^  Camille 
does  him  only  justice  in  calling  him  "  Temporizer 
Fabius."  But  he  almost  seems  to  suspect  him  of 
having  rather  willingly  allowed  the  mob  all  the 
time  it  needed  to  become  irresistible .^  The 
famous  white  charger  remained  hitched  to  the 
post  till  the  vanguard  of  women  had  arrived  at 
Versailles ;  he  mounts  it  at  last,  forced  by  the 
former  gardes  f?^anfaises,  one  of  them  telling  him 
— accompanying  the  words  with  a  suggestive 
gesture  with  his  musket — "  General,  to  Versailles 
or  to  the  lantern  !  "  ^  and  then  he  rides  at  such  a 
pace  that  it  is  pretended,  as  Camille  says  with 
mocking  exaggeration,  the  great  horse  needed 
nine  hours  for  the  journey. 

'  Report  of  the  commission  of  the  municipal  cduncil. 

'^Lafayette  himself  admits:  "J'avais  pense  depuis  long- 
temps  que  Fassemblee  serait  plus  tranquille  et  le  roi  plus  en 
surete  a  Paris."— Mem.  de  Lafayette,  I.  286  ;  edit.  1837-39. 
It  is  rather  striking  that,  to  my  knowledge,  every  historian 
championing  Lafayette  has  somehow  managed  to  skip  over 
this  sentence.  Even  if  it  be  not  considered  as  furnishing 
reason  for  suspicion  in  regard  to  what  he  left  undone  on  the 
5th  of  October,  it  is  surely  worth  quoting  because  it  throws 
such  a  flood  of  light  on  the  political  perspicacity  of  the 
man. 

^  Lafayette  uses  a  very  full  brush  in  painting  the  dangers 
which  he  had  to  brave.  He  writes  :  "  A  d  [verses  reprises  le 
fatal  reverbere  fut  descendu  pour  lui  ;  vingt  fois  il  fut 
couche  en  joue."— Mem.  de  Lafayette,  I.  282. 


60  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

When  Lafayette  wrote  down  his  recollections, 
his  memory  played  him  many  a  trick.  Not  only 
is  his  chronology  of  the  fatal  day  strangely  at 
fault ;  he  forgets  to  record  that  a  partisan  of  his — 
Vauvilliers,  a  member  of  the  municipal  council — 
announced  to  the  ministers  some  hours  before  it 
became  a  fact,  that  the  ivhole  national  guard  had 
started  for  Versailles  to  bring  the  king  to  Paris, 
that  he  himself  sent  an  adjutant  to  the  municipal 
council  to  insist  upon  his  being  authorized  to 
march  to  Versailles,  that  the  council  sent  four 
delegates  along  with  him,  who  were  to  demand, 
among  other  things,  that  the  king  "  confide  the 
guarding  of  his  sacred  person  exclusively  to  the 
national  guard  of  Paris  and  Versailles,"  and  trans- 
fer his  residence  to  Paris.  Irrelevant  these  facts 
are  certainly  not,  and  scanning  them  in  the  light 
of  the  position  which  the  5th  of  October  created 
for  the  general,  one  cannot  help  asking  oneself, 
whether  his  silence  upon  them  is  quite  acci- 
dental.^    One  of  the  most  suggestive  documents 

^  His  narrative  is  co  paratively  brief,  but  he  finds  space 
to  intimate  twice  that  his  virtue  was  even  superior  to  his 
courage,  and  that  but  for  the  pui"ity  of  his  heart  the  day 
might  eventually  have  raised  him  to  the  dizziest  height.  In 
Paris  the  spokesman  of  the  former  gardes-frangaises,  who 
were  among  the  first  to  raise  the  cry  "  a  Versailles,"  apostro- 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  61 

bearing  upon  the  history  of  the  fatal  day  is  a  car- 
icature, representing  a  white  horse  with  Lafa- 
yette's head,  led  by  a  proletarian  armed  with  pike 
and  axe  ;  the  legend  reads :  "  My  friends,  lead 
me,  I  beg  you,  to  sleep  at  Versailles." 

Though  it  cannot  be  directly  proved  that 
Lafayette  rather  liked  to  be  led  to  Versailles,  cir- 
cumstantial evidence  renders  it  likely.  That  the 
Duke  of  Orleans  and  those  who  made  the  impo- 
tent ambition  of  the  dissolute  prince  a  means  to 
serve  their  own  impure  ends,  had  taken  a  very 
active  part  in  kindling  the  fire,  is  as  good  as 
proved.^ 

phized  him  thus  :  "  Mon  general,  le  I'oi  nons  trompetous  et 
vous  comme  les  autres  ;  il  faut  le  deposer  ;  son  enfant  sera 
roi,  vous  serez  regent,  et  tout  ira  bien  "  ;  and  in  Versailles, 
upon  entering  the  royal  palace,  he  repelled  with  a  smart 
apropos  the  denunciatory  gi-eeting  ' '  Cromwell ! " 

'  Grace  Dalrymple  Elliott  writes  in  her  Journal  of  my  Life 
during  the  French  Revolution  (pp.  37,  38)  :  "The  Duke  of 
Orleans  was  certainly  not  at  Versailles  on  that  dreadful 
morning  (the  6th),  for  he  breakfasted  with  company  at  my 
house  when  he  was  accused  of  being  in  the  queen's  apart- 
ment disguised.  .  .  He  expressed  himself  as  not  approving 
of  the  bringing  of  the  king  to  Paris  :  '  that  it  must  be  a 
scheme  of  Lafayette's,'  but  added,  '  I  dare  say  that  they 
will  accuse  me  of  it,  as  they  lay  every  tumult  to  my  account. 
I  think  myself  this  is  a  mad  project,  and  like  all  Lafayette 
does.'"  Apart  from  the  absurd  accusation  as  to  his  being  in 
the  queen's  apartment,  this,  of  course,  proves  nothing.  Such 
a  breakfast-table  was  not  the  place  to  unbosom  himself 


62  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

That  it  could  have  been  kept  under  control  by 
acting  i^romptly  and  with  energy  is  demonstrated 
by  the  fact,  that  without  recourse  to  powder  and 
lead  or  steel,  the  Hotel  de  Ville  was  cleared  of  the 
rabble,  holding  for  a  while  complete  possession  of 
it,  carrying  away  the  arms,  ransacking  the  draw- 
ers for  money,  and  even  attempting  to  set  fire  to 
the  building. 

Meanwhile  part  of  the  women  had  started  for 
Versailles.  Threats  of  fiendish  bestiality  against 
the  queen  i  and  the  presence  of  men  disguised  as 
women  in  the  crowd,  indicated  only  too  clearly 
that  terrible  things  had  to  be  expected.  Everv 
female  encountered  on  the  march,  whether  young 
or  old,  clothed  in  rags  or  in  elegant  attire,  was 
forced  to  join  the  procession.  Arrived  at  Versailles 
the  horde  first  paid  its  respects  to  the  National 
Assembly.     The  wenches  made  themselves  com- 

without  reserve.  It  is,  however,  not  improbable  that  he 
said  what  he  thought.  But  did  he  say  all  he  thouglit  ?  He 
could,  indeed,  not  be  benefited  by  having  the  king  brought 
to  Paris.  He  rests  under  the  accusation,  that  according  to 
his  programme  the  5th  of  October  should  be  the  last  day  of 
the  reign,  perhaps  even  of  the  life  of  Louis  XVI.,  and  the 
6tli  the  first  day  of  his  own  regency.  That  the  man,  who 
afterwards  cast  a  formal  vote  for  tlie  death  of  the  head  of 
his  family,  was  none  too  good  to  pursue  such  a  scheme,  is 
certain. 
>  Taine,  1. 133. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  63 

fortable  in  the  seats  of  the  representatives  and 
bade  them  "  shut  up,"  as  they  had  not  come  to 
listen  to  long-winded  speeches,  but  to  get  bread. 
But  when  Mirabeau  hurled  a  sharp  rebuke  into 
their  faces,  they  lustily  applauded  him.  TJie 
president  ^  was  made  to  lead  a  deputation  of  the 
shrews  to  the  king.  On  foot  he  trudged  through 
rain  and  mud  at  the  head  of  them  to  the  palace, 
surrounded  by  the  boisterous  crowd,  jesting  and 
threatening,  laughing  and  cursing.  In  the  hall  of 
the  Assembly,  a  duchess  of  the  street  seated  her- 
self in  his  chair. 

When  at  last,  late  in  the  evening,  Lafayette 
arrived  with  the  national  guard,  he  assured  the 
king  that  he  had  nothing  more  to  fear.  Louis 
submitted  to  whatever  he  was  asked  to  do  ;  only 
in  regard  to  the  transfer  of  his  residence  did  he 
give  an  evasive  answer. 

Upon  an  examination  of  the  question,  whether 
Lafayette  did  all  he  could  and  ought  to  have  done 
to  make  good  his  pi-omise  that  the  public  peace 
and  order  would  be  no  more  disturbed,  I  can,  to 
my  regret,  not  enter.  I  can  only  mention  that 
the  account  of  La  Marck,  who  speaks  as  an  eye- 
and-ear-witness,  throws  a  strange   light  upon  the 

'  Moiinier. 


64  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

general's  own  story.  Whether  he  be  blamable  or 
not,  the  promise  was  not  fulfilled.  Early  in  the 
morning  the  mob  penetrated  into  the  palace  by  an 
unguarded  side-entrance.  Over  the  corpses  of 
those  who  tried  to  bar  their  way  they  rushed  to 
the  apartments  of  the  queen.  Marie  Antoinette 
had  barely  time  to  save  herself  into  the  rooms  of 
the  king.  In  the  letter  to  D'Estaing,  which  I 
mentioned  before,  Louis  had  written :  "  The 
Frenchman  is  incapable  of  a  regicide."  Lafayette 
arrived  in  time  to  prevent  this  assertion  being 
put  to  a  severer  test.  "When  Louis  stepped  out 
on  a  balcony  and  announced  his  willingness  to  go 
to  Paris,  he  was  enthusiastically  cheered.  Against 
the  queen,  however,  the  delirious  rabble  contin- 
ued to  hurl  the  fiercest  curses  and  imprecations, 
until  Lafayette  led  her  out  on  the  balcony  and 
kissed  her  hand.  In  that  moment,  he  says,  the 
peace  was  concluded.  Yes,  the  peace  which,  by 
way  of  the  guillotine,  led  to  the  graveyard. 

A  few  hours  later  the  royal  family  was  on  its 
way  to  Paris,  and  the  National  Assembly  resolved 
never  to  separate  itself  from  the  king.  Royalty 
had  formally  struck  its  flag  before  the  mob  and 
accepted  the  rabble  as  its  master.  But  that  was 
by  far  not  all.     The  mob  had  trampled  into  the 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  65 

dust  every  one  of  the  constituted  authorities.  It 
is  for  this  reason  that  the  5th  and  6th  of  October 
are  the  most  portentous,  the  darkest  days  of  tlie 
revolution.  The  municipal  council  and  the  com- 
mander-in-chief of  the  national  guard  had,  accord- 
ing to  their  own  confession,  received  the  law  from 
the  mob,  and  the  National  Assembly  had  not 
merely  been  unable  to  stem  tlie  torrent ;  like  the 
municipal  council  and  the  national  guard  it  had 
been  treated  to  contemptuous  kicks,  and  like  them 
it  had  submitted  to  being  pressed  into  the  service 
of  the  mob.  On  the  5th  and  6th  of  October  the 
proletariat  of  the  capital  made  itself  the  de  facto 
sovereign  of  France.  This  fact  is  the  main  key  to 
the  whole  subsequent  history  of  the  revolution. 
This  time  the  proletariat  had  become  completely 
conscious  of  the  full  scope  and  purport  of  its  vic- 
tory. Would  it  ever  again  scruple  or  hesitate 
to  dictate  the  law  to  the  city  government,  the 
bourgeoisie  in  uniform,  tlie  king,  the  National 
Assembly,  when  it  saw  fit  to  do  so  ?  Would  it 
ever  again  doubt  its  ability  to  do  it,  after  having 
succeeded  so  completely  ?  Henceforth  a  weari- 
some march  of  many  miles  was  no  longer  required. 
Week  in  and  week  out,  day  and  night,  were  its 
finsrers   ;iround   the  throat   of   the   king-  and  the 


66  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

National  Assembly,  and  therewith  around  the 
throat  of  France. 

What,  on  the  30th  of  August,  Mirabeau  had 
declared  "  a  thousand  times  more  disastrous  than 
the  dissolution  of  the  Assembly  by  a  stroke  of 
despotism,"  had,  in  a  modified  form,  come  to  pass. 
Did  he  still  think  as  he  had  thought  then  ? 

Quite  a  while  before  the  vanguard  of  the  wo- 
men arrived  at  Versailles  he  notified  the  President 
of  the  Assembly  that,  as  he  expressed  himself, 
"  Paris  mai-ches  upon  us,"  urging  him  to  hasten 
to  the  palace  in  order  to  have  the  necessary 
measures  taken  for  parrjdng  the  impending  blow. 
Mounier,  who  deeply  distrusted  the  impetuous 
tribune,  refused  to  give  credence  to  the  informa- 
tion. When  Mirabeau  vouched  for  its  truth  and 
with  an  air  of  peremptoriness  insisted  upon  his 
advice,  Mounier  replied :  "  Paris  marches  upon 
us  ;  well !  so  much  the  better,  we  shall  all  the 
sooner  be  a  republic."  ^ 

On  the  10th  of  October,  Malouet  demanded 
j^roscriptive  declarations  against  libellous  writings 
exciting  the  j)eople  to  acts  of  violence.  Mirabeau 
rose  in  opposition,  saying :  "  Do  not  multiply  vain 
declarations  ;  revive  the  executive  power ;  know 
1  Buchez  et  Roux,  III.  78. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  67 

how  to  maintain  it ;  brace  it  by  all  the  support 
that  can  be  derived  from  the  good  citizens  ;  else 
society  falls  into  dissolution  and  nothing  can  save 
us  from  the  horrors  of  anarchy."  ^ 

On  the  14th  he  introduced  a  rigorous  bill 
against  attroupements^  an  imitation,  as  he  himself 
said,  of  the  English  Riot  Act? 

Was  it  not  a  pretty  bold  undertaking  in  the 
face  of  these  public  utterances  and  acts  to  suspect 
his  position  towards  the  events  of  the  5th  and 
6th  ?  Ought  they  not  to  have  been  convincing 
to  every  unprejudiced  mind  ?  But  let  us  suppose 
that  other  facts  or  alleged  facts,  upon  which  I 
cannot  enter,  left  ample  room  for  reasonable 
doubts.  Time,  upon  which  he  often  declared  he 
must  rely  for  his  vindication,  has  brought  a  docu- 
ment to  light  which  answers  the  question  in  such 
a  way,  that,  as  to  it,  malice  itself  can  no  longer 
discover  the  shadow  of  a  rent  in  his  armor. 

If  there  was  a  man  in  France,  whom  the  storm 
bursting  forth  on  the  5th  did  not  take  by  surprise, 
it  was  he.  Towards  the  end  of  September,  as 
La  Marck  tells  us,  he  often  said,  speaking  of  the 
court :  "  What  are  these  people  thinking  of  ?  Do 
they  not  see  the  abysses  opening  up  under  their 
'  CEuvres,  II.  271.  ^  lb.,  II.  278,  sq. 


68  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

feet?  "  One  day  he  exclaimed  :  "  All  is  lost ;  the 
king  and  the  queen  will  perish,  and  you  will  see 
it ;  the  populace  will  kick  their  corpses."  La 
Marck  looking  at  him  aghast  with  horror,  he 
emphatically  repeated  :  "  Yes,  yes,  they  will  kick 
their  corpses  ;  you  do  not  sufficiently  understand 
the  dangers  of  their  position ;  but  their  eyes  ought 
to  be  opened  to  them."  ^ 

Now,  on  the  7th  of  October,  Mirabeau  went  to 
La  Marck  and  told  him  :  "  If  you  have  any  means 
to  make  yourself  heard  by  the  king  and  the 
queen,  convince  them  that  France  and  they  are 
lost  if  the  royal  family  do  not  leave  Paris.  I  am 
working  at  a  plan  to  get  them  out  of  it ;  will  you 
be  able  to  go  to  them  and  assure  them  that  they 
can  count  upon  me  ?  "  ^  La  Marck  promised  to 
deliver  the  plan,  and  a  few  days  later  Mirabeau 
gave  him  the  remarkable  document  which  is 
known  as  the  Memoir  of  the  15th  of  October.^ 
The  hailli  had  once  said  of  him  :  "  His  head  is  a 
mill  of  thoughts  and  ideas."  Perhaps  at  no  other 
moment  of  his  life  did  he  justify  this  word  more 
than  then.  With  truly  miraculous  celerity  he 
ties  the  warp  of  an  astounding,  all-embracing  plan, 

'  Corresp.,  I.  112.  «  ib^  j,  ng. 

■ab.,I.  364-382. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  69 

and  everything  indicates  that,  if  his  arm  is  but 
left  free,  he  will  be  able  to  weave  in  the  woof 
with  equal  celerity. 

The  Memoir  begins  by  stating  that  neither  the 
king  nor  the  National  Assembly  is  free  in  Paris, 
i.  e.y  Mirabeau  starts  from  the  point  which  was  in 
fact  absolutely  decisive  for  the  whole  subsequent 
course  of  the  revolution.  Then  he  proceeds  to 
ask,  whether  the  king  is  at  least  personally  quite 
safe,  and  answers  this  question  thus :  "  In  the 
situation  in  which  he  is,  the  slightest  catastrophes 
could  compromise  this  safety.  .  .  The  excited 
mob  of  Paris  is  irresistible  ;  winter  approaches, 
provisions  may  be  scarce,  bankruptcy  may  ensue. 
What  will  Paris  be  three  months  hence  ?  Cer- 
tainly a  hospital,  perhaps  a  theatre  of  horrors." 
The  ministers,  he  continues,  are  without  any 
resources.  Only  Necker,  whom  he  calls  "  a  truly 
empty  head,"  still  enjoys  some  popularity,  but  he 
does  not  know  how  to  use  it.  Then  he  goes  on  : 
"  The  provinces  are  not  as  yet  torn  asunder,  but 
they  observe  each  other ;  a  covert  dissension  an- 
nounces storms.  The  exchange  of  provisions  is 
more  and  more  interrupted.  The  number  of  mal- 
contents increases  by  the  inevitable  effect  of  the 
justest    decrees   of   the    National    Assembly.      A 


To  THE   FRENCH  REVOLUTION. 

nation  is  in  essence  nothing  but  what  its  labor 
is.  The  nation  has  become  disused  to  work. 
The  public  force  lies  in  public  opinion  and  the 
revenues  of  the  state  ;  all  the  ties  of  public 
opinion  are  severed  and  only  the  direct  taxes 
are  paid  and  even  these  but  in  part,  while  half 
of  our  taxes  are  indirect  ones.  It  will  require 
several  years  to  restore  what  six  months  have 
destroyed,  and  the  impatience  of  the  people, 
stimulated  by  distress,  manifests  itself  on  all 
sides." 

Besides,  circumstances  steadily  press  on  towards 
another  disastrous  event.  The  National  As- 
sembly, organized  upon  a  wrong  principle  and  com- 
posed of  too  heterogeneous  elements,  loses  every 
day  more  and  more  the  public  confidence.  "  It  is 
pushed  beyond  its  own  principles  by  the  pernicious 
irrevocability  with  which  it  has  invested  its  first 
decrees,  and,  not  daring  either  to  contradict  itself 
or  to  retrace  its  steps,  it  has  made  its  very  power 
another  obstacle.  ...  A  dull  commotion  is  setting 
in,  which  can  in  one  day  destroy  the  fruits  of  the 
greatest  exertions ;  the  body  politic  falls  into 
dissolution  ;  a  crisis  is  necessary  to  regenerate  it ; 
it  needs  a  transfusion  of  fresh  blood. 

"  The    only  means   to  save   the   state  and    the 


THE  FRENCH  REVOLUTION.  71 

nascent  constitution  is  to  bring  the  king  into  a 
situation  which  will  allow  him  to  unite  himself 
instantly  with  his  people. 

"  For  a  long  time  Paris  has  swallowed  up  all 
the  revenues  of  the  state.  Paris  is  the  seat  of  the 
fiscal  regime  abhorred  by  the  provinces  ;  Paris 
has  created  the  public  debt ;  Paris  has  ruined  the 
public  credit  and  compromised  the  honor  of  the 
nation  by  its  pernicious  stock-jobbing.  Shall  now 
the  National  Assembly  also  see  nothing  but  this 
one  city  and  for  its  sake  plunge  the  whole  kingdom 
into  perdition  ?  .  .  .  What  is  one  to  do  ?  Is  the 
king  free  ?  His  freedom  is  not  complete  ;  it  is  not 
recognized. 

"  Is  the  king  safe  ?  I  do  not  think  so.  Can 
Paris  save  itself  ?  No  ;  Paris  is  lost,  if  it  be  not 
brought  back  to  order,  if  it  be  not  forced  into 
moderation." 

Then  he  proceeds  to  discuss  the  question,  liow 
one  can  extricate  oneself  from  the  appalling 
situation,  and  by  what  means  the  impending 
dangers  can  be  averted. 

"  Several  means  are  available,  but  among  them 
are  some  which  would  unfetter  the  direst  evils, 
and  I  mention  them  only  to  divert  the  king  from 
them  as  his  inevitable  ruin. 


Y2  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

"  To  withdraw  to  Metz,  or  any  other  point  on 
the  frontier,  would  be  to  declare  war  to  the  nation 
and  abdicate.  A  king,  who  is  the  only  protection 
of  his  people,  does  not  fly  from  his  people ;  he 
lets  it  be  the  judge  of  his  acts  and  principles,  but 
does  not  sever  at  one  blow  all  the  bonds  uniting 
him  with  it;  he  does  not  arouse  against  himself 
the  universal  distrust;  he  does  not  put  himself 
into  such  a  situation  that  he  can  return  to  his 
state  only  with  arms  in  his  hands,  or  is  reduced  to 
beg  the  aid  of  foreign  countries. 

"  And  who  can  calculate  how  far  the  exaltation 
of  the  French  nation  would  go,  if  it  were  to  see 
itself  abandoned  by  its  king  to  unite  himself  with 
the  proscribed  and  become  himself  one  ;  how  far 
it  might  go  in  arming  itself  for  resistance  and 
defying  the  forces  he  could  muster  against  it? 
After  such  an  event  I  should  myself  denounce  the 
king. 

"  To  retire  into  the  interior  of  the  kingdom  and 
to  summon  the  whole  nobility  would  not  be  less 
dangerous.  Whether  it  be  justified  or  not,  the 
whole  nation,  in  its  ignorance  confounding  the 
nobility  with  the  patriciate,  will,  for  a  long  time, 
consider  the  noblemen,  as  a  class,  their  most  im- 
placable enemies.      The  abolition   of   the   feudal 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  73 

system  was  an  atonement  due  to  ten  centuries  of 
madness.  One  could  have  moderated  the  move- 
ment, but  now  it  is  too  late,  and  the  sentence  is 
irrevocable.  To  unite  himself  with  the  nobility 
would  be  worse  than  to  throw  himself  into  the 
arms  of  a  foreign  and  hostile  army  ;  that  would 
be  to  choose  between  a  great  nation  and  some 
individuals,  between  peace  and  civil  war  with 
extremely  unequal  forces. 

"  Where  would  be  in  such  a  case  the  safety  of 
the  king  ?  A  corps  of  noblemen  is  not  an  army 
which  could  wage  war ;  a  province  cannot  en- 
trench itself.  Would  not  the  greatest  part  of  this 
nobility  be  crushed,  killed,  even  before  uniting  ? 
Would  its  estates  not  be  destroyed  ?  And  if  it 
were  only  summoned  to  bring  the  greatest  sacri- 
fices, the  mortal  blow  would  be  dealt  ere  one 
could  exchange  views  and  come  to  an  understand- 
ing ;  and  if  one  intended  to  preserve  to  the 
nobility  all  of  its  exemptions  and  privileges  that 
public  opinion  and  enlightened  reason  have 
destroyed,  docs  one  believe  that  peace,  that  the 
revenues  could  be  restored  in  a  nation,  which 
thereby  would  be  robbed  of  its  dearest  and  most 
justified  hopes  ? 

"  To  go  awa}'  in  order  to    regain  liberty,  de- 


T4  THE   FRENCH  REVOLUTION. 

nounce  the  National  Assembly  and  dissolve  every 
connection  with  it,  would  be  a  less  violent  course 
than  the  two  preceding  ones,  but  not  less  danger- 
ous ;  it  would  endanger  the  safety  of  the  king  ;  it 
would  also  inaugurate  civil  war,  because  many  of 
the  provinces  want  to  maintain  the  decrees  of  the 
Assembly  .  .  •  because  the  enlightened  part  of 
this  nation  knows  that  one  must  provisionally 
obey  even  the  errors  of  a  legislative  body,  without 
which  no  constitution  whatever  could  ever  be 
established.  Then  neither  the  nobility,  Avhose 
passions  he  does  not  share,  nor  the  nation,  whose 
intents  he  does  not  accept,  would  be  for  the 
king.  .  .  . 

"  Besides  it  is  certain  that  a  great  revolution  is 
needed  to  save  the  kingdom,  that  the  nation  has 
rights,  that  it  is  about  to  regain  them  all,  that 
they  must  not  only  be  restored,  but  also  consoli- 
dated, that  only  a  national  convention  can  regen- 
erate France,  that  the  National  Assembly  has 
made  several  laws  which  it  is  indispensable  to 
accept,  and  that  there  is  no  safety  for  the  king 
and  the  state  but  in  the  closest  coalition  between 
the  monarch  and  the  people." 

Only  one  means  is  left,  "  which  is  certainly  not 
without  danger;    but  one  must  not  believe  that 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  75 

one  can  get  out  of  a  great  clanger  without  danger, 
and  all  the  forces  of  the  statesmen  must  now  be 
exerted  to  prepare,  to  moderate,  to  direct,  and  to 
limit  the  crisis,  but  not  to  prevent  it,  for  that  is 
absolutely  impossible,  nor  to  postpone  it,  for  that 
would  only  serve  to  make  it  more  violent. 

"  This  last  plan  can  be  carried  out  by  simple 
means.  Of  course  these  means  should  be  pre- 
pared beforehand  down  almost  to  the  minutest 
details.  Only  at  the  moment  the  resolution  is 
taken  should  they  be  connnunicated  to  those  who 
are  to  employ  them.  The  cabinet  is  not  suffi- 
ciently well-meaning,  or  at  least  not  considered  to 
be  so,  to  admit  it  into  the  confidence.  It  is  a  last 
resource  of  the  public  weal  and  the  personal  wel- 
fare of  the  king.  All  would  be  lost,  if  indiscre- 
tions were  to  reveal  a  plan  which  might  be  con- 
sidered a  conspiracy,  if  its  aim  and  consequences 
be  not  known,  while  its  only  object  is  the  welfare 
of  the  state." 

Then  follows  the  sketch  of  the  plan._ 
While  the  arrangements  for  the  departure  of  the 
king  are  being  made,  public  opinion  in  the  prov- 
inces must  be  prepared  for  the  impending  events. 
The  progress  of  events  will  unquestionably  de- 
monstrate   with    ever    increasing    impressiveness 


76  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

tlie  fact  that  the  king  is  not  free.  The  national 
guard  of  Paris  is  sure  to  step  out  of  its  legitimate 
functions,  if  one  tries  to  confine  it  to  them.  By 
asking  the  support  of  the  National  Assembly,  its 
eyes  will  be  opened  to  its  own  situation  and  it  will 
see  its  own  existence  imperilled.  Thus  it  will 
become  more  and  more  patent  that  the  public 
welfare  imperatively  demands  the  departure  of  the 
king.  To  insure  the  departure,  his  guards  shall 
be  "  systematically  dispersed,"  and  under  different 
pretexts  an  army  of  10,000  men  organized,  consist- 
ing entirely  of  national  regiments  to  be  placed 
midway  between  Paris  and  Rouen.  Then  the  king 
shall  depart  for  Rouen  in  broad  daylight.  Rouen 
shall  be  chosen,  first,  because  it  is  in  the  interior  of 
the  kingdom,  thereby  precluding  the  suspicion 
that  the  king  intends  to  fly,  then,  because  from 
there  Paris  can  be  provisioned  and  thus  the  good 
intentions  of  the  king  be  demonstrated,  and  final- 
ly, because  the  Normandie  has  a  numerous  and 
energetic  population,  and  Bretagne  and  Anjou, 
being  also  loyal,  are  within  easy  reach.  Simulta- 
neously with  the  departure  a  proclamation  shall  be 
issued,  declaring  that  the  king  throws  himself  into 
the  arms  of  his  people,  because  violence  had  been 
done  to  him  at  Versailles  ;  that  he,  as  he  would 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  77 

prove,  liad  been  denied  the  right  of  every  citizen 
to  come  and  go  as  he  pleased  ;  that  this  situation 
had  served  as  a  pretext  to  the  malcontents  to  re- 
fuse obedience  to  the  decrees  of  the  National 
Assembly,  thereby  compromising  the  fruits  of  a 
revolution,  in  which  he  took  as  lively  an  interest 
as  the  most  zealous  friends  of  liberty ;  that  he 
wished  to  be  inseparable  from  his  people,  as  he 
had  irrefutably  proved  by  choosing  Rouen  as  the 
place  of  his  residence  ;  that  he  was  the  first  king 
of  France  wishing  to  give  the  nation  its  rights, 
and  that  he  had  persisted  in  his  intentions,  despite 
his  ministers  and  other  advices  calculated  to  cor- 
rupt monarchs ;  that  he  had  irrevocably  sanc- 
tioned such  and  such  decrees  of  the  National 
Assembly,  but  that  there  were  others,  which  he 
deemed  not  sufficiently  considered  or  advanta- 
geous enough  for  the  people,  and  that  he  therefore 
desired  the  people  to  examine  them  once  more, 
acknowledging,  however,  their  binding  force  as 
laws  in  the  meantime ;  that  he  would  ask  the 
National  Assembly  to  join  him  in  order  to  con- 
tinue its  labors,  but  would  soon  call  another  con- 
vention to  examine,  confirm,  modify,  and  ratify  the 
decrees  of  the  first ;  that  he  wished,  above  all,  the 
public  debt  to  be  considered  sacred ;  that  he  was 


78  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

willing  personally  to  submit  to  the  greatest  sacri- 
fices and  would  not  require  more  than  one  million 
a  year  ;  that  the  public  creditors  should  no  longer 
be  allured  by  vain  promises,  but  receive  an  ade- 
quate security ;  that  he  would  subdue  his  people 
not  by  arms,  but  by  his  love,  confiding  his  honor 
and  safety  to  French  loyalty ;  that  he  wished  only 
the  welfare  of  the  citizens  and  wanted  to  be  only 
a  citizen  himself. — Couriers  should  bring  this  very 
firm,  but  very  popular  proclamation  into  all  the 
provinces. — Another  proclamation  should  be  sent 
to  the  National  Assembly,  setting  forth  the  motives 
for  the  king's  resolution  and  asking  it  to  follow 
him  to  Rouen.  It  would  undoubtedly  do  so,  if  it 
were  free  ;  if  it  could  not  do  it,  the  session  would 
tliereby  ipso  facto  be  closed.  The  Assembly's 
being  under  constraint  would  become  so  apparent 
that  it  would  soon  be  possible  to  convene  another 
Assembly.  Further  proclamations  should  con- 
tinue to  enlighten  the  people  about  their  true 
interests,  and  the  changing  of  public  opinion 
would  soon  commence  to  work  a  change  in  the 
spirit  of  the  National  Assembly.  If  anywhere 
resistance  should  be  attempted,  the  executive, 
authorized  by  the  National  Assembly,  would  use 
its  whole  power  to  overcome  it. 


THE   FRENCH  REVOLUTION.  ^9 

Nothing  came  of  the  plan.  La  Marck  gave  the 
Memoir  to  the  Count  of  Provence,  the  king's 
eldest  brother.  He  praised  Mirabeau's  intentions, 
but  treated  it  as  an  interesting  academical  treatise, 
declaring — no  doubt  only  too  trul}' — tliat  it  was 
impossible  to  induce  the  king  to  take  so  bold  a 
course.  But  though  the  Memoir  led  to  no  jorac- 
tical  results,  it  is  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
political  documents  in  existence.  Its  critical  part 
shows  the  whole  subsequent  history  of  the  revolu- 
tion as  in  a  magician's  mirror,  and  this  whole 
subsequent  history  of  the  revolution  irrefutably 
proves,  that  if  there  still  was  any  possibility  to 
save  the  king's  head  and  spare  France  the  reign  of 
terror  and  the  ensuing  despotism  of  Napoleon,  it 
could  have  been  done  only  by  adopting  Mirabeau's 
plan  and  entrusting  its  execution  to  him.  If  the 
records  of  everything  else  we  know  of  Mirabeau 
were  forever  obliterated,  this  one  Memoir  would 
suffice  to  prove  that  he  was  a  political  genius  of 
the  very  first  order.  Only  the  utter  imbecility  of 
fanatical  doctrinarianism  can  find  in  it  materials 
for  the  charge  that  he  became  a  recreant  and 
turned  against  the  revolution,  whose  foremost 
champion  he  had  thus  far  been.  Every  line  of  it 
demonstrates  that,   in   fact,   his   whole   mind   Avas 


80  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

bent  upon  not  only  maintaining,  but  also,  as  he 
said,  consolidating  tlie  revolution  in  sa\'ing  it 
despite  itself  from  itself.  There  was  no  other  way 
to  do  this  than  by  appealing  from  Paris  to  the 
country,  and  to  do  it  now  and  in  such  a  manner, 
that  the  couiltrj^  could  respond  to  the  appeal  not 
only  by  sentiments  and  wishes,  but  by  decisive 
acts.  And  this  was  possible  only  if  the  king 
accompanied  the  appeal  by  the  explicit  and  em- 
phatic declaration  of  his  identification  with  the 
revolution,  guaranteeing  the  unimpeachable  sin- 
cerity of  the  declaration  by  irreversible  acts. 

It  is  not  surprising  that,  at  the  time,  many 
strongly  suspected  or  even  firmly  believed  Mira- 
beau  to  be  one  of  the  principal  authors  of  the  5th 
of  October.  In  their  opinion  the  sins  of  his  youth 
were  sufficient  evidence  that  moral  scruples  would 
never  be  a  check  to  his  political  ambition ;  his 
political  past,  of  which  they  noticed  or  understood 
only  the  one  §ide,  that  of  the  revolutionary  fire- 
brand, seemed  to  them  in  perfect  keeping  with  a 
manoeuvre  of  such  brazen  ruthlessness  ;  and  many 
an  inconsiderate  d  propos  of  his  rash  and  unruly 
tongue  furnished  strong  pegs  to  distrust  and  jeal- 
ousy, hatred  and  stupidity,  on  which  to  hang 
plausible    accusations.       These    people    were    so 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  81 

blindfolded  b}^  prejudice,  that  they  simply  ignored 
the  incompatibility  of  their  assumptions  .with  the 
public  utterances  and  acts  of  Mirabeau  which  I 
mentioned.  When  the  National  Assembly  de- 
cided that  the  facts  elicited  by  the  judicial  inquiry 
conducted  by  the  Chatelet  gave  no  cause  to  pro- 
ceed against  him,  they  remained  satisfied  that  it 
was  a  miscarriage  of  justice.  They  grievously 
wronged  him  ;  but  in  these  times,  when  morbid 
suspiciousness  became  more  and  more  one  of  the 
cardinal  virtues,  their  error  was,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, almost  excusable.  But  what  shall 
one  say  of  the  writers  of  to-day  who,  with  the 
Memoir  of  the  15th  before  their  eyes,  still  persist 
in  putting  every  particle  of  those  incriminating 
baubles  under  the  microscope  of  their  critical 
acumen,  and  at  least  intimate  that  there  is  no  tell- 
ing whether  he  was  not,  after  all,  for  a  while  and 
to  some  extent,  in  collusion  with  the  conspirators? 
La  JNIarck  relates  that  Avhen  he  told  Mirabeau  half 
a  year  later  that,  up  to  that  time,  even  the  queen 
had  supposed  tlie  charge  to  be  well-founded,  "his 
mien  instantly  changed ;  he  became  yellow,  green, 
hideous.  The  horror  which  he  felt  was  striking 
.  .  .  for  a  long  time  he  could  not  get  over  the 

painful  impression  that  lie  should  have  been  the 
6 


82  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

object  of  such  a  horrid,  suspicion."  ^  Small  won- 
der !  The  man  who  said  that  the  course  he  urged 
upon  the  king  would  be  considered  "  a  con- 
spiracy," and  who  had  predicted  before  the  Octo- 
ber events  that  the  mob  would  "  kick  the  corpses 
of  the  king  and  the  queen,"  could  not  have  failed 
to  see  that  by  the  Memoir  of  the  15th  he  put  his 
own  head  under  the  executioner's  axe.  To  say 
that  he  had  had  a  share  in  the  conspiracy  is,  there- 
fore, to  say  that  he  had  helped  to  hatch  and  ex- 
ecute a  criminal  plot,  possibly  leading  to  regicide 
and  sure  to  cost  human  life,  for  the  purpose  of 
attempting,  right  after  its  complete  success,  to 
undo  at  the  risk  of  his  own  neck  what  he  had 
done.  The  assumption  is  a  palpable  absurdity. 
Since  the  publication  of  the  Memoir  of  the  15th, 
Mirabeau's  accusers  have,  therefore,  no  longer  any 
standing  in  the  court  of  common  sense.  It  takes 
learned  historians  to  still  grant  them  a  hearing 
and  gravely  to  wag  their  wise  heads  at  the  awful 
things  they  have  to  report  of  the  great  miscreant. 
'■  Corresp.,  I,  148,  149. 


LECTURE  IX. 

The  Decisive  Defeat  of  November  7th,  17S9, 

Not  intellect  and  character,  but  character  and 
intellect  are  required  to  be  a  leader  of  men,  and  the 
more  so  the  stormier  the  times  and  the  greater  the 
issues.  Mirabeau  invariably  rested  his  claims  to 
leadership  primarily  upon  his  character  and  not 
upon  his  superior  intellect.  One  of  the  chief  tests 
of  character,  however,  is  the  effect  of  obstacles  and 
defeats  upon  the  will.  With  weak  men  it  always 
slackens  under  their  pressure,  though  they  be  intel- 
lectually veritable  paragons  ;  upon  the  strong  char- 
acter it  has  a  bracing  effect,  and  acts  as  a  spur. 

If  Mirabeau  had  misjudged  himself  as  to  this 

paramount  question,  the  shelving  of  the  Memoir 

of  the  15tli  of  October  by  the  Count  de  Provence 

as  an  interesting  academical  treatise  would  have 

been  a  staggering  blow,  for  it  proved  that  from 

those  who  were  personally  the  most  interested  in 

it,  no  assistance  could  be  expected  in  intelligent 

83 


84  THE   FRENCH  REVOLUTION. 

efforts  to  avert  the  impending  doom  of  the  mon- 
archy; it  had  to  be  saved  without  them  and  in 
spite  of  them,  or  it  could  not  be  saved  at  all.  It 
is  therefore  eminently  characteristic  of  the  man, 
that  at  no  time  is  his  initiative  more  vigorous  and 
buoyant  than  in  the  weeks  immediately  following 
this  grievous  disappointment. 

On  the  14tli  of  October  he  had  submitted  to  the 
Assembly  a  law  concerning  "  les  attroupements,''* 
"imitating,"  as  he  said,  "but  not  copying"  the 
English  Riot  Act.  When  he  had  finished  reading 
it,  the  Assembly  vividly  applauded  but  did  not  act 
upon  it  until,  a  week  later,  the  mob  in  Paris  had 
once  more  dipped  its  hands  in  blood,  massacring 
the  baker  FranQois  upon  the  accusation  that  he 
reserved  some  of  his  bread  for  customers  able 
and  willing  to  pay  higher  prices.  Mirabeau  then 
improved  the  opportunity  to  warn  the  Assembly 
that  though  a  martial  law  was  necessary,  the  most 
urgent  need  was  to  put  the  executive  again  into  a 
condition  enabling  it  to  fulfil  its  duties.  "The 
executive  power  avails  itself  of  its  own  annihila- 
tion," he  said.i  ^^-^(j  ^o  guard  against  an  unjust, 
one-sided  interpretation  of  this  accusation,  he  wrote 
in  the  Coiirrier  de  Provence  :  "  Not  without  reason 
'  CEuvres,  II.  394. 


THE  FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  85 

does  the  cabinet  avail  itself  of  its  own  annihilation 
to  hold  itself  excused  in  regard  to  the  disorders  of 
society  ;  if  it  has  no  power  (s'z7  ne  pent  rieri)^  it  is 
not  responsible  for  anything."  ^ 

Still  nothing  was  further  from  his  mind  than 
the  intention  fully  to  exonerate  the  ministers.  In 
his  opinion  they  were — not  intentionally,  but  by 
incapacity — highly  culpable,  but  the  Assembly 
was  at  least  as  guilty  as  they.  He  wrote  in  these 
days  to  Mauvillon  :  "  The  monarch}'^  is  in  danger 
rather  because  one  does  not  govern,  than  because 
one  conspires.  If  no  pilot  presents  himself,  the 
vessel  will  probably  run  aground.  If,  on  the  con- 
trary, the  force  of  things  compels  to  call  a  man  of 
brains,  and  furnishes  the  courage  to  conquer  all 
human  deferences  and  the  petty  jealousy  which 
will  always  try  to  prevent  it,  you  do  not  imagine 
how  easy  it  is  to  make  the  public  vessel  float. 
The  resources  of  this  country,  even  the  mobility 
of  this  nation,  which  is  its  cardinal  vice,  furnish  so 
many  expedients  and  facilities,  that  in  France  one 
must  never  either  presume  or  despair."  ^  He  is 
satisfied  that  the  future  depends  on  having  the 
right  men  at  the  helm  more  than  on  anything  else ; 
but  he  sees  as  clearly,  that  in  this  tempestuous  and 
1  No.  56.  -  Lettres  a  Mauvillon,  488. 


86  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

reef-bound  sea,  the  ship  must  be  sailing  toward 
destruction  even  with  the  best  men  at  the  hehn,  if 
they  be  denied  the  possibility  of  making  use  of 
their  strength  and  their  skill.  Neither  by  striking 
the  shackles  off  the  arms  of  the  present  utterly 
incapable  ministers,  nor  by  putting  efficient  but 
equally  fettered  men  in  their  chairs,  could  the 
perils  of  the  situation  successfully  be  coped  with. 
Only  if  a  proper  change  of  persons  and  a  proper 
cliange  of  system  in  regard  to  the  position  of  the 
executive  and  its  relation  towards  the  lesfislative 
could  be  brought  about  simultaneously,  would  the 
hope  that  the  revolution  might  be  turned  back  and 
kept  down  to  its  legitimate  task  of  reform,  rest 
upon  a  more  solid  foundation  than  mere  wishes. 

That  Mirabeau  did  not  need  the  lesson  of  the 
5th  and  6th  of  October  fully  to  understand  this, 
is  proved  by  the  fact,  that  three  weeks  before,  an 
article  of  the  Coiirrier  de  Provence  (Sept.  14)  had 
already  advocated  the  remedy  which  he  proposed 
in  the  Assembly  on  the  6th  of  November.  On 
the  9th  and  loth  of  October  the  Conrrier  had  re- 
turned to  the  charge.  The  articles  may  not  have 
been  written  by  himself,  but  the  paper  was  his 
organ,  and  nobody  could  suppose  it  to  act  without 
his  authorization  in  a  question  of  such  moment. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  87 

Above  all,  however,  lie  had  as  early  as  Septem- 
ber 29th,  and  in  the  Assembly  itself,  explicitly  de- 
clared in  favor  of  following  the  example  of  Eng- 
land, and  demanded  that  the  question  be  taken  up 
and  decided.  ^  The  charge  which  Montlosier  pre- 
ferred against  him  on  the  7th  of  November,  that 
he  had  sprung  a  mine  upon  the  Assembly  by  his 
motion,  was  therefore  wholly  unfounded. 

It  cannot,  however,  be  doubted,  that  but  for 
those  two  October  days  Mirabeau  would  have 
proceeded  more  slowly.  They  forced  upon  him 
the  conviction  that  not  a  day  might  be  lost  with 
impunity.  From  that  moment  all  his  energies  are 
bent  upon  carrying  out  the  double  programme. 
Without  Lafayette's  consent  and  co-operation 
this  was  unquestionably  an  impossible  task.  For 
weeks  he  and  his  friends,  supported  ostensibly 
with  ardor  by  Cice,  tlie  Archbishop  of  Bordeaux 
and  keeper  of  the  seals,  are  day  and  night  at  work 
to  bring  about  an  alliance  with  the  general.  For 
this  purpose  the  two  men  met  on  the  15th  or  16th 
of  October  at  Passy,  in  the  house  of  the  Marquise 
d'Aragon,  Mirabeau's  niece.  This  first  conversa- 
tion was  mutually  deemed  sufficiently  satisfactory 
to  continue  the  negotiations.  Our  material  con- 
^  Moniteur,  No.  65,  pp.  532,  533. 


88  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

cerning  them  is  unfortunately  neither  ample  nor 
definite  enough  to  get  a  perfectly  clear  idea  of  them. 
Too  much  must  be  read  between  the  lines  and  even 
guessed.  The  difficulties  are  trebled  by  the  fact 
that  for  a  while  a  purely  personal  question,  Mira- 
beau's  pecuniary  embarrassments,  is  in  such  a  way 
mixed  up  with  the  great  political  question,  that  it 
is  impossible  to  separate  the  two ;  they  are,  so  to 
speak,  intergrown.  Lafayette  was  to  procure  him, 
directly  or  indirectly,  by  the  ajDpointment  to  an 
ambassadorship,  the  pecuniary  aid  he  stood  in 
need  of,  and  this  was  in  a  way  to  form  the  basis  of 
the  pact.  Mirabeau's  wants  were  so  urgent  that 
he  might  have  succumbed,  or,  at  least,  come  des- 
perately near  succumbing  to  the  temptation  of 
buying  relief  at  the  expense  of  his  ambition  and 
patriotism,  if  his  rich  and  open-handed  friend  La 
Marck  had  not  repeatedly  assured  him  that  he 
would  never  allow  him  to  sink  under  the  load  of 
his  debts.  Mirabeau  soon  became  all  the  more 
willing  to  rely  upon  these  promises  as  Lafayette 
sent  him  not  quite  half  the  amount  he  had  under- 
taken to  get  for  him.  The  money  was  promptly 
returned,  and  every  idea  of  going  for  the  sake  of 
the  money  with  a  big  title  into  virtual  exile, 
definitely    abandoned.      But     that   was     not   all. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  89 

On  the  26tli  of  October  he  informs  La  Marck 
that  Montmorin  has  proposed  to  Lafayette  to 
nominate  him,  Mirabeau,  ambassador  to  Holland 
or  England,  "not  to  go  there,  but  to  decorate 
me  and  to  render  me  worthy  and  fit  for  the 
supreme  honor  of  having  in  my  pocket  a  promise 
from  the  king  which  assures  me  that  I  shall  be 
minister  next  May."  "  Lafayette,"  concludes 
the  important  letter,  "  is  to  speak  only  this 
morning  to  the  queen,  but,  to  tell  the  truth,  he 
seemed  to  me  less  decided  than  ever,  and  succumb- 
ing under  the  fatality  of  his  indecision.  As  to 
myself,  I  shall  resume  the  combat,  firmly  resolved 
— ivliat  is  in  their  oivn  iyiterest  if  it  he  true  that  they 
think  me  necessary — not  to  lose  an  inch  of  ground, 
and  convinced  that  at  the  very  latest  by  the  end 
of  next  month,  everything  will  go  to  smash."  ^  La 
Marck  replied :  "This  wo  aid  be  acceptable,  if  all 
this  were  not,  as  you  have  strong  reasons  to  an- 
ticipate, to  go  to  smash  before  the  end  of  next 
month." 

La   Marck   was   not   as   much   given   to  using 

strong  language  as  Mirabeau,  and  at  this  time  he 

still  took  a  much  less  gloomy  view  of  the  future. 

His  ready  assent  to  Mirabeau's  prophec}^  therefore, 

1  Corresp.,  I.  406,  407. 


90  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

leaves  no  doubt  that,  as  is  to  be  inferred  from  the 
whole  situation  and  the  general  tenor  of  the  cor- 
respondence of  the  two  friends  at  this  period,  their 
lugubrious  prediction  is  not  intended  to  be  as 
sweeping  as  at  first  sight  the  "  everything  "  would 
seem  to  indicate.  They  only  refer  to  the  cabinet 
and  what  is  directly  in  connection  with  and  de- 
pendent on  this  question.  In  their  opinion  the 
present  administration  can  no  longer  be  saved, 
neither  by  the  passive  resistance  of  the  king,  nor  by 
all  the  small  devices  of  the  ministers  themselves, 
clinging  most  tenaciously  to  their  chairs,  though 
their  seats  are  cushions  of  thorns.  And  Mirabeau 
is  determined  himself  to  do  his  best  for  the  fulfil- 
ment of  his  prophecy. 

You  remember  that  from  the  beginning  he  had 
charged  the  ministers  with  matchless  ineptitude. 
It  therefore  goes  without  saying  that,  if  he  could 
have  acted  entirely  to  suit  himself,  he  would  also 
now  from  the  first  have  declined  to  listen  to  any 
other  proposition,  peremptorily  insisting  upon 
their  being  compelled  to  go.  But  to  gain  at  once 
Lafayette's  consent  to  such  a  radical  course  was 
utterly  out  of  the  question.  He  considered  it,  above 
all,  almost  a  sacrilege  to  think  of  overthrowing 
Necker.     Mirabeau,  as  we  know,  deemed  him  the 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  91 

worst  of  all,  and  the  general  certainly  did  not  put 
his  own  political  acumen  into  the  best  light  by  still 
having  so  much  faith  in  the  financial  necromancer, 
whose  only  miracles,  ever  since  the  convocation  of 
the  States-General,  consisted  in  the  rapidity  and 
thoroughness  with  which  he  destroyed  his  reputa- 
tion as  a  great  financier  and  statesman.  But  this 
did  not  alter  the  fact  that  Lafayette's  support 
was  indispensable.  Mirabeau,  therefore,  so  far 
yielded  as  to  eater  upon  negotiations  with  the 
ministers,  but  he  did  it  reluctantly  and  without 
abandoning  even  for  the  moment  the  intention  to 
bring  all  the  pressure  within  his  power  to  bear 
upon  Lafayette,  to  frighten  him  into  adopting  his 
views.  On  the  17th  of  October  he  informs  La 
March,  that  in  the  forenoon  the  general  is  to 
brinir  him  to  Montmorin,  and  that  in  the  after- 
noon  he  is  to  see  Necker,  who  is  mad  about 
it  and  has  only  consented  because  he  is  at 
bay  and  feels  the  knife  to  be  at  his  throat. 
Then  the  letter  continues :  "  Lafayette,  who  is 
alarmed  by  the  question  of  provisioning  (Paris) 
and  uneasy  about  the  provinces,  must  be  forced 
to  come  to  a  decision.  I  myself  am  resolved  to  sup- 
port the  motion  of  Necker's   resignation  (depart), 


92  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

SO    deeply    am    I    convinced    that   everything   is 
perishing."  ^ 

The  interview  with  Necker  Listed  five  hours. 
According  to  Mme.  de  Stael,  Necker  said  in  the 
course  of  it :  "  My  strength  consists  in  morality  ; 
you  have  too  much  esprit  not  to  feel  some  day  the 
necessity  of  this  support ;  until  that  moment  has 
come,  it  may  suit  the  king  under  the  actual  cir- 
cumstances to  have  you  for  minister,  but  we  two 
cannot  be  ministers  at  the  same  time."  Mirabeau 
did  not  fail  to  acknowledge  and  reciprocate  the 
compliment.  On  the  19th  he  wrote  Lafayette : 
"If  you  have  reflected  upon  the  perfidious  col- 
lusion of  the  ministers  with  the  Ijrutal  or 
rather  truly  delirious  pride  of  the  despicable 
charlatan  (Necker)  who  has  brought  the  throne 
and  France  within  an  inch  of  their  ruin,  and 
who  persists  in  rather  consummating  it  than  to 
acknowledge  to  himself  his  incapacity,  you  do 
not  believe  any  more  that  I  can  be  in  the  least 
their   auxiliary. 

"  They  have  insulted  me,  marked  me  out ;  they 

have  tried,  so  far  as  they  could,  to  denounce  my 

ambition   and   the   difficulties  which   I   throw  in 

their  way ;  they   could  only  disarm  me  in  oper- 

1  Corresp.,  I.  385. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  93 

ating  the  public  welfare,  and  the  evil  spirit  of  the 
human  race  is  not  further  from  that  than  they. 
Permit  me  to  entreat  you,  that  you  no  longer 
demand  from  me  that  I  spare  them  and  that  .  .  . 
I  may  at  last  enable  the  nation  to  judge,  whether 
the  actual  cabinet  can  save  the  state."  ^  He  tells 
him,  that  the  very  next  day  he  will  attack  the 
ministers,  and  he  is  as  good  as  his  word. 

Two  days  later  La  Marck  warned  him  not  to 
precipitate  matters ;  just  because  his  becoming 
minister  was  an  imperative  necessity,  he  should 
not  risk  anything.  Mirabeau  did  not  spurn  the 
advice.  The  negotiations  went  on,  but,  as  I 
mentioned,  came  to  naught,  and  Lafayette  could 
not  make  up  his  mind  what  to  do.  Three  days 
after  Mirabeau  had  informed  La  Marck  of  Mont- 
morin's  offer  and  his  determination  to  reject  it, 
Lafayette  writes  him,  underlining  the  sentence: 
"  What  would  you  say,  if  Necker  should  threaten 
to  go  in  case  Mirabeau  arrives,"  i.  e.,  is  made 
minister  ?  It  is  hard  to  tell  what  to  make  of  this 
question.  Is  it  to  him  still  so  much  a  matter  of 
course,  that  Necker's  going  would  be  the  greatest 
calamity,  that  he,  in  spite  of  everything,  assumes 
even  Mirabeau  will  shrink  back  if  he  learns  that 
'  Corresp.,  I.  389,  390. 


94  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

this  would  be  the  consequence  of  his  entering  the 
cabinet  ?  Tliis  woukl  seem  to  be  the  most 
natural  interpretation,  if  Talon  had  not  reported 
the  same  day  to  La  March,  that  he  had  found  the 
general  dissatisfied  with  Necker,  "  positively 
announcing  that  the  wheel  will  turn  to-day." 

For  two  or  three  days  the  go-betweens  seem  to 
have  been  very  confident  of  complete  success.  It 
is  likely  that  two  undated  lists  of  ministers  in 
Mirabeau's  handwriting  were  projected  in  these 
days.  One  of  them  is  headed  by  Necker's  name 
as  prime-minister,  but  with  the  remark :  "  Because 
one  must  render  him  as  powerless  as  he  is  inca- 
pable, and  at  the  same  time  preserve  his  popu- 
larity to  the  king."  Mirabeau  figures  in  it  as 
member  of  the  cabinet,  but  without  any  special 
department.  To  his  name  the  remark  is  added: 
"  The  petty  scruples  of  human  deference  are  no 
more  in  season.  The  government  must  loudly 
announce  that  its  foremost  auxiliaries  will  be 
henceforth  sound  principles,  character,  and  talent." 
Lafayette  is  to  be  a  member  of  the  cabinet  with 
the  title  of  "  Marechal  de  France^'''  and  tempo- 
rarily invested  with  the  office  of  commander-in- 
chief  for  the  purpose  of  reorganizing  the  army. — 
The  second   list   is  incomplete  and  divided  into 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  95 

two  groups,  respectively  headed :    "  Part  of  La- 
fayette," and  "  Part  of  the  Queen."  ^ 

One  is  evidently  on  the  eve  of  the  decision,  but, 
unfortunately,  the  more  we  approach  it,  the  more 
fragmentary  also  our  sources  become.  Thus 
much  we  can  see,  that  both  sides  are  equally  active 
in  getting  ready  for  the  battle.  Lafayette  has,  after 
all,  again  failed  to  "  turn  the  wheel."  His  exas- 
perating consistency  in  swinging  like  a  pendulum 
from  right  to  left  and  back  from  left  to  right 
nothing  can  overcome.  Talon  writes,  on  the  5th 
of  November,  to  La  March :  "  I  am  going  to  La- 
fayette ;  we  shall  do  the  impossible  to  determine 
him."  And  in  the  same  note  he  says  :  "  A  terrible 
plot,  I  repeat  it,  is  being  formed  against  Mirabeau 
in  the  Assembly."  ^  This  is  no  news  to  IVIirabeau. 
He  writes  on  the  same  day  to  La  INIarck :  "  The 
bomb  of  m}'  enemies  is  to  explode  on  Monday  " 
(the  9th).  And  he  knows  as  well  that  the  min- 
isters do  not  propose  to  be  led  like  sheep  to 
the  slaughter-house.  On  the  6th  he  informs  La 
Marck,  that  they  have  had  a  conference  at  La- 
fayette's, Avho,  he  declares,  was  mad  about  them 
on  the  4th,  but  is  completely  duped  by  them. 
But  he  is  in  high  spirits.  He  is  determined  to 
'  Corresp.,  I.  411,  412.  "^  lb.,  I.  416. 


96  THE   FRENCH  REVOLUTION. 

head  them  off.  On  the  5th  he  announces  to  La 
Marck,  that  he  will  attack  them  the  next  day  and 
tells  him  how  he  intends  to  do  it.  I  do  not  see, 
he  says,  what  miracle  could  make  these  gentle- 
men live,  if  from  Monday  next  they  can  get  no 
dollar  more,  and  "  are  to-morrow  compelled  to 
accept  or  refuse  the  honor  of  seating  themselves 
among  us."  A  victory,  which  he  achieved  on 
that  day  in  another  question  over  the  cabinet, 
elates  him  so  much  that  he  writes  on  the  morning 
of  the  6th  to  La  Marck,  that  his  cause  has  advanced 
"  at  giant  strides."  Lafayette,  he  thinks,  will 
be  compelled  to  surrender  practically  at  discretion, 
grateful  that  his  (jNIirabeau's)  "  personal  fidelity  " 
will  cede  to  him  the  honor  of  presenting  the  list 
of  ministers,  which  he  (Mirabeau)  will  compose 
for  him. 

The  letter  states  that  he  proposes  to  open  the 
attack  "by  a  simple  tactical  evolution."  M.  Lo- 
menie  infers  from  this  expression  that  the  financial 
question,  which  was  the  order  of  the  day,  only 
served  him  as  a  "  pretext."  If  tnis  be  correct,  his 
further  strictures  upon  the  speech  cannot  be  re- 
futed. He  charges  the  remarks  upon  the  financial 
problems  with  being  "somewhat  lengthy,"  and 
asserts  that  Mirabeau,  after  having  entertained  the 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  97 

Assembly  "  for  an  hour  witli  these  preliminaries, 
came  abruptly,  and  almost  without  transition,  to  the 
true  object  of  his  discourse."  If  so,  then  at  least 
on  this  occasion  Mirabeau  evidently  cuts  a  rather 
sorry  figure  as  an  orator.  That  is  all  tlie  more 
surprising,  because  he  had  had  ample  time  for 
preparation  and  intended  to  strike  a  decisive  blow. 
M.  Lomenie  ought  to  have  been  struck  by  this 
as  much  as  the  most  ardent  admirer  of  Mirabeau, 
for  the  one  thing  in  which  he  acknowledges  him 
to  have  been  a  master  mind  is  oratory.  He,  there- 
fore, must  hold  others  excused  if  with  them  the 
suspicion  is  aroused  that  the  fault  may  lie  not 
with  Mirabeau,  but  with  him.  In  my  opinion  it  is 
one  of  Mirabeau's  greatest  speeches,  but  M.  Lo- 
menie could  not  do  him  justice  as  an  orator,  be- 
cause perhaps  in  no  other  case  has  he  so  strikingly 
proved  his  inability  fully  to  understand  and  appre- 
ciate him  as  a  statesman.  Mirabeau  does  not  seize 
upon  the  financial  question  as  a  pretext,  does  not 
waste  an  hour  in  irrelevant  preliminaries,  is  not 
driven  to  take  abruptly  an  awkward  side-leap  in 
order  to  get  at  last  somehow  to  his  true  object. 
The  financial  question  had  been  the  immediate 
occasion   for   convening   the    States-General ;  the 

financial  question  had  continued  to  be  one  of  the 
7 


98  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

main  propelling  forces  of  the  revolntion  ;  the 
financial  question  became  every  week  more  the 
most  pressing  and  the  most  immediately  dangerous 
problem,  the  financial  question  had  broadened  into 
tlie  question  of  the  whole  economical  condition  of 
the  country,  disintegrating  more  and  more  not 
only  the  political,  but  the  whole  social  structure — 
so  long  as  no  efficacious  remedy  was  applied  to  the 
financial  distress  and  the  rapidly  progressing  vitia- 
tion of  the  whole  economical  condition  of  the 
countr}^,  every  day  was  in  itself  a  "giant-stride" 
further  towards  the  abyss,  and,  finally,  no  remedy 
could  be  efficacious,  unless  the  axe  was  laid  to  the 
main  root  of  the  evils,  that  threatened  to  let  the 
revolution  terminate  in  chaos.  Therefore,  what- 
ever the  order  of  the  day,  he  had  to  make  the 
financial  question  the  basis  of  his  argument,  if  he 
wanted  to  treat  the  problem  confronting  France 
ex  fundamento  and  argue  as  a  statesman.  On  this 
basis  he  builds  with  a  master's  hand.  There  are 
no  prolixities,  no  irrelevancies,  no  sophistries,  no 
captivating  oratorical  flourishes.  It  is  a  matter-of- 
fact  speech,  closely  knit  and  of  flawless  logic :  not 
an  argument  manufactured  for  the  purpose  of 
arriving  at  a  predetermined  conclusion,  but  an 
array  of  irrefutable  facts  constituting  an  unbreak- 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  99 

able  cliain  leading  straight  up  to  the  conclusion. 
But  from  beginning  to  end  it  is  the  reasoning  not 
of  the  political  metaphysician  operating  with  the 
logical  categories  of  the  school,  but  of  the  states- 
man fully  conscious  that  he  must  shape  his  course 
according  to  the  merciless  logic  of  facts  and  there- 
fore never  lose  sight  of  the  whole,  viewing  and 
judging  everything  in  its  relation  to  and  its  bear- 
ing upon  the  Avhole.  Tliis  M.  Lomenie  fails  to 
do.  The  point  of  view  from  wliich  he  judges 
speech  and  speaker  is  not  the  whole  situation,  but 
the  isolated  fact  that  Mirabeau  Avants  to  overthrow 
the  cabinet  and  become  minister  himself.  Choos- 
ing this  point  of  view  he  does  not  look  to  the 
speech  for  the  correct  interpretation  of  the  an- 
nouncement that  the  attack  will  be  opened  by  a 
simple  tactical  evolution,  but  this  announcement 
is,  without  any  proof,  assumed  to  furnish  the  key 
to  the  speech,  i.  e.,  to  l)e  a  formal  avowal  that  he 
will  not  attempt  to  conquer  by  proving,  but  in- 
tends to  outmanoeuvre  the  adversary  by  stratagems. 
In  fact  the  tactical  evolution  consisted  only  in 
keeping  as  mucli  as  possible  all  personal  questions 
out  of  view.  Not  by  attacking  the  ministers  did 
he  propose  to  get  rid  of  them,  but  b}"  putting  the 
cabinet  into  such  a  position,  that  henceforth  only 


100  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

able  ministers  would  have  any  chance  of  main- 
taining themselves.  Indeed  a  dexterous  tactical 
move,  but  also  something  more  than  that:  the 
only  means  to  save  the  countiy. 

Literally  not  a  minute  does  Mirabeau  waste  in 
preliminaries.  In  the  very  first  sentence  he  suc- 
cinctly states  the  thesis  he  proposes  to  prove : 
among  the  multiplying  financial  disorders  "are 
some,  the  aggravation  of  which  could  render  all 
our  labors  useless  ;  "  ^  in  other  words :  if  a  financial 
sanitation  be  not  effected,  everything  is  at  stake. 
At  the  head  of  the  financial  disorders  he  puts  the 
disappearing  of  specie.  "  A  nation  accustomed  to 
the  use  of  specie  .  .  .  cannot  be  deprived  of  it  for 
any  length  of  time  without  trouble  arising  in  all 
its  transactions,  without  the  efforts  of  individuals 
to  sustain  them  becoming  more  and  more  ruinous 
and  preparing  very  great  calamities.  These 
calamities  approach  at  long  strides.  We  are  on 
the  eve  of  a  formidable  crisis."  Commerce  can 
no  more  procure  the  specie  it  needs;  everybody 
hoards  it  for  his  own  safety ;  the  causes,  which 
drive  it  out  of  the  country,  become  every  day 
more  active,  and  yet  it  is  indispensable  for  the  pi'O- 
vision  trade,  on  which  the  maintenance  of  public 
1  CEuvres,  II.  395. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  101 

tranquillity  so  largely  depends.  "Absolutely 
nothing  is  done  to  combat  the  calamity  of  our 
foreign  exchange ; "  drafts  on  Paris  are  so  dis- 
credited, that  they  can  no  longer  be  negotiated  in 
any  commercial  place.  The  caisse  (V eseompte  con- 
tinues to  flood  the  country  with  its  paper  money, 
which  is  justly  looked  upon  with  growing  distrust, 
since  the  government  has  begun  to  dispense  it 
from  the  obligation  to  pay  on  presentation  specie 
for  its  notes.  Necker's  very  reputation  has  struck 
a  blow  against  the  public  credit.  Everybody 
reasons  thus :  if  ever  he  is  reduced  to  the  neces- 
sity of  having  recourse  to  such  means,  all  resources 
must  be  exhausted.  Confidence  has  vanished  and 
is  vanishing  more  every  day.  The  withdrawal  of 
other  securities  to  the  amount  of  about  200  mill- 
ions has  increased  the  stringency.  All  the  great 
commercial  centres,  and,  above  all,  the  capital,  are 
already  "  reduced  to  the  last  expedients."  "  Are 
the  anxieties  of  Paris  in  regard  to  the  supply  of 
provisions  not  as  much  the  effect  of  the  scarcity 
of  specie  and  the  apprehensions  it  excites,  as  of 
the  dark  plots,  so  difficult  to  understand  and  so 
impossible  to  prove,  to  which  one  persists  in  at- 
tributing them?"  If  an  economical  catastrophe 
befall  Paris^in  consequence  of  a  great  number  of 


^_  LZBRARY 

miVEnSlTY  OF  CALTFORNrA 
SANTA  BARBARA 


102  THE   FRENCH   EEVOLUTION. 

suspensions,  ruin  must  spread  from  this  centre  all 
over  tlie  country.  "  Would  it  not  be  a  miracle, 
upon  which  no  one  dare  put  his  trust,  if  in  so  gen- 
eral a  calamity  the  social  bond  did  not  break ;  if 
in  default  of  physical  force  moral  force  were  to 
preserve  it  ? 

"  You  undoubtedly  ask  yourselves,  gentlemen,  to 
what  these  observations  are  to  lead  us  ?  To  turn 
us  more  than  ever  away  from  the  resource  of 
palliatives,  to  dread  vague  hopes,  not  to  expect 
the  return  of  a  happier  time  except  by  multiply- 
ing our  efforts  and  measures  to  bring  it  about, 
not  to  go  on  trying  by  used-up  resources  to  throw 
our  embarrassments  upon  those  who  will  come 
after  us.  Our  efforts  would  be  useless  ;  the  reign 
of  delusions  is  past ;  experience  has  taught  us  too 
much  the  perfidy  of  all  means  leaving  to  imagina- 
tion alone  to  create  the  motives  of  confidence." 

If  this  be  beating  around  the  bush  with  irrel- 
evancies  used  as  pretexts,  I  am  yet  to  read  the 
first  political  speech  that  takes  the  bull  by  the 
horns  and  states  with  all  the  plainness  and  suc- 
cinctness that  language  is  capable  of,  what  the 
speaker  is  driving  at.  One  only  must  not,  in  the 
face  of  his  express  declarations,  impute  to  him 
that  he  merely  wanted  to  overthrow  the  cabinet. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  103 

This  was  not  the  end,  but  a  means  to  the  end, 
and  but  one  among  several.  What  he  wants  is  to 
put  an  end,  once  for  all,  to  the  policy  of  palliatives 
and  initiate  a  radical  cure,  and  he  declares  and 
proves  that  in  the  nature  of  things,  everything  can 
be  but  a  palliative,  unless  confidence  be  restored. 
"In  one  word,"  he  says,  "one  must  do  away 
with  all  the  causes  destructive  of  confidence,  and 
put  in  their  place  the  means,  the  efficacy  of  which 
is  discernible  to  the  least  trained  eyes  and  sustains 
itself  by  the  solidity  and  wisdom  of  their  own 
construction."  Mind:  all  the  causes  destructive 
of  confidence. 

Then  he  proceeds  to  state  and  discuss  the  means, 
which,  in  his  opinion,  ought  to  be  put  in  their 
place.  He  begins  with  the  supply  of  provisions, 
i.  e.,  with  the  question  which  more  than  any  one 
other  thing  renders  Paris  a  volcano  threatening 
every  day  a  new  eruption.  He  thinks  an  attempt 
ought  to  be  made  to  induce  the  United  States  to 
pay  their  war-loans  by  sending  France  grain. 

Next  he  suggests  for  the  administration  of  the 
public  debt  the  establishment  of  a  caisse  nationale 
with  revenues  of  its  own,  commensurate  to  the 
obligations  to  be  discharged  by  it  and  independent 
of  the  ministry  of  finances.     This  would  not  only 


104  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

completely  restore  the  confidence  of  the  creditors 
of  the  state  by  giving  them  a  perfect  guarantee 
that  they  will  always  be  paid  what  they  have  to 
claim,  but  also  engage  this  powerful  class,  in  their 
own  interest,  in  every  way  to  support  the  caisse 
nationale  and  the  public  credit  in  general. 

What  more,  he  then  asks,  will  have  to  be  done, 
to  secure  to  the  nation  the  credit  it  deserves? And 
he  answers :  "  The  return  of  peace  and  good  order, 
the  restoration  of  the  forces  of  the  empire."  He 
pretends  to  think  that  one  is  rapidly  advancing  on 
the  high-road  towards  this  goal,  but  declares  that 
it  cannot  be  reached,  so  long  as  there  is  an  antag- 
onism between  the  Assembly  and  the  ministers, 
and  this  antagonism,  he  asserts,  must  continue,  so 
long  as  the  ministers  are  absent  from  the  National 
Assembly.  "  All  good  citizens  sigh  for  the  re- 
establishment  of  the  public  force ;  and  what  public 
force  can  we  establish  if  the  executive  and  lesris- 
lative  powers  look  upon  each  other  as  enemies  and 
fear  to  discuss  in  common  the  public  affairs  ?  " 

That  this  was  the  pivotal  point  of  the  whole 
political  problem,  is  incontestable.  On  this  occa- 
sion Mirabeau  assumed  it  to  be  so  patent,  that  it 
required  no  proof.  He  at  once  proceeded  to  the 
examination  of  the  question,  whether  the  means, 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  105 

by  which  he  proposed  to  bring  about  the  necessary 
concert  between  the  two  departments,  be  adapted 
to  the  end. 

In  England,  he  said,  "  the  depository  of  a  long 
course  of  experiences  on  liberty,"  the  nation  con- 
siders the  presence  of  the  ministers  in  Parliament 
not  only  absolutely  necessary,  but  one  of  its  great 
privileges.  It  thus  exercises  over  all  acts  of  the 
executive  power  a  control  which  is  more  important 
than  any  other  responsibility. 

"  There  is  not  a  member  of  the  Assembly  that 
cannot  interrogate  them.  The  minister  cannot 
help  answering  .  .  .  every  question  is  official,  has 
the  whole  Assembly  as  a  witness  ;  evasions,  equivo- 
cations are  judged  by  a  great  number  of  men,  who 
have  the  right  to  insist  upon  more  explicit  an- 
swers. .  .  What  has  one  to  oppose  to  these  ad- 
vantages ?  Will  it  be  said  that  the  National  As- 
sembly has  no  need  to  be  informed  by  the  minis- 
ters ?  But  where  are,  in  the  first  place,  the  facts 
to  be  found  which  constitute  the  experience  of  the 
government  ?  .  .  .  Can  one  say  that  those  who  ex- 
ecute the  laws  have  nothing  to  tell  to  those  by 
whom  they  are  devised  and  determined  ?  Are  the 
executors  of  all  the  public  transactions  .  .  .  not  like 
a  repertory,  which  an  active  representative  of  the 


106  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

nation  must  constantly  consult  ?  And  where  could 
this  be  done  to  greater  advantage  to  the  nation 
than  in  the  presence  of  the  Assembly?  Outside 
the  Assembly  the  inquirer  is  but  an  individual,  to 
whom  the  minister  can  answer  what  he  likes,  and 
even  not  answer  at  all.  Will  he  be  interrogated 
by  a  decree  of  the  Assembly?  But  then  one  ex- 
poses oneself  to  procrastinations,  delays,  tergiversa- 
tions, obscure  answers.  .  .  Does  one  say  that  the 
minister  can  be  summoned  to  appear  before  the 
Assembly  ?  .  .  .  only  the  majority  can  summon  him, 
while  in  the  Assembly  he  cannot  escape  the  inter- 
rogatory of  a  single  member. 

"  Where  could  the  ministers  combat  witli  less 
success  the  liberty  of  the  people  ?  where  Avill  they 
make  with  less  inconvenience  their  observations 
on  the  acts  of  legislation  ?  where  will  their  preju- 
dices, their  errors,  their  ambition  be  unveiled  with 
more  energy  ?  where  will  they  contribute  more  to 
the  stability  of  the  decrees  ?  where  will  they  more 
solemnly  take  the  obligation  to  execute  them  ?  .  .  . 

1 "  Does  one  say  that  the  minister  will  have 
more  influence  in  the  Assembly  than  if  he  had  not 

'  The  paragraph-structure  in  this  and  similar  quotations 
may  appear  a  little  odd.  It  is  always  strictly  according  to 
the  original. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  10  T 

the  right  to  sit  in  it  ?  It  woukl  be  pretty  difficult 
to  prove  it.  The  influence  of  the  ministers,  if  it 
is  not  due  to  their  talents  and  their  virtues,  springs 
from  manoeuvres,  seductions,  secret  corruptions, 
and  if  anything  can  diminish  the  effect  of  these,  it 
is  when  they,  as  members  of  the  Assembly,  are 
constantly  under  the  eyes  of  an  opposition,  which 
has  no  interest  to  spare  them. 

"  Why  should  we  fear  the  presence  of  the  min- 
isters ?  Must  we  dread  their  vengeance  ?  Is  it  to 
be  apprehended  that  they  Avill  themselves  mark 
out  their  victims  ?  One  would  forget  tliat  we  are 
making  a  free  constitution.  .  .  The  laws  on  in- 
dividual liberty  will  liberate  us  from  ministerial 
despotism.  That  is  the  true,  the  only  safeguard 
of  the  liberty  of  votes. 

"  No,  gentlemen,  we  shall  not  yield  to  frivolous 
fears,  to  idle  phantoms  ;  we  will  not  have  that 
distrustful  timidity  which  rushes  into  traps  from 
very  fear  to  defy  them. 

"  The  first  agents  of  the  executive  power  are 
necessary  in  every  legislative  assembly  ;  they  form 
a  part  of  the  organs  of  its  intelligence.  The  laws, 
discussed  with  them,  will  become  more  easy  ;  their 
sanction  will  be  more  assured,  and  their  execution 
more   complete.     Their  presence  will  prevent   in- 


108  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

cidents,  steady  our  march,  promote  concert  between 
the  two  powers  to  whom  the  fate  of  the  empire  is 
confided." 

He  concluded  with  a  threefold  motion,  covering 
the  three  remedies  he  had  suggested.  The  last 
one,  clad  in  the  form  of  an  invitation  to  the  min- 
isters, conferred  upon  them  "  a  consultative  voice, 
until  definite  provision  be  made  in  regard  to  them 
by  the  constitution." 

So  many  members  vividly  applauded  the  orator 
that  he  might  well  feel  confident  of  success.  And 
even  apart  from  the  cogency  of  his  reasoning  the 
Assembly,  if  it  cared  an3ahing  for  being  consistent, 
had  indeed  good  cause  for  receiving  the  motion 
favorably.  On  the  4th  of  August  the  king  had 
notified  the  Assembly  of  the  appointment  of  three 
new  ministers.  1  The  last  sentence  of  his  letter 
read  thus :  "  By  choosing  from  your  Assembly  I 
indicate  my  desire  to  entertain  with  it  the  most 
constant  and  most  amiable  llarmon3^"  Upon 
demand  the  letter  had  to  be  read  a  second  time 
and  each  time  it  was  loudly  applauded.  Then, 
state    the   Archives    Parlementaii^es^    "upon    the 

'  The  Ai'chbishop  of  Bordeaux,  Champion  de  Cice,  the 
Arclibishop  of  Vienne,  La  France  de  Pompignan,  and  de  la 
Tour-du-Pin-Pauliu. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  109 

motion  of  several  members  the  Assembly  votes 
unanimously  an  address  of  thanks  to  the  king  for 
the  mark  of  confidence  which  he  has  given  it."  ^ 
The  new  ministers,  it  is  true,  had  ceased  to  occupy 
their  seats  in  the  Assembly,  but,  so  far  as  I  can  see, 
not  in  consequence  of  any  action  on  the  part  of 
the  Assembly;  their  letter  of  the  5th  of  August  to 
the  Assembly  is  silent  on  this  point.^  On  the 
other  hand,  however,  the  crown  had  claimed  the 
right  to  send  the  ministers  before  the  Assembly, 
verbally  to  communicate  to  it  the  views  of  the 
government,  and  the  Assembly  had  not  contested 
the  claim.  But  three  days  after  that  letter  of  the 
king,  to  which  the  Assembly  unanimously  voted  to 
reply  by  an  address  of  thanks,  the  cabinet  appeared 
before  the  Assembl}^,  Cice  announcing:  "We  are 
sent  to  you  by  the  king  to  deposit  in  your  bosom 
the  apprehensions  agitating  the  paternal  heart  of 
His  Majesty."  3 

Would  an  opinion,  based   merely  on  these  facts 
and  on   what  was   revealed   on  the   surface  of  the 

•  Arch.  Pari.,  IX.  341. 

^Mirabeau  said  in  the  Assembly  :  "lis  ont  juge  a  propos 
d'abdiquer  la  litre  des  I'epreseiitans  de  la  nation  ;  ils  ont  cru 
bien  faire,  mais  il  est  perniis  d'avoir  deux  avis  a  cet  egard." 
—Moniteur,  Sept.  29,  1789. 

3  Arch.  Pari.,  IX.  360. 


110  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

situation,  not  ratlier  liave  charged  Mirabeau  with 
having  set  up  an  unnecessarilj^  huge  apparatus 
for  the  attainment  of  his  end,  than  with  having 
undertaken  a  hopeless  task  ?  And  the  speeches 
that  were  made  against  his  motion  were 
eminently  calculated  to  confirm  this  view.  I 
say  speeches,  for  to  say  arguments  would  be 
an  unwarrantable  abuse  of  the  word.  Blin's 
speech,  the  only  one  with  at  least  a  pretence  at 
arguing,  was  a  tissue  of  gross,  self-contradictory 
sophisms.  Instead  of  refuting  Mirabeau,  he 
tears  to  pieces  a  man  of  straw  set  up  by  liim- 
self.  He  undertakes  to  prove  the  impropriety  of 
consulting  with  the  ministers  in  the  Assembly, 
by  gravely  demonstrating  that  it  would  not  be 
the  proper  thing  to  consult  "  only  "  the  ministers — 
he  231'etends  to  think  that  the  adoption  of  the 
motion  would  preclude  the  ministers  being  con- 
sulted by  committees,  because  Mirabeau  has 
spoken  disparagingly  of  these — he  opposes  the 
motion,  now,  because  the  poor  ministers  ought  not 
to  be  exposed  to  the  ruthless  attacks  of  ambitious 
members,  and,  in  tlie  next  minute,  because  they 
will  force  all  sorts  of  obnoxious  laws  upon  the 
Assembly,  for  their  responsibility  will  have  been 
rendered  a  "  chimerical  terror."      Tlie  experiences 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  Ill 

of  England,  according  to  liira,  are  only  the  most 
impressive  warning  against  the  motion :  if  the 
ministers  had  not  been  in  Parliament,  England 
would  never  have  lost  her  American  colonies  and 
numberless  bad  laws  would  not  have  been 
passed.  Let  the  motion  be  adopted  and  there  is 
but  one  alternative  :  either  the  executive  power  is 
unnecessarily  and  uselessly  depressed  and  debased, 
or  "  the  Assembly  is  no  longer  free  and  the  nation 
is  in  danger  of  losing  its  liberty."  "  The  only 
enemies  of  the  kings  and  of  the  nations  are  the 
ministers."^ 

This  apothegm  of  political  doctrinarianism  run 
mad  was  the  climax  of  the  speech.  The  climax, 
but  not  the  true  key  to  it.  This  was  concealed  in 
a  vague  and  enigmatical  remark  about  some 
"  ambition  of  a  near  or  distant  future."  Princi- 
pally to  ponder  this  over-night,  and  not  to  digest 
the  argumentative  hash  to  which  it  had  been 
treated  by  Blin,  the  Assembly  postponed  its  decis- 
ion to  the  next  day.  That  boded  no  good. 
Apparently  Mirabeau  had  every  reason  to  be  of 
good  cheer  ;  in  fact  the  battle  was  virtually  lost, 
for  the  constitution  of  the  Assembly  was  such, 
that  it  was  almost  sure  to  succumb  if  poison  of 
1  Arch.  Pari.,  IX.  711-713. 


112  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

this    kind   was  allowed  to  work  for  twenty-four 
hours.^ 

The  tone  which  his  adversaries  assumed  the 
next  day,  at  once  apprised  Mirabeau  that  he  was 
defeated.  Montlosier  excelled  Blin  in  the  holy 
zeal  with  which  he  declaimed  against  allowing 
the  ministers  "  to  enlighten  our  debates  with  their 
false  light,  to  fill  them  with  their  false  doctrine  ; " 
but  his  concluding  assertion,  that  the  proposition 
must  have  "a  mystic  sense,"  smartly  turned 
Blin's  dagger  around  in  tlie  wound.  Lanjuinais, 
who  followed  him,  disdained  to  fight  with  innuen- 
does. With  visor  wide-open  he  struck  straight 
home.  "An  eloquent  genius,"  he  exclaimed, 
"  prevails  on  you  and  subjugates  you ;  Avhat  would 
this  man  not  do,  if  he  were  to  become  minister? "^ 

'  According  to  the  Arch.  Pari. ,  Blin  spoke  on  the  6th  and 
7th.  The  second  speech,  however,  reads  so  much  like  a 
synopsis  of  the  first  that  one  cannot  help  suspecting  a 
blunder  on  the  part  of  the  editors,  though  it  is  almost  too 
gross  to  seem  credible.  If  Blin  spoke  but  once,  it  is  as  good 
as  certain  that  he  did  so  on  the  7th.  In  that  case  the  situa- 
tion would  have  been  apparently  still  more  favorable  for 
Mirabeau,  but  in  fact  he  had  all  the  more  reason  to  expect  a 
defeat.  As  his  motion  had  been  vigorously  supported  bj'' 
some,  and  none  of  the  other  opponents  had  adduced  any- 
thing against  it  bearing  even  the  semblance  of  a  serious 
argument,  the  refusal  to  come  to  a  vote  was  inexplicable 
unless  it  concealed  a  sinister  design. 

2  CEuvres,  II.  433.     The  synopsis  of  Lanjuinais'  speech  in 


THE   FRENCH  REVOLUTION.  113 

That  was  David's  pebble  felling  Goliath  to  the 
ground.  Lajuninais  ended  by  making  the 
counter-motion,  that  during  the  legislative  period 
and  for  three  years  after  the  close  of  it,  no  repre- 
sentative of  the  nation  be  allowed  to  accept  from 
the  executive  power  any  place,  pension,  prefer- 
ment, grace,  etc. 

Mirabeau's  reply  was  absolutely  crushing,  but 
he  spoke  against  a  pre-determined  and  irrevocable 
resolution.  Nobody  so  much  as  attempted  to 
answer  him ;  he  was  simply  voted  down. 

"  I  cannot  believe  that  the  author  of  the  motion 
seriously  wishes  to  have  determined  that  the  elite 
of  the  nation  cannot  contain  a  good  minister. 

"  That  the  confidence  accorded  by  the  nation  to 
a  citizen  must  be  a  reason  for  excluding  the  confi- 
dence of  the  king.  .  .  . 

"  That  in  declaring  that,  without  any  other 
distinction  than  that  of  virtues  and  talents,  all 
citizens  have  an  equal  aptitude  for  every  employ, 
one  must  except  from  that  aptitude  and  that 
equality  of  rights  the  twelve  hundred  deputies 
honored  by  the  suffrage  of  a  great  people. 

"  That  the  National  Assembly  and  the  cabinet 

the  Archwes  Pnrlementaires  is  so  brief,  that  it  is  worthless. 
Not  even  any  allusion  is  made  to  this  sentence. 


114  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

must  be  so  divided,  so  opposed  to  each  other,  that 
one  ouofht  to  discard  all  means  wliich  mi^ht 
establish  more  intimacy,  more  confidence,  more 
unity  in  the  plans  and  in  the  measures. 

"  No,  gentlemen,  I  do  not  believe  that  this  is 
the  object  of  the  motion,  for  I  shall  never  be  able 
to  believe  an  absurdity. 

"  Nor  can  I  imagine  that  what  with  our  neigh- 
bors serves  the  public  welfare,  can  be  with  us  only 
a  source  of  evils.  .  .  . 

"  Nor  can  I  believe  that  it  is  intended  to  offer 
this  insult  to  the  cabinet,  to  think  that  whoever 
belongs  to  it  must  eo  ipso  for  this  fact  be  suspicious 
to  the  National  Assembly. 

1 "  To  three  ministers  already  taken  from  the 
midst  of  this  Assembly  and  almost  upon  its  vote, 
that  this  example  has  taught  that  a  similar  promo- 
tion would  be  dangerous  in  the  future. 

"  To  every  meml^er  of  this  Assembl}^  that,  if  he 
were  called  into  the  cabinet  for  having  done  his 
duty  as  citizen,  he  would  cease  to  do  it  by  the  fact 
in  itself  of  his  being  minister.  .  .  . 

"  I  besides  ask  myself  :  is  it  a  point  of  the  con- 

'  The  reader  has  of  course  to  supply  for  this  and  for  the 
following  sentence,  "  to  offer  this  insult ",  from  the  preced- 
ing paragraph. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  115 

stitution  one  proposes  to  settle?  The  moment 
has  not  yet  come  to  examine  whether  the  functions 
of  ministers  are  incompatible  with  the  quality 
of  representative  of  the  nation,  and  such  a  ques- 
tion cannot  be  decided  without  discussing  it  at 
length. 

"Is  it  a  simple  police  rule  which  one  intends  to 
establish  ?  Then  there  is  perhaps  a  previous  law 
which  one  ought  to  obey,  that  of  our  mandates, 
without  whicli  none  of  us  would  be  what  he  is ; 
and  in  this  respect  one  ought,  perhaps,  to  examine, 
whether  this  Assembly  is  competent  to  establish 
for  this  session  an  incompatibility  of  which  the 
mandates  know  nothing  and  to  which  no  deputy 
has  subjected  himself. 

"  Shall  every  representative  be  forbidden  to 
resign?     Our  liberty  w^ould  be  violated. 

"  Shall  he  who  resigns  be  prevented  from 
accepting  a  place  in  the  cabinet  ?  Then  one  in- 
tends to  curtail  the  liberty  of  the  executive  power. 

"  Is  it  proposed  to  deprive  the  constituents  of 
the  right  to  re-elect  the  deputy  whom  the  king- 
has  called  into  his  council  ?  Then  not  a  rule  of 
police  is  to  be  rendered,  but  a  point  of  the  consti- 
tution must  be  established." 

"Furthermore:  can  it  not    easily  happen  that 


116  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

the  Assembly  itself  believes  salvation  dependent 
on  having  ministers,  that  share  its  principles  and 
views,  taken  from  its  midst? 

"  However  great  the  number  of  statesmen, 
which  so  enlightened  a  nation  as  ours  may  con- 
tain, is  it  nothing  to  render  1,200  citizens  ineligi- 
ble, who  already  are  the  SUte  of  the  nation  ? 

"  I  ask  :  shall  the  king  prefer  courtiers  or  those 
to  whom  the  nation  has  not  given  its  confidence, 
though  they  may  have  solicited  it,  to  the  deputies 
of  his  people  ?  " 

As  it  is  impossible  to  answer  these  questions, 
he  says,  it  is  impossible  that  the  ostensible  object 
of  the  motion  be  its  true  purpose,  "  To  render 
homage  to  the  intentions  of  him  who  has  moved 
it,  I  am  forced  to  think  that  some  secret  motive 
justifies  it,  and  I  shall  try  to  divine  it. 

"  I  believe  that  it  can  be  useful  to  prevent 
certain  members  of  the  Assembly  from  entering 
the  cabinet. 

"  But  as  it  is  not  proper  to  sacrifice  a  great 
principle  in  order  to  obtain  this  specific  advantage, 
I  propose  as  an  amendment  the  exclusion  from 
the  cabinet  of  those  members  of  the  Assembly 
whom  the  author  of  the  motion  seems  to  fear,  and 
I  undertake  to  name  them. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  117 

"  There  can  be,  gentlemen,  but  two  members  in 
the  Assembl}^  who  can  be  the  secret  objects  of 
the  motion.  The  others  have  given  sufficient 
proofs  of  liberty,  courage,  and  public  spirit  .  .  . 
Who  are  these  members  ?  You  have  already 
guessed  it,  gentlemen  ;  it  is  either  the  author  of 
the  motion,  or  myself.  .  .  The  amendment,  gen- 
tlemen, which  I  propose,  is,  that  the  exclusion 
which  one  demands,  be  confined  to  M.  de  Mira- 
beau,  deputy  of  the  commoners  of  Aix." 

One  would  have  to  search  the  annals  of  parlia- 
mentarism a  long  time  to  find  another  speech 
every  single  sentence  of  which  is  such  a  sledge- 
hammer stroke.  Never  did  a  prouder  word  pass 
the  lips  of  Mirabeau  than  his  amendment,  and  it 
painted  the  situation  with  photographic  exactness. 
The  vanquished  put  himself  the  laurel  wreath  of 
victory  upon  his  brow,  and  the  victors  stood  before 
him  as  culprits  caught  in  the  act.  Blin's  motion, 
to  exclude  the  members  of  the  Assembly  for  the 
duration  of  its  session  from  the  cabinet,  was 
adopted  by  a  great  majority,  but  the  Assembly 
had  borne  testimony  to  the  immense  superiority  of 
the  man  and  its  unappeasable  jealousy  of  him  in  a 
way,  which  })ut  an  indelible  stigma  not  only  upon  its 
political  discernment,  1)ut  also  upon  its  patriotism. 


118  THE   FRENCH  REVOLUTION. 

"Every  time  that  Mirabeau  was  too  much  in 
the  right,"  says  Mejan,  the  editor  of  his  speeches, 
"he  was  accused  of  having  too  much  talent"; 
and,  "  they  only  assassinated  the  principles  and 
reason."  Alas  !  they  did  more.  They  also 
ground  the  axe  for  Louis  XVI.,  and  at  the  crank 
of  the  whetstone  stood  those  who  palmed  them- 
selves off  as  his  only  trusty  knights.  Most  of  the 
"  right,"  i.  e.,  the  conservatives,  voted  with  the 
dominating  faction  of  the  majority  for  Blin's 
motion,  and  La  Marck  directly  charges  Cic^  with 
being  the  real  originator  of  the  plot  which  was 
hatched  against  Mirabeau  and  his  motion  between 
the  two  meetings  of  the  Assembly  on  the  6th  and 
7th  of  November.!  Led  by  a  minister  of  the  king, 
his  especial  champions  stabbed  the  one  man  who 
could  have  saved  him,  if  it  still  was  possible  to 
save  him,  ^  and  therefore  they  stabbed  the  king 
by  stabbing  Mirabeau. 

'  Corresp.,  I.  420-422.  Lafayette  corroborates  La  Marck "s 
assertion. 

^  I  cannot  refrain  from  calling  attention  to  the  following 
remarkable  sentence  in  a  letter  written  by  Mirabeau  on 
Sept.  3,  1788 — notice  the  date — to  his  uncle:  "  Un  evene- 
ment  (his  election  to  the  States-General)  qui  me  mettrait  en 
scene  dans  un  moment  qui  va  recommencer  la  nionarchie, 
en  la  constituent,  si  elle  est  encore  susceptible  d'etre  eon- 
stituee." — Mem.,  V.  193.     The  italics  are  mine. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  119 

"  I  should  think  myself  very  happy  if,  at  the 
price  of  my  exclusion,  I  could   preserve   to  this 
Assembly  the  hope  to  see  several  of  its  members, 
worthy  of  my  conhdence  and  all  my  respect,  become 
the   confidential  advisers  of   the  nation    and  the 
king,  wliom  I  sliall  not  cease  to  consider  indivisi- 
ble."    With  these  words  Mirabeau  had  concluded 
his  reply  to  Lajuinais.     They  were  not  a  hollow 
and  hypocritical   phrase,  but  expressed  his   true 
sentiments.     Though   he   ardently  wished  to  be- 
come   himself    minister,    not    only    to   satisfy   his 
burning    ambition,    but    also     because     he     was 
thoroughly   convinced    that   as    a   statesman    he 
towered  far  above  all  others,  yet  he  deemed  the 
legal  establislnnent  of  the   correct  principle  con- 
cerning the  relations  of  the   two  departments  of 
infinitely    greater  import  than  this   or    any  other 
personal   question.     This  is  no   mere  conjecture; 
the   assertion    is   fully  provable   by  positive    evi- 
dence.^ 

1  On  the  18th  of  November  he  writes  to  his  sister  Mme  du 
Saillant :  "  Ne  me  parle  pas  de  ces  haines  trop  betes  si  elles 
ne  sont  pas  atroces,  etne  t'en  fache  pas  pour  nous,  mais  pour 
le  bien  de  I'Etat,  et  de  la  revolution  qu'ils  ne  comprennent 
pas  ;  en  verite  j'aurais  le  droit  d"en  parler  com  me  Ciceron  a 
Atticus."  Allusion  is  made  to  the  passage  in  the  16th  letter 
of  the  1st  book,  commencing  :  "  Quaeris  deinceps,  qui  nunc 
sit  status  rerum,  et  qui  mens."— Memoii-es,  VI.  420. 


120  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

The  second  list  of  ministers  in  his  handwriting, 
which  I  mentioned,  does  not  contain  his  name, 
and  Lafayette  states  directly :  "  Mirabeau  re- 
nounces entering  (the  cabinet),  provided  that  he 
has  an  influence  upon  it."  ^  Then  he  (Mirabeau) 
again  and  again  repeats — as  well  in  his  private 
correspondence  as,  at  a  later  period,  in  his  Notes 
to  the  court — that  there  is  no  salvation,  unless  the 
insane  decree  of  November  7th  be  repealed,  and 
in  these  declarations  his  own  name  is,  at  the  most, 
mentioned,  so  to  speak,  incidentally  ;  as  a  rule  they 
contain  no  reference  whatever  to  himself.  Thus 
he  writes  already  at  the  end  of  1789 :  "  What 
more  will  have  to  be  done  ? — Revive  the  executive 
power;  regenerate  the  royal  authority,  and  con- 
ciliate it  with  national  liberty.  That  will  not  be 
done  without  a  new  cabinet,  and  this  enterprise  is 
noble  and  difficult  enough  for  one  to  wish  to 
belong  to  it.  But  a  new  cabinet  will  always  be 
badly  composed,  so  long  as  the  ministers  are  not 
members  of  the  legislature.  The  decree  concern- 
ing the  ministers  must  therefore  be  reconsidered. 
It  will  be  reconsidered,  or  the  revolution  will 
never  be  consolidated."  ^ 

The   brief   but   masterly   recapitulation  of   his 
iMemoires,  II.  432.  ■'  Corresp.,  I.  429. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  121 

reasons  for  this  opinion  in  a  Note  of  the  12th  of 
September,  1790,  to  the  court,  is  so  absolutely  free 
from  personal  considerations  that,  so  far  as  this  is 
concerned,  it  might  have  been  written  by  a  Wash- 
ington, The  decree,  he  says,  "  must  be  ojjenly 
attacked  by  the  king  and  by  all  those  who  want  to 
save  at  the  same  time  the  monarchical  government 

O 

and  the  kingdom,''  for,  "  in  a  representative  gov- 
ernment it  is  impossible  that  the  ministers  should 
not  sit  in  the  legislative  body,  if  tbe  nation  is  not 
to  be  exposed  to  violent  shocks  and  the  royal 
authority  to  continual  attacks.  Their  presence 
alone  can  serve  there  as  an  intermediary  and  com- 
mon bond  between  the  powers,  which  it  is  easier 
to  separate  in  theory  than  in  practice.  Thereby 
all  the  active  measures  of  the  legislative  body  will 
seem  measures  of  the  executive  power ;  one  would 
no  longer  present  two  opposite  ends  to  the  respect 
of  the  people  ;  there  would  be  unity  of  action  in 
the  authority;  the  National  Assembly  would  in- 
crease its  real  strength  ;  and  the  king  would  pre- 
serve his  prerogative.  If  this  measure  is  always 
indispensable  in  the  form  of  government  which 
we  have  adopted,  it  is  still  more  so  in  a  moment 
of  revolution,  when  the  royal  authority,  assaulted 
on  all  sides  and  paralyzed  in  all  its  energies,  can 


122  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

perish  either  by  inaction  or  by  the  rivalry  of 
another  authorit}^,  wliich  would  only  need  to  be 
favored  by  circumstances  to  crowd  it  out  en- 
tirely." 1 

That  was  but  too  true,  because  when  it  had  been 
decided  that  the  king  was  to  have  only  a  "  sus- 
pensive "  and  not  an  absolute  veto,  the  question  of 
granting  him  the  right  of  dissolving  the  legislature 
was,  as  M.  Lomenie  says,  "considered  as  ipso  facto 
discarded."-  Without  the  possibility  of  appeal- 
ing from  the  legislature  to  the  people,  and  the 
ministers  "  being  mere  clerks  (^commis)  at  the  As- 
sembly's commands,"^  the  crown  was  completely 
at  its  mercy. 

The  fatal  seed  yielded,  month  after  month,  a 
more  abundant  crop  of  poisonous  fruit.  ]Mira- 
beau's  anxiety  to  find  some  means  of  uprooting  it, 
therefore,  steadily  increased,  though  the  realiza- 
tion of  his  wish  to  enter  the  cabinet  liimself  pal- 
pably became  more  and  more  impossible.  In 
October,  1790,  he  repeatedly  advises  the  king,  if 
the  decree  be  rescinded,  either  to  appoint  a  mixed 
cabinet — half  moderates  and  half  radicals — or  to 
give  all  the  places  to  pure  Jacobins.  The  first 
proposition   was    based  upon  what  he  had  written 

'  Corresp.,  II.  178.  "-  lb.,  IV.  438.  »Ib,,  V.  16. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  123 

half  a  year  before  to  Lafayette  in  proposing 
to  him  an  alliance  once  more :  let  us  "  unite 
the  opinions  by  the  men,  as  we  cannot  unite  the 
men  by  the  opinions."  ^  The  latter  advice  is  in 
itself  irrefutable  proof  that,  apart  from  all  per- 
sonal aims  and  ends,  he  implicitly  believed  wliat 
he  said  about  the  absolute  necessity  of  an  organic 
connection  between  the  legislative  and  executive 
power.  But  there  was,  unquestionably,  also  more 
than  a  grain  of  truth  in  his  oft-quoted  remark: 
"  Jacobins  that  are  ministers  will  not  be  Jacobin 
ministers."  ^ 

It  hardly  needs  to  be  stated  that  when  in  Septem- 
ber, before  the  fall  of  Necker,  he  advised  the  king 
openly  to  attack  the  decree,  he  intended  to  do  so 
himself.  We  have  the  draft  of  the  speech  he  pro- 
posed to    deliver  in  the   Assembly.^     "  He  aban- 

'  Apr.  28,  1790.     Corresp.,  11.  4.  ^jb.,  H.  228. 

*  Memo)  res,  VIII.  126-149.  "  Voila  ou  nous  a  conduit  la 
separation  inconsequente  des  premiers  agens  du  pouvoir 
executif  et  des  representans  de  la  nation.  Oui,  je  suis  force 
de  le  repeter,  les  malheurs  qui  ont  accompagne  les  premiers 
temps  de  notre  revolution,  ceux  dont  nous  avons  etesucces- 
sivement  assaillis  jusqu'ici,  ceux  dont  nous  sommes  menaces 
encore,  n'ont  eu  et  ne  pourront  avoir  de  cause  plus  directe 
et  plus  certaine  .  .  .  je  vais  tacher  de  vous  demontrer,  par 
une  analyze  exacte  et  rigoureuse,  que  pour  I'avenir  eomme 
pour  le  passe  votre  decret  serait  une  cause  essentiellement 
generatrice  d'anarchie  et  de  discorde,  car  il  est  tout-a-fait 


124  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

cloned  the  intention,  because  he  soon  became  con- 
vinced that  there  was  not  the  slightest  chance  of 
success,  and  witliout  the  possibility  of  success  the 
attempt  would  have  been  a  gross,  tactical  blunder, 
for  it  could  only  have  the  effect  of  lessening  his 
influence  and  furnishing  arms  to  his  enemies. 
Lafayette  cut  the  string  of  his  bow. 

As  early  as  the  summer  of  1789  Mirabeau  had 
told  the  Assembly :  "  You  must  show  a  profound 
contempt  for  the  absurd  dogma  of  political  infalli- 
bility." ^  The  admonition  was  as  little  heeded  as 
most  of  his  warnings.  The  further  the  Assembly 
advanced  in  its  revolutionary  course,  the  more  it 
became  addicted  to  the  sweet  sin.  Its  worst  off- 
spring was  the  resolution  that  its  decrees  should 
be  irrevocable,  until  a  new  constituent  Assembly 
was  convened.  The  doubts  as  to  the  wisdom  of 
this  course  were,  however,  after  all,  not  completel}'" 
silenced.  At  least  a  back-door  was  provided  to 
remove  rotten  timber  if  it  should  appear  that  by 


destructif  de  la  constitution  dont  I'etablissement  vous  oc- 
cupe : 

1.  Parce  qu'il  porte  atteinte  au  droit  de  la  nation  ; 

2,  Parce  qu'il  empeclie  I'acconiplisseinent  du  premier 
devoir  du  monarque  ;  et  parce  qu'il  gene,  dans  Texercise  des 
leurs,  et  les  ministres  et  I'Assemblee. 

1  Aug.  18.  CEuvres,  II.  36. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  125 

some  inexplicable  accident  the  infallible  builders 
of  the  New  France  had  used  any.  Neither  the 
next  legislature  nor  the  people  were  to  have  any 
power  over  their  work,  but  they  themselves  were 
to  revise  it  before  attaching  to  it  the  unbreakable 
seal  of  legal  infallibility.  This  opportunity  Mira- 
beau  was  to  improve,  though,  as  he  said,  "  It 
was  mounting  the  breach  and  exposing  myself  to 
great  dangers."  Trusting  that  public  opinion  in 
the  provinces  Avould  give  him  sufficient  support, 
he  was  determined  "  openly  to  attack  all  that  part 
of  its  (the  Assembly's)  work,  which  is  the  cause  of 
the  present  calamities  of  the  kingdom  .  .  .  leaving 
it  no  alternative  but  complete  retraction  or  stub- 
born obstinacy."  He  was  confident  that,  if  prop- 
erly managed,  the  disgust  of  the  departments 
with  "the  legal  anarchy"  could  be  turned  to  such 
account,  that  a  "counter-revolution  in  the  idea" 
would  be  "as  inevitable  as  invincible."  "La- 
fayette," he  writes,  "at  first  entered  upon  this 
plan  and  undertook  to  have  the  materials  col- 
lected ;  soon  he  saw  in  it  only  a  means  to  separate 
the  constitutional  from  the  regulative  articles,  to 
fill  up  some  gaps  in  the  actual  constitution  and  to 
elude  the  imperious  and  salutary  necessity  of  a 
ratifying  assembly.     Then  he  wanted  to  charge  a 


126  THE   FRENCH  REVOLUTION. 

committee  with  tliis  labor,  though  it  cannot  be 
divided  .  .  .  ;  he  was  sure,  he  said,  that  he  could 
get  me  into  that  committee  and  have  me  made  its 
reporter.  Finally  ...  he  resolved  to  concert  with 
the  Jacobins  the  success  of  a  plan  which  the  Jaco- 
bins had  to  fear  the  most.  He  believed  that  he 
could  re-establish  the  principles  of  the  monarch- 
ical government  by  the  influence  of  a  republican 
sect."  The  committee  was  appointed,  and  Mira- 
beau  was  not  made  a  member  of  it,  though,  as  he 
asserts,  Lafayette  had  the  day  before,  given 
"  his  word  of  honor  "  to  another  person  that  he 
would  be. 

As  to  this  last  charge,  Mirabeau  himself  or  his 
informant  has  probably  laid  the  color  on  too  thick. 
Thus  much,  however,  is  certain.  Lafayette,  who 
emphatically  disclaimed  any  republican  tendencies, 
who  ever  posed  as  the  especial  champion  of  the 
constitutional     monarchy^ — Lafayette,    who     had 

1  At  least  in  his  professions  towards  the  king.  What  he 
really  was — a  monarchist  or  a  republican— it  is  impossible  to 
tell,  simply  because  he  never  knew  it  himself,  being  also  in 
this  respect  "  I'homme  aux  indecisions."  He  declared  him- 
self to  have  been  in  1789  at  heart  a  republican,  but  by  neces- 
sity a  monarchist.  On  the  27th  of  March,  1793,  he  wrote  from 
Magdeburg  to  Mr.  Von  Archenholz  in  Hamburg  :  "  J'avais 
sacrifie  des  inclinations  republicaines  aux  circonstances  et 
a  la  volonte  de  la  nation."— Mem.   de  Dumouriez,  II.  459. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  127 

forsaken  Mirabeaii  in  the  decisive  battle  of  the  7th 
of  November,  now  rendered  the  decisive  defeat  of 
that  day  irretrievable.  "  Finding  a  board  that  had 
escaped  the  public  shipwreck,"  Mirabeau  bitterly 
exclaims,  "  he  has  laid  his  hands  on  it  only  to 
break  it."  i 

Then  he  professed  to  have  been  converted  into  a  royalist  by 
the  events  of  the  5th  and  6th  of  October,  1789.  D'Estaing 
wrote  on  the  7th  of  October  to  the  Queen:  "  M.  de  Lafa- 
yette m'a  jure  en  route,  et  je  le  crois,  que  ces  atrocites  avai- 
ent  fait  de  lui  un  royaliste."  (Moniteur,  II.  46.)  On  the  20th 
of  May,  1790,  he  plumes  himself  on  his  royalism,  and  boasts 
of  a  victory  over  the  repviblicans.  He  says,  in  a  letter  of 
that  date,  addressed  to  his  cousin  Bouille  :  "II  s'est  eleve 
dernierement  une  question  sur  la  paix  et  la  guerre  qui  a 
separe  notre  parti,  d'une  maniere  tres  marquee,  en 
monarchique  et  republicain :  nous  (the  former)  avons  ete 
plus  forts ;  mais  cette  circonstance  et  bien  d'autres,  m'ont 
prouve  que  les  amis  du  bien  public  ne  sauraient  trop  s'unir." 
(Mem.  de  Bouille,  123.)  The  flight  of  the  king  caused  him 
to  return  to  his  old  love.  According  to  Ferrieres  he  con- 
sidered it  "  comme  la  voie  la  plus  propre  de  conduire  a  la 
republique."  (Mem.  de  Ferrieres,  II.  334.)  Nevertheless  he 
went  with  the  royalists.  The  manner  in  which  the  fact  is 
stated  by  him  in  the  above-quoted  letter  to  von  Archenholz, 
is  certainly  a  corroboration  rather  than  a  denial  of  Fer- 
rieres's  assertion.  ' '  Lorsque  apres  son  (the  king's)  evasion 
I'Assemblee  constituante  lui  off r it  de  nouveau  la  couronne, 
je  crus  devoir  reunir  ma  voix  a  la  presque  unanimite  de  ce 
decret." — Mem.  de  Dumouriez,  II.  461. 
'  Corresp.,  I.  192-195. 


LECTURE  X. 
Other  Defeats  and  Mischievous  Victories. 

"  OjSTE  must  never  judge  my  conduct  in  part, 
neither  upon  one  fact,  nor  upon  one  speech.  Not 
that  I  refuse  to  give  my  reasons  for  every  one  ; 
but  one  can  only  judge  them  as  a  whole  and 
exercise  an  influence  by  the  whole.  It  is  impos- 
sible to  save  the  state  day  by  day."  Thus  wrote 
Mirabeau  on  the  10th  of  May,  1790,  to  the  king.i 

Unquestionably,  in  the  nature  of  things  it  is  im- 
possible to  save  a  state  day  by  day.  But  it  is 
certain  that,  unless  he  did  just  this,  he  could  not 
save  it  at  all,  for  insurmountable  obstacles  barred 
every  other  way  against  him.  Though  it  became 
from  week  to  week  more  true,  it  had  been  true 
from  the  beginning  what  he  wrote  in  January, 
1790,  to  La  March:  "We  drift  at  random  on 
the  sea  of  unforeseen  events,  old  prejudices,  and 
invidious  passions."  ^     There  was  no  one  in  com- 

1  Corresp.,  II.  13.  -  lb.,  I.  446. 

128 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  129 

mand  of  the  craft.  It  ploughed  its  way  through 
the  surging  waves,  as  the  fitful  storm  happened 
to  strike  the  sails.  We  have  seen  how  Mirabeau 
had  tried  to  avert  this  by  urging  the  legal  captain 
actually  to  assume  the  command  and  keep  the  ves- 
sel upon  a  predetermined  course.  He  had  failed, 
and  from  the  first  hour  everything  concurred  to 
render  it  from  day  to  day  more  certain  that  every 
attempt,  either  to  set  a  captain  over  the  crew  or  to 
have  a  definite  course  laid  out,  must  result  in  a  more 
complete  failure.  To  do  this,  would  by  no  means 
have  rendered  salvation  a  certainty ;  but  without 
doing  this,  salvation  was  no  more  possible  than  a 
house  can  be  built  without  a  base  on  which  to 
build.  From  time  to  time  and  in  regard  to  this  or 
that  question,  Mirabeau  might  succeed  in  prevent- 
ing a  fresh  blunder  or  even  in  getting  the  right 
thing  done ;  but  all  he  could  thereby  achieve  was 
at  best  that  the  vessel  would  keep  afloat  a  little 
longer.  At  best,  for  what  was  in  itself  an  achieve- 
ment would  always  be  liable  to  be  turned  into  a 
fresh  source  of  calamity  by  adopting  only  one  half 
of  his  advice  and  rejecting  the  other  half,  while  its 
salutariness  depended  altogether  on  its  adoption  as 
an  integral  whole. 

The  father  compared  Mirabeau's  mind  to  a  mir- 


130  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

ror,  in  which  everything  is  pictured  and  effaced  in 
an  instant.  Lom^nie  endorses  ^  this  harsh  judg- 
ment and  finds  its  justification,  as  to  his  policy, 
principally  in  its  innumerable  and  rapid  mutations.^ 
So  far  as  the  charge  is  borne  out  by  the  facts,  it 
serves  as  a  proof  of  Mirabeau's  claim  to  genuine 
statesmanship.^  If  he  had  not  disj)layed  such  a 
versatility  in  his  tactics  and  even  in  his  strategy, 
he  would  have  been  what  Lomenie  believes  him 
to  have  been  :  an  orator  with  a  rather  thin  and 
pretty  impure  varnish  of  statecraft.  One  of  the 
main  charges  he  brought  against  Necker  was  that 

'  IV.  73,  74. 

^  If  the  charge  is  true,  then  no  man  was  ever  guilty  of 
grosser  self-deception  than  he.  He  wrote  to  Mauvillon  : 
"  J'ai  mis  plus  de  suite  qii'un  autre  moi'tel  quelconque,  pevit- 
etre,  a  vouloir  operer,  ameliorer  et  etendre  une  revolution 
qui,  plus  qu'aucune  autre,  avancera  I'espece  humaine. 
Vous  verrez  aussi  que  ce  qui  n'a  du  vous  paraitre  longtemps 
que  les  apergus  electriques  d'une  tete  tres-active,  etait  la 
combinaison  d'un  energique  philantrope,  qui  a  su  tourner  a 
son  but  toutes  les  chances,  toutes  les  circonstances,  tons  les 
hasards  d'une  vie  singulierement  etrange,  et  feconda  en 
bizarreries  et  en  singular! tes." — Lettres  a  Mauvillon,  476. 

^  He  writes,  January  4,  1790  :  "  Les  cartes  sont  tellement 
melee  dans  ce  tripot-ci,  il  est  si  difficile  pour  un  joueur  un 
peu  systematique  d'y  combiner  un  coup,  les  sottises  de  part 
et  d'autre  y  dejouent  si  completement  tons  les  calculs,  qu' 
apres  une  deperdition  d'esprit  et  d'activite,  dont  chaque 
journee  est  tres-fatiguee,  on  se  retrouve  au  meme  point, 
c'est-a-dire  au  centre  du  chaos." — Corresp.,  447. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  131 

the  minister  was  in  his  policy  "  always  at  war  with 
the  circumstances."  ^  He  was  not  guilty  of  the 
same  mistake,  for  he  understood  that  the  states- 
man has  to  shape  his  policy  according  to  the  cir- 
cumstances, though  he  be  ever  so  much  displeased 
with  them.  He  never  changed  as  to  the  What,  and 
not  to  change  as  to  the  How  would  have  been 
the  height  of  impotent  doctrinarianism,  because 
the  circumstances  were  constantly  undergoing  such 
changes,  so  that  to-day  was  worthless  or  worse 
than  worthless,  what  some  weeks  or  months  before 
had  been  best  calculated  to  attain  the  What.  No 
consistency  as  to  ways,  means,  and  methods  was 
possible,  so  long  as  wind  and  waves  had  virtually 
sole  command  of  the  ship.  So  long  as  this  was 
the  case,  the  true  statesman  could  have  but  one 
aim  and  end :  to  get  her  out  of  this  condition  at 
any  risk ;  for  as  long  as  she  was  in  it,  everything 
else  was  necessaril}^  but  a  hazardous  makeshift. 
And  to  get  her  out  of  this  condition  was  Mira- 
beau's  one  aim  and  end,  and  became  so  ever  more 
and  more,  the  more  it  became  evident  that  the  task 
could  not  be  accomplished.  On  this  question 
everything  depended,  and  as  to  this  question,  his 
very  victories  had  necessarily  the  effect  of  defeats. 
'  Corresp.,  II.  155. 


132  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

Necessarily,  for  it  was  but  too  true  what  he 
wrote  to  Lafayette  :  "  The  circumstances  are  very 
great,  but  the  men  are  very  small."  ^  They  were 
not  quite  so  small  as  they  appeared  to  him  in  his 
wrath,  but  still  they  were  too  small  to  see  how 
small  they  were  as  to  statecraft  in  comparison  to 
him.  They  realized  the  difference  just  enough  to 
resent  it  most  bitterly.  The  thought  to  have 
the  state  saved  by  him  was  so  unbearable  to  them, 
that  it  rendered  them  incapable  of  honestly  exam- 
ining the  question,  whether  it  could  be  saved 
without  him  or  not.  Whenever  his  ascendency 
approached  a  certain  line,  they  deemed  it  a  sacred 
duty  towards  themselves  and  the  country  to 
thwart  him  without  stopping  to  ask,  whether  they 
thereby  did  not  thwart  themselves  and  drag  the 
country  further  towards  the  brink  of  the  abyss. 
His  only  source  of  power  was  his  genius,  and 
that  was  a  blade  without  a  handle  and  a  lever 
without  a  fulcrum,  if  those,  who  alone  could  make 
his  thoughts  authoritative,  active  will,  were  deter- 
mined under  no  circumstances   to    do  so   to   the 

1  Dec.  1,  1789.  Corresp.,  I.  423.  To  Mauvillon  he  wrote  : 
"Helas!  mon  ami,  vous  avez  trop  raison  :  Beaucoiqj  de 
vanite  et  pen,  d'amour  de  la  gloire.  C'est  a  cause  de  cela 
qu'il  faut  changer  le  caractere  national." — Lettres  a  Mau- 
villon, 507. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  133 

extent  it  had  to  be  done,  if  it  was  to  be  of 
avail- 
On  the  7th  of  November  the  Assembly  had 
chained  itself  down  to  this  determination  by  erect- 
ing it  into  a  law ;  and  the  one  man,  with  whose  aid 
the  wheels  could  perhaps,  after  all,  have  been 
reversed,  was  quite  as  effectually  chained  down  to 
it  by  political  shortsightedness,  misplaced  moral 
punctiliousness,  and,  above  all,  the  jealousy  of 
unbounded  petty  vanity. 

Circumstances  had  lifted  Lafaj-ette  into  such 
a  position,  that  it  may  be  considered  doubtful 
whether  Mirabeau  could  have  sufficiently  fructi- 
fied a  victory  on  the  7th  of  November,  if  he  did 
not  succeed  in  either  conciliating  or  overthrowing 
him.  But  the  defeat  was  unquestionably  irretriev- 
able if  he  could  do  neither.  From  the  5th  of  Oc- 
tober, Lafayette  was  the  most  powerful  man  in  the 
realm,  not  to  do  good,  but  to  avert  as  well  as  to 
bring  about  some  of  the  worst  evils.  Therefore 
one  of  the  main  points  in  Mirabeau's  programme 
from  that  day  on  is  to  coax  or  to  force  him  into  an 
offensive  and  defensive  alliance,  or  to  break  his 
power.  The  unintermitted  and  most  arduous 
struofsfle  to  achieve  either  of  these  ends  is  a  con- 
tinuous  series  of  defeats,  and  next  to  that  of  the 


134  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

7th  of  November  lie  lias  suffered  no  more  portent- 
ous ones. 

Mirabeau  always  lent  a  helping  hand  to  his 
adversaries.  In  this  case,  too,  he  was  far  from 
being  blameless.  Lafayette's  character  renders  it 
a  certainty  that  he  could  never  have  made  up  his 
mind  to  accept  in  thorough  good  faith  the  prof- 
fered alliance.  But  Mirabeau  made  it  doubly  cer- 
tain by  airing  most  freely  his  contempt  of  the 
general's  political  capacities,  and  by  indulging  in 
regard  to  him  too  in  his  dangerous  taste  for  invent- 
ing nettling  sobriquets.  That  the  caps  fitted  the 
general's  head  to  perfection  was  not  calculated  to 
make  him  fancy  them  any  better,  and  the  balm  of 
fulsome  flattery,  which  Mirabeau  now  and  then 
poured  over  the  wounds,  could  not  have  much 
healing  effect,  because  the  perfume  of  insincerity 
was  too  strong. 

Upon  Lafayette,  however,  rests  by  far  the  greater 
half  of  the  responsibility  that  this  alliance  was  not 
concluded,  which  might  have  changed  the  fate  of 
France.  Though  the  idea  of  it  was  profoundly  dis- 
tasteful to  Mirabeau,  because  the  mean  opinion  he 
had  of  the  general's  talents  rendered  it  humiliating 
to  him,  he  repeatedly  returned  to  the  charge, 
because  he  was  equally  well  aware  that  the  chance 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  135 

of  overthrowing  him  was  exceedingly  small,  and 
that  the  imperative  interests  of  the  country  ad- 
mitted of  no  other  alternative  than  an  alliance. 
And  coarse  flattery  was  not  the  only  means  by 
which  he  tried  to  attain  his  end.  He  did  address 
him  also  as  a  man,  whose  better  and  higher  im- 
pulses ought  to  be  considered  as  so  strong,  that 
they  can  be  successfully  appealed  to  in  the  lan- 
guage of  bitter,  but  wholesome  truth.  If  La- 
fayette's character  had  been  of  that  loftiness  of 
which  he  himself  was  ever  the  last  man  to  enter- 
tain the  least  doubt,i  resentment  would  not  have 

'  His  self-complacency  and  self-deception  verge  upon  the 
comical.  The  most  perfect  of  men  cannot  rightfully  claim 
"  la  tranquillite  d'une  conscience  pure  qui  n'eut  jamais  a 
rougir  d'un  seul  de  ses  sentiments,  ni  d'une  seule  de  ses 
actions."  The  man  who  approaches  the  nearest  to  this  an- 
gelic purity — frail  human  nature  being  left  out  of  his  moral 
make-up — will  be  the  last  to  speak  and  boast  of  it.  Lafay- 
ette was  ever  the  hei'ald  of  his  own  virtues,  and  in  sounding 
their  praises  he  opened  his  mouth  as  wide  as  a  public  crier. 
"  Je  vous  jure,"  he  wrote  in  June,  1789,  "  que  dans  les  douze 
ans  de  ma  vie  publique,  si  j'ai  fait  beaucoup  de  fautes,  je 
n'ai  pas  eu  un  moment  dont  je  ne  m'applaudisse,  et  parmi 
les  fautes  que  j'ai  faites  il  y  en  a  beaucoup  que  je  dois  a  la 
prudence  d'autrui."  Happy  France  !  Things  were  being 
set  to  rights  by  this  immaculate  man,  into  whose  ears  even 
the  whisperings  of  ambition  tried  to  worm  their  way  in 
vain.  In  a  letter  to  the  Due  de  Liancoui't,  wliich  must  have 
been  written  in  the  second  half  of  August,  1789,  he  says  : 
"  Ma  situation  est  bien  etrange.     Je  suis  dans  une  grande 


136  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

been  the  principal  and  ultimate  effect  of  Mirabeau's 
castigations,  accompanied,  as  they  were,  by  earnest 
entreaties.  He  would  have  confessed  to  himself  that 
he,  too,  was  indeed  far  from  being  spotless,  and  in 
the  consciousness  of  his  own  shortcomings  he  would 
have  found  the  moral  courage  to  silence  the  protests 
of  his  self-righteous  virtuousness,  and  for  the 
country's  sake  to  lock  arms  with  the  giant,  though, 
as  a  contemporary  says,  his  face  was  punctured  not 
only  by  the  small-pox,  but  also  by  vice.  More 
than  once  Lafayette  was  on  the  point  of  doing  it, 
but  at  the  last  moment  the  promptings  of  his  nobler 
qualities  were  always  overcome  by  the  insinuating 
sophisms  of  his  smaller  self.  And  he  not  only 
drew  back,  but  he  drew  back  in  a  way  which 
proved  that  even  as  to  fundamental  principles,  his 
virtue  was  not  entirely  flawless.  "Let  M.  de 
Lafayette  name  a  single  occasion  when  I  have  not 
done  more  than  I  had  promised  him ;  let  Mm  name 
a  single  otie,  when  he  has  not  failed  to  Tceep  his  ivord 
with  me,  and  I  consent   to  declare   our  accounts 

avanture,  et  je  jouis  de  penser  que  j'en  sortirai,  sans  avoir 
eu  meme  un  mouvement  ambitieux  a  me  reproclier,  et 
apres  avoir  mis  tout  le  monde  a  sa  place,  je  me  retirerai 
avec  le  quart  de  la  fortune  que  j'avais  en  entrant  dans 
le  monde."— Mem.  de  Lafayette,  I.  307,  272,  276;  edit. 
1837-39. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  137 

balanced."  ^  On  the  3d  of  October,  1790,  Mirabeau 
charged  La  Marck  to  send  this  message  by  Segur 
to  Lafayette,  and  neither  the  general,  nor  Segur, 
nor  any  of  his  other  friends  has  ever  been  able  to 
refute  the  accusation  that  he  repeatedly  did  go 
back  upon  his  solemn  engagements  with  Mirabeau. 
Nobody  will  contend  that  the  moral  repulsion, 
with  which  Lafayette  tried  to  justify  his  conduct 
towards  Mirabeau,  ^  was  either  feigned  or  without 
cause.  But  unless  Lafayette  knew  of  a  hand 
equally  skilful  and  strong,  he  could  neither  as  a 
statesman  nor  as  a  patriot  justify  his  pushing  away 
this  one  because  there  were  some  ugly  stains  on  it. 
And  he  never  even  pretended  that  he  knew  of 
such  a  hand,  except  his  own,  and  history  gives, 
no  doubt,  full  answer  to  the  question,  how  far  that 
was  equal  to  the  task.  Besides,  how  could  a  can- 
did man,  who  felt  such  an  unconquerable  moral  re- 
pulsion, write  to  the  object  of  this  moral  repulsion  : 
"  Mutual  confidence  and  friendship,  that  is  what  I 

iCorresp.,  II.  208.  La  Marck  writes  Nov.  9,  1790,  to 
Mercy- Argenteau  :  "  sa  (Lafayette's)  mauvaise  f oi  egale  son 
incapacite."     lb.,  II.,  300. 

2  "  Lafayette  eut  des  torts  avec  Mirabeau,  dont  rimmor- 
talite  le  choquait  .  .  .  il  ne  pouvait  s'empecher  de  lui 
temoigner  une  mesestinie  qui  le  blessait  ...  On  craignit 
mes  repugnances  pour  son  immoralite." — Memoires  du  Gen- 
eral Lafayette,  II.  3G7. 


138  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

give  and  expect."  ^     No,  not  the  moral  repulsion, 
but  something  else  was  really  unconquerable. 

Lafayette  writes  in  his  Memoirs  in  regard  to 
Mirabeau's  wish  to  be  elected  President  of  the 
Assembly  for  the  "  Federation  "  festival  of  July  14, 
1790  :  "  Lafayette,  without  offering  any  opposition 
to  his  being  Preside^nt  on  anotlier  occasion,  wished 
for  this  one  a  virtuous  patriot,  and  he  said  so  frank- 
ly." Now,  either  Mirabeau  deserved  the  uncon- 
querable moral  repulsion,  and  then  he  was  never 
worthy  to  occupy  the  chair  of  the  Assembly,  or 
he  was,  his  moral  taints  notwithstanding,  worthy 
to  occupy  the  chair  of  the  Assembly,  and  then  the 
unconquerable  moral  repulsion  overshot  the  mark. 
But,  apart  from  this,  Lafayette's  nice  distinction 
would  have  been  plausible,  if  the  occasion  liad  been 
simply  a  patriotic  festival  without  any  political 
import,  and  if  Mirabeau  had  merely  intended  to 
serve  some  personal  ends.  The  general  was,  how- 
ever, aware  that  neither  was  the  case.  He  knew 
that   Mirabeau   wanted    to   improve    the    unique 

1  Corresp.,  I.  413.  Oct.  29,  1789.  It  is  besides  deserving 
of  notice  that  according  to  his  own  confession  the  moral 
scales  he  himself  used  in  iDolitics  were  none  too  sensitive. 
He  writes:  "  Je  me  suis  souvent  servi  d'instruments  qu'il 
faudra  bientot  briser.  J'ai  tout  essaye  excepte  la  guerre 
civile."— Mem.,  I.  372  ;  edit.  1837-39. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  139 

opportunity  to  blow  the  dying  embers  of  loyalty 
into  a  flame,  which  might  have  given  again  some 
solidity  to  the  breaking  rivets  of  the  tottering- 
throne.  And  this  opportunity  Lafayette  would 
not  let  him  have,  not  because  he  was  illoyal,  not 
because  he  was  consciously  striving  for  a  republic, 
but  because  he  himself  wanted  to  cut  the  most 
prominent  figure  on  the  occasion — because  he 
wanted  to  be,  what  Mirabeau  declared  him  to  be, 
"  the  rival  "  of  tlie  king.^  And  if  he  wanted  to 
outshine  the  kin^-,  the  thouGfht  that  he  mio-lit  be 
outshone  by  Mirabeau  was,  of  course,  utterly  un- 
bearable to  him.  These  are  not  conjectures.  His 
vanity  was  too  great  to  allow  him  to  refrain  from 
proclaiming  it  with  his  own  lips  in  a  most  offensive 
manner.  When  Frochot  asked  him  his  reasons 
for  objecting  to  Mirabeau  alone  as  President,  he 
replied :  "  Mirabeau  behaves  too  badly  towards  me  ; 
I  have  vanquished  the  King  of  England  in  his 
power,  the  King  of  P' ranee  in  hi.-5  authority,  the 
people  in  its  fury ;  I  shall  certainly  not  yield  the 
place  to  Mirabeau."  ^  "  These  words  show,"  re- 
marked Mirabeau,  "  how  far  he  is  possessed  of  the 
secret  of  his  smallness  and  the  weight  of  his  van- 
ity." Indeed,  a  crushing  weight.  Vanity  is  to 
'  Corresp.,  II.  '^G.  "■  lb.,  II.  54. 


140  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

such  a  degree  the  dominant  trait  of  his  character 
that  to  it  more  than  to  anything  else  it  is  due  that, 
apart  from  his  American  debut,  all  the  unparalleled 
opportunities  offered  him  by  the  strangest  coin- 
cidence of  circumstances  are  invariably  cast  away,^ 
frequently  even  turning  his  good  qualities  and 
high  aspirations  into  direct  means  for  inflicting 
the  greatest  injuries  upon  his  country.  Even  his 
staunch  friend  and  admirer,  Jefferson,  is  compelled 
to  charge  him  with  "a  canine  appetite  for  popu- 
larity,"^ and  Lafayette  himself  directly  endorses 
this  judgment  by  speaking  of  "  the  delicious  sen- 
sation of  the  smile  of  the  multitude." 

But  there  were  yet  other  defects  in  Lafayette's 
intellectual  and  moral  make-up,  which  rendered  it 

'  Bouille  characterizes  him  thus:  "Je  redoutais  son  car- 
actere  mefiant  et  dissimule,  plus  que  son  ambition,  que 
j'aurais  desire  voir  satisfaite,  s'il  avait  voulu  sauver  le  roi, 
la  nionarchie  et  sa  patrie,  en  arretant  la  i-e volution  au  point 
ou  elle  etait  alors  (Oct.,  1789),  eten  etablissant  un  gouverne- 
ment  sur  des  bases  et  sur  des  principes  solides  et  convenables 
a  la  France  et  au  genie  de  ses  peuples.  M.  de  Lafayette  le 
pouvait  ;  il  etait  le  seul  homme  qui  eut  alors  assez  de  force 
et  de  puissance ;  mais  il  avait  de  I'ambition,  sans  le  carac- 
tere  et  le  genie  necessaires  pour  la  diriger  :  elle  se  reduisait 
au  desir  de  faire  du  bruit  dans  le  nionde  et  de  faire  parler 
de  lui.  Ce  n'etait  pas  un  homme  naechant,  et  encore  moins 
scelerat ;  mais  il  etait  au-dessous,  je  pense,  de  la  grande  cir- 
constanceouilsetrouvait." — Mem.  de  Bouille,  85. 

-  Jefferson  to  Madison,  Jan.  30,  1787.  Jefferson's  "Works, 
II.  108. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  141 

imperative  upon  Mirabeau  to  exert  himself  inces- 
santly and  to  the  utmost  to  effect  his  overthrow, 
when  tlie  negotiations  for  an  alliance  came  to 
naught.  He  never  tires  in  his  Notes  to  the  Court 
of  analyzing  the  reasons  wliich  must  make  every 
day  another  step  towards  perdition,  so  long  as  one 
does  not  muster  courage  to  shake  off  this  incubus. 
If  he  had  never  written  anytlring  else,  these  criti- 
cisms upon  Lafayette's  character,  the  nature  of 
his  power,  and  the  inevitable  consequences  of  the 
two,  separately  and  combined,  would  secure  him 
a  place  among  the  keenest  and  most  penetrating 
political  tliinkers  and  observers  of  all  times. 
Though  La  Marck  is  right  in  saying  :  "  There  are 
2,000  causes  for  a  single  effect,"  ^  the  history  of  the 
revolution  becomes  surprisingly  lucid,  if  one  but 
fully  grasps  the  leading  facts  constituting  the  main 
working  causes.  Among  these,  however,  Lafay- 
ette and  the  nature  of  his  power  are  unquestionably 
of  the  very  first  rank,  and  as  to  all  the  principal 
points,  Mirabeau  understood  the  man  as  well  as 
his  position  so  completely,  that  all  the  researches 
of  history  have  only  served  to  corroborate  his 
judgment. 

Ever  since  the  5th  of  October,   Mirabeau  calls 

'  Aug.  23,  1791.     Corresp.,  III.  178. 


142  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

him  "  dictator  "  and  points  out  that  his  dictator- 
ship is  of  the  worst  kind  imaginable,  because  it  is 
merely  a  fact  and  therefore  uncontrolled  by  the 
consciousness  of  responsibility.  This  was  all  the 
more  a  danger  which  it  was  impossible  to  overesti- 
mate, because  to  this  man  a  real  dictatorship  would 
have  been  as  much  a  horror,  as  he  delighted  in  this 
counterfeit  of  it.  To  be  called  and  to  fancy  him- 
self dictator  and  really  to  be  one  to  the  extent  not 
only  of  being  more  powerful  than  any  one  else, 
but  also  of  being  indirectly^  able  to  prevent  every- 
body else  from  doing  what  he  did  not  want  to  be 
done,  that  was  the  acme  of  his  ambitious  cravings. 
But  thouR-h  he  valued  this  ten  times  more  than  his 
life,  he  would  ten  times  rather  risk  losing  it  all, 
than  formally  and  ofhcially  to  assume  the  supreme 
direction  with  immortal  glory  at  the  end  of  the 
narrow  and  rugged  path,  but  the  spectre  of  per- 
dition grinning  up  to  him  from  the  precipices  on 
the  left  and  on  the  right.  Not  only  his  physical 
courage  and  his  own  belief  in  the  intensity  and  per- 
fect honesty  of  his  lofty  sentiments  and  aspirations 
are  above  suspicion  ;  as  to  the  negative  side  also  his 
moral  courage  must  be  acknowledged  to  have  been 

'  By  the  agency  of  those  upon  whom  the  official  responsi- 
bUity  rested. 


THE   FREIS'CH   REVOLUTION.  143 

of  a  high  order.  But  as  to  the  positive  moral 
courage,  which  iu  mighty  political  aud  social  up- 
heavals is  the  most  indispensable  requisite  of  a  man 
in  a  leading  position,  he  was  most  lamentably  defi- 
cient. In  the  garb  of  extreme  favor  fate  Avas,  in 
fact,  very  cruel  to  him,  for  it  thrust  him  into  a 
first-class  rSle,  and  the  essential  elements  for  sus- 
taining in  such  times  the  part  of  a  cliaractei'  was 
entirely  forgotten  by  nature  in  his  intellectual  and 
moral  equipment. 

On  the  28th  of  April,  Mirabeau  wrote  to  Lafa- 
yette :  "  In  the  midst  of  so  many  dangers  I  forget 
the  greatest :  the  inaction  of  the  only  man  who 
could  prevent  them.  But,  undoubtedly,  tliis  dicta- 
torship is  not  to  consist  in  doing  nothing."  ^  No, 
not  exactly,  but,  as  I  already  intimated,  worse  than 
that :  his  doings  were  confined  to  preventing  others 
from  doing  what  ought  to  have  been  done.  This 
he  did  most  effectually,  for,  as  La  March  said : 
"  Insufficient  in  the  great  things,  this  man  is  very 
adroit  in  the  small  ones."  ^  One  would,  however, 
do  him  wrong  by  supposing  tliat  his  l)arring  the 
way  to  others  was  entirely  due  to  the  irrepressible 
jealousy  of  his  vanity.  To  a  great  extent  it  sprang 
from  the  same  cause  that  was  at  the  bottom  of  his 
'  Corresp.,  II.  3.  ■  lb.,  II.  285. 


144  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

doing  nothing  himself.  Mirabeau  calls  him 
"  Vhomme  aux  indecisions,  the  man  of  indecisions.^ 
He  ever  at  the  same  time  wills  and  wills  not,  never 
willing  so  clearly  and  so  resolutely  that  he  feels  it 
to  be  an  imperative  necessity  and  peremptory  duty 
to  act  up  to  his  will.  The  more  momentous  the 
question,  the  surer  it  is  that  he  will  either  try  to  get 
off  with  the  semblance  of  acting,  or  come  to  a  dead 
halt  in  his  acting,  ere  it  becomes  decisive.  "  Decis- 
ion," however,  as  Mirabeau  told  him,  "  is  what  we 
need  the  most  and  the  onl}^  means  of  salvation." 
And,  like  all  men  who  lack  this  quality,  he  tried 
to  make  up  for  his  own  deficiency  by  consulting 
other  people  to  such  an  extent  that  bad  was  ren- 
dered worse — especially  as  he  took  good  care  to 
ask  advice  only  where  he  Avas  sure  that  the  answer 
would  not  be  wholly  distasteful.  To  his  face 
Mirabeau  severely  reproved  him  for  his  proneness 
to  surround  himself  exclusively  with  men  who, 
though  not  without  merit  in  some  respects,  are 
after  all  only  second  and  third  class  and  utterly 
unfit  for  the  tasks  to  be  performed,  because  "  not 

'  Corresp.,  II.  34.  On  the  24th  of  October,  1789,  La  Marck 
writes  to  Mirabeau  :  "  II  est  tout  a  fait  a  vous,  et  il  le  serait 
efficacement  s'il  savait,  non  pas  etre  decide,  mais  conserver 
la  decision  dans  laquelle  il  est  laisse  chaque  fois  qu'on  lui 
a  parle  de  vous  comme  j'en  pense." — Corresp.,  I.  402. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  145 

one  of  tliein  knows  the  men  and  the  conntiy,  not 
one  of  them  knows  the  affairs  and  the  things. 
Marquis,  our  time,  our  revolution,  our  circum- 
stances resemble  in  nothing  what  was ;  neither  by 
esprit^  nor  by  memory,  nor  by  social  qualities  can 
one  to-day  conduct  oneself ;  only  by  the  combina- 
tions of  meditation,  the  inspiration  of  genius,  the 
omnipotence  of  character."  ^ 

It  would  be  difficult  to  imagine  a  worse  com- 
bination of  qualities  for  a  dictator,  and  the  nature 
of  Lafayette's  power  was  such  that  an  absolutely 
fatal  crop  of  consequences  had  inevitably  to  spring 
from  it. 

Mirabeau  says  in  his  Note  of  June  1st,  1790,  to 
the  court:  "Lafayette  derives  his  force  from  the 
confidence  which  he  inspires  in  his  army  (/.  g.,  the 
national  guard  of  Paris).  He  inspires  this  con- 
fidence only  because  he  seems  to  share  the  opinions 
of  the  multitude.  But  as  it  is  not  he  who  dictates 
these  opinions — for  of  all  cities  in  the  kingdom  it  is 
Paris  where  public  opinion,  directed  by  a  mass  of 
writers  and  a  still  greater  mass  of  other  lights,  is 
the  least  at  the  power  of  one  man — it  follows  that 
Lafayette,  Avho  has  acquired  his  influence  only  by 
singing  to  the  tune  of  Paris,  will  always  be  forced, 

'  Corresp.,  II.  30. 
10 


146  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION, 

ill  order  to  preserve  it,  to  follow  the  torrent  of  the 
multitude.  What  barrier  could  he  oppose  to  it  ? 
— Will  a  general  of  national  guards  not  soon  be 
without  soldiers  and  without  power,  if  his  princi- 
ples are  not  those  of  his  armj^?— It  is,  therefore, 
easy  to  foresee,  what  liis  conduct  will  always  be. 
To  fear  and  flatter  the  people ;  to  share  its  errors 
from  hypocrisy  and  from  interest ;  to  sustain  the 
most  numerous  party,  whether  it  be  right  or  wrong  ; 
to  frighten  the  court  by  popular  movements,  which 
he  will  have  concerted,  or  which  he  will  cause  to 
be  apprehended  in  order  to  render  himself  nec- 
essary ;  to  prefer  tlie  public  opinion  of  Paris  to 
that  of  the  rest  of  the  kingdom,  because  he  does 
not  derive  his  force  from  the  provinces — that  is 
the  often  culpable  and  always  dangerous  circle,  in 
which  he  must  needs  be  compelled  to  move — that 
is  his  whole  destiny." 

"  Thouo-h  not  a  demao-offue  this  man  will  there- 
fore  be  formidable  to  the  royal  power  so  long  as  the 
public  opinion  of  Paris,  of  which  he  can  only  be  the 
instrument,  will  make  it  a  law  unto  him.  Now 
supposing  that  the  kingdom  returns  to  sounder 
ideas  on  true  liberty,  the  city  of  Paris  will  be 
the  last  to  change  principles,  for  it  is  the  deepest 
steeped  in  radicalism.     Therefore  it  is  of  all  citi- 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTIOX.  147 

zens,  Lafayette,  upon  whom  the  king  can  count 
the  least.  .  . 

"  What  would  it  then  mean  to  compose  the 
cabinet  of  men  devoted  to  Lafayette? — They 
would  strive  to  make  the  whole  kingdom  con- 
form itself  to  Paris,  while  the  only  means  of  salva- 
tion is  to  bring  Paris  to  its  senses  by  the  king- 
dom. .  .  At  the  same  time  slave  and  despot,  sub- 
ject and  master,  he  would  be  the  most  formidable 
tyrant."  i 

On  the  15th  of  September,  Mirabeau  summed 
up  this  reasoning  in  a  few  words  :  "  All  powerful 
for  doing  harm,  Lafayette  is  and  must  become 
more  and  more  powerless  to  prevent  it."  ^  Five 
days  before  he  liad  already  Avritten :  "  It  is  possi- 
ble that  the  shame  of  tolerating  an  insurrection  in 
the  presence  of  an  army  of  30,000  men  will  drive 
Lafayette  some  day  to  fire  u[)on  tlie  people.  Well, 
lie  thereby  would  wound  himself  mortally. 
Would  the  people,  who  liave  demanded  the  head 
of  M.  Bouillc  for  liaving  tired  upon  revolting- 
soldiers,  forgive  the  commander  of  tlie  national 
guard  after  a  coml)at of  citizens  against  citizens?  ""^ 
And  in  November,  when  the  mob  vented  its  wrath 

>  Corresp.,  II.  27-29.  ^  lb.,  II.  182. 

3  lb.,  II.  171. 


148  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

upon  the  residence  of  M.  de  Castries  for  his  having 
wounded  in  a  duel  Charles  de  Lameth,  Mirabeau 
dryly  remarked :  "  This  man,"  I  said  to  myself, 
"  who  sees  this  house  devastated  as  a  simple  spec- 
tator, will  have  neither  the  force  nor  the  influence, 
if  it  become  necessary  to  save  the  king^."  ^ 

Every  one  of  these  assertions  has  been  borne 
out  by  the  facts — everj^  one  of  these  predictions 
has  been  fulfilled  to  the  letter. 

To  determine  correctly  the  responsibility  that 
rests  upon  Lafayette  personally,  tlie  question  must, 
of  course,  be  propounded  and  answered,  how  far 
the  vicious  nature  of  his  power  resulted  from 
circumstances  over  which  he  could  exercise  no 
control.  Mirabeau  did  not  fail  to  see  that  this  was 
to  a  very  considerable  extent  the  case.  If  he  had 
been  heard  betimes  and  his  advice  had  been  fol- 
lowed implicitly,  this  would  have  been  different. 
It  is  one  of  the  earliest  and  most  momentous  cases, 
in  which  infinite  harm  resulted  from  his  achieving 
but  half  a  victory. 

To  his  motion  of  July  8, 1789,  concerning  an  ad- 
dress against  the  concentration  of  troops,  had  been 
attached  the  motion,  to  request  the  king  "  to  order 
that  in  the  cities  of  Paris  and  Versailles  civic 
'  Cori'esp.,  II.  841 


THE   FRENCH  REVOLUTION.  149 

guards  be  at  once  levied,  whicli,  under  the  orders 
of  the  king,  will  be  amply  sufficient  to  maintain 
public  order  and  tranquillity."  ^  An  overwhelm- 
ing majority  voted  for  the  address,  but  an  over- 
whelming majority  also  adopted  the  amendment  of 
Gaulthier  de  Biauzat  to  strike  out  all  that  related 
to  the  formation  of  civic  guards.  As  soon  as  the  dis- 
missal of  Necker  became  known  in  Paris,  the  gravity 
of  this  blunder  became  apparent.  After  the  mischief 
was  done,  which  Mirabeau  had  intended  to  prevent, 
the  civic  guard  was  organized,  but  in  spite  of  the 
horrors  which  had  preceded  and  followed  the 
storming  of  the  Bastille,  half  of  his  advice  remained 
even  then  unheeded.  In  what  manner  he  proposed 
to  have  the  guard  put  "  under  the  orders  of  the 
king,"  cannot  be  said  to  a  certainty.  It  is,  how- 
ever, probable  that  his  idea  was,  pursuant  to  a 
suggestion  from  Duroveray,  to  have  the  officers 
appointed  by  the  government.^  The  government 
was  allowed  no  direct  influence  whatever  upon  it, 
and  the  consequence  was  that  the  national  guard, 
gradually  but  steadily,  lost  its  original  character. 

'  OEuvres,  I.  308. 

^  Lafayette,  on  the  contrary,  warned  the  electors  of  Paris 
on  the  14th  of  July,  "  de  se  defier  des  officiers  generaux  que 
le  gouverneinent  mettrait  a  la  tete  de  la  milice  bourgeoise." 
— Proces- verbal  des  electeurs,  I.  405. 


150  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

From  an  instrument  to  maintain  the  government 
of  the  law,  it  was  changed  more  and  more  into  an 
instrument  for  promoting  the  revolution,  radical- 
ism, and,  ultimatel}^  the  undisputed  sway  of  the 
sovereign  mob  and  its  demagogical  leaders.  "  One 
can  liardly  imagine,"  writes  Mirabeau  on  the  anni- 
versary of  the  portentous  victory  of  the  Paris  mob 
in  Versailles,  "how  much  tlie  petty  vanity  to  be 
armed,  to  have  a  uniform,  to  play  at  soldier,  to 
make  oneself  noticeable,  to  obtain  a  command,  and, 
above  all,  a  kind  of  impunit}^,  have  contributed 
towards  rendering  the  French  heads  revolution- 
ary.'' 1  And  in  the  great  Memoir  of  December, 
1790,  he  declares  that,  "  in  an  infinite  number  of 
respects  the  national  guard  of  Paris  "  is  to  be  con- 
sidered "an  obstacle  to  the  re-establishment  of 
order.  Most  of  its  chiefs  are  members  of  the 
Jacobins,  and,  carrying  the  principles  of  this  so- 
ciety among  their  soldiers,  they  teach  them  to  obey 
the  people  as  the  paramount  authority.  This 
troop  is  too  numerous  to  acquire  a  corps  spirit ; 
too  closely  connected  with  tlie  citizens  ever  to  dare 
to  resist  tliem ;  too  strong  to  leave  the  smallest 
chance  to  the  royal  authority  ;  too  weak  to  oppose 
itself  to  a  great  insurrection  ;  too  easily  corrupted, 

'  Corresp.,  II.  213. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  151 

not  in  the  aggregate,  but  individually,  not  to  bo 
an  instrument  ever  ready  to  tlie  hands  of  the  fac- 
tions ;  too  conspicuous  by  its  apparent  discipline 
not  to  give  the  tone  to  the  other  national  guards  of 
the  kingdom,  with  which  its  cliief  has  the  infatua- 
tion to  correspond  ;  finally,  too  ambitious  not  to 
render  the  formation  of  a  military  household  of 
the  king  very  difficult."  ^  Here  again  the  history 
of  the  revolution  is  a  running  commentary  upon 
his  assertions,  fully  bearing  out  every  one  of  tliem. 
The  national  guard,  wliich,  if  organized  before  the 
storming  of  the  Bastille  and  upon  sound  princi- 
ples, might  have  done  so  much  towards  awaken- 
ing, propagating,  and  enforcing  a  proper  under- 
standing of  true  liberty,  became  indeed  one  of  the 
main  obstacles  to  the  re-establishment  of  order,  be- 
cause, as  witli  its  chief,  the  power  for  doing  mis- 
chief increased  as  fast  as  that  of  preventing  it 
diminislied.  There  was  only  this  difference  in  the 
two  cases,  that  liis  race  was  run  much  sooner  than 
that  of  the  national  guard.  When  his  eyes  were 
partly  opened  to  the  fact,  where  he  had  helped  to 
lead  the  country,  and  Avhen  he  earnestly,  though 
with  no  more  political  discernment  and  positive 
courage  than  before,  tried  to  reverse  the  wheels, 
'  CoiTesp.,  II.  418. 


152  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION, 

the  national  guard  just  entered  upon  that  phase  of 
its  downward  evolution,  which  commenced  by  its 
being  the  conscious  and  willing  ally  of  the  rabble, 
and  ended  by  its  being  itself  the  organized  rabble. 
To  understand  fully  the  import  of  this  portent- 
ous evolution,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  at 
the  time  France  had  virtually  no  army.  "  Since  it 
has  learned  the  public  law,  the  army  is  no  longer 
an  army,"  Mirabeau  wrote  to  La  Marck  a  few  days 
after  the  mob  had  forced  the  king  to  transfer  his 
residence  to  Paris.  ^  As  early  as  the  8th  of  July 
he  had  warned  the  government  that  this  would  be 
the  effect  of  "  electrifying  '  the  troops  '  by  the  con- 
tact with  the  capital  and  interesting  them  in  our 
j)olitical  discussions."  ^  The  National  Assembly 
was  not  slow  to  endorse  the  reproofs  administered 
to  the  government,  but  it  had  no  ear  for  the  equally 
emphatic  warning  that  this  was  at  least  as  great  a 
danger  to  the  liberty  it  proposed  to  establish,  as  to 
the  crown.  Soon,  however,  this  became  so  appar- 
ent that  it  passed  a  formal  vote  of  thanks  to 
Bouill^,  when  he  argued  the  question  with  the 
rebellious  regiments  at  Nancy  with  powder  and 
lead.  But  though  in  an  emergency  the  Assembly 
still  mustered  sufficient  courage  to  eulogize  some- 
^  Oct.  16,  1789.     Corresp.,  I.  383.  =  CEuvres,  I.  304. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  l53 

body  else  for  daring  to  do  the  right  thing,  it  was 
much  too  faint-hearted  to  draw  itself  the  logical 
conclusions  of  the  fact  that  as  it  was  told  by  Mira- 
beau,  "  with  an  army  without  discipline  public 
peace  cannot  exist."  ^  It  did  not  want  to  under- 
stand that,  as  a  little  water  is  but  fuel  to  a  o-reat 
fire,  "  special  decrees  for  every  particular  insurrec- 
tion "  were  worse  than  worthless.  How  could  the 
systematic  and  heroic  cure  proposed  by  Mirabeau 
— disbanding  of  the  whole  army  for  the  purpose  of 
reorganizing  it  at  once  upon  the  basis  of  an  ade- 
quate oath — meet  with  any  favor  in  an  Assembly, 
which  accompanied  with  demonstrations  of  dis- 
pleasure his  declaration  that,  to  counteract  the  ill 
use  made  by  the  people  of  the  rights  of  man,  a  dec- 
laration of  the  duties  of  every  citizen  had  become 
necessary  ! 

In  the  address  of  the  9th  of  July  he  had  made 
the  Assembly  say  :  "  Sire,  we  are  always  ready  to 
obey  you,  because  you  command  in  the  name  of  the 
laws  .  .  .  our  very  fidelity  orders  us  to  resist," 
if  your  agents  were  to  do  violence  to  the  laws.^ 
This  was  sound  doctrine  in  a  state  that  proposed 
to  establish  a  government  of  law.  But  it  was  a 
most  monstrous  doctrine,  if  it  was  virtually  inter- 
'  CEuvres,  IV.  10.  -'  lb.,  I.  ;}15. 


154  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

pretecl  to  the  effect  that  only  the  king  and  his 
agents  should  be  bound  by  the  laws.  In  theory 
and  in  practice  the  people  and  their  representatives 
liad  to  be  as  implicitly  subject  to  them,  and  this 
was,  in  the  nature  of  things,  impossible  to  attain, 
unless  the  laws  entrusted  to  the  government  the 
means  required  for  executing  the  laws.  Every 
month  this  was  more  lost  sight  of,  by  the  people 
as  well  as  by  the  Assembly.  As  the  revolution 
recognized  the  people  as  the  source  of  the  law,  the 
logic  of  the  masses,  armed  with  the  rights  of  man 
as  the  supreme  law,  concluded  that  they,  in  their 
quality  of  people,  were  superior  to  the  law ;  and 
the  Assembly,  though  not  formally  and  expressly 
endorsing  this  claim  as  the  Convention  was  to  do, 
rendered  the  complete  realization  of  the  doctrine 
inevitable,  by  acting  upon  the  principle  that  to  es- 
tablish liberty  the  government  must  above  all  be 
debarred  from  being  a  government.  "  Take  care  " 
— Mirabeau  warned  them  in  the  debate  on  the  right 
of  peace  and  war — "  take  care  that,  by  carrying  the 
distrust  of  the  moment  into  the  future  (z.  e.,  the 
constitution),  we  do  not  render  the  remedies  worse 
than  the  evils.  .  .  Take  care  that,  in  order  to  re- 
strain (the  government),  you  do  not  render  it  in- 
capable of  acting.  .  .  Take   care  ;  we  would  con- 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTIOX.  155 

found  all  powers  by  confounding  action  with  will, 
direction  with  law ;  the  executive  power  would 
soon  be  only  the  agent  of  a  committee  ;  we  would 
not  only  make  the  laws,  but  also  govern."  ^ 

As  to  the  particular  question  in  hand,  he  carried 
his  point  in  the  main,  as  I  have  mentioned  before  ; 
as  to  the  general  question  he  was,  according  to  his 
own  testimony,  utterly  defeated.  The  National 
Assembly,  he  says  in  the  Memoir  of  December, 
1790,  "  has  believed  to  solve  the  problem  of  a  per- 
fectly free  monarchy,  by  creating  a  royalty  without 
power,  without  action,  without  influence,  admitting 
it  in  theory,  and  forgetting  it  in  practice."  ^  This 
has  been  done,  as  he  asserts,^  because  "  the  secret 
object  of  tlie  legislators  was  to  organize  the  king- 
dom in  such  a  manner  that  they  would  have  the 
option  between  republic  and  monarchy — "  "  the 
materials  for  a  republic   greatly  exceeding  those 


'  CEuvres,  III.  334,  335,  337.  In  tlie  same  debate  he  said : 
"  Pretendez-vous,  parce  que  la  royaute  a  des  dangers,  nous 
faire  renoncer  aux  avantages  de  la  royaute.  Dites-le  nette- 
nient ;  alors  ce  sera  a  nous  determiner  si,  parce  que  le  feu 
brule,  nous  devons  nous  priver  de  la  chaleur  de  la  lumiere 
que  nous  empruntons  de  lui.  Tout  pent  se  soutenir,  excepte 
I'inconsequence  :  dites-nous  qu'il  ne  faut  pas  de  roi,  ne  nous 
dites  pas  qu'il  ne  faut  (iu"un  roi  impuissant,  inutile." — 
CEuvres,  III.  374. 

'  Corresp.,  II.  442.  ^  Oct.  14.  1790.     Corresp.,  IT.  226. 


156  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

for  a  monai-chy,"'  as  he  declares  in  November.^ 
But,  as  the  Assembly  has  "•  established  a  kind  of 
democracy  without  destroying  the  monarchical 
government,  or  rendered  royalty  useless  without 
establishing  a  complete  democracy,  i.  e.,  has  aban- 
doned its  original  basis  without  putting  anything 
in  the  place  of  it,"  this  has  resulted  in  the  forma- 
tion of  "  a  monstrous  government,  which  it  is  im- 
possible to  put  into  effect ;  "  ^  therefore  the  consti- 
tution would  only  liave  to  be  left  to  itself  to  ren- 
der "  its  self-destruction  almost  inevitable."  ^  The 
intended  organization  of  a  monarchy  with  the  mon- 
arch practically  left  out,  he  insists,  has  resulted  in 
the  construction  of  a  nondescript  commonwealth 
without  any  executive.  "  The  Assembly,  while 
admitting  royalty,  has  not  erected  an  executive 
power.  I  do  not  intend  merely  to  say  that  it  has 
arrogated  this  power  to  itself.  I  mean  that  it  does 
not  exist,  and  even  cannot  exist."  ^ 

If  any  one  thing  is  more  irrefutably  established 
hy  the  subsequent  course  of  events  than  another, 
it  is  the  truth  of  these  charges.  But  if  this  is  so, 
was  Mirabeau  then  not  egregiously  mistaken  when 
he  wrote  to  his  uncle  in  October,  1789,  that  the 

'  Corresp.,  II.  ;320  "  ■'  lb.,  II.  433. 

=  lb.,  II.  215.  4  lb.,  II.  437. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTIOX.  157 

revolution  necessarily  had  "  to  go  a  hundred  times 
further  than  one  could  have  imagined,"  because 
after  the  storming  of  the  Bastille  "  one  no  longer 
thought  of  establishing  liberty,  believing  that  it 
had  been  conquered?"^  Indeed,  no  !  This  ivas 
one  of  the  main  roots  of  the  whole  disastrous  de- 
velopment. On  the  14tli  of  July  everything  had 
yet  to  be  done  as  to  the  establishing  of  liberty.  Up 
to  that  day,  and  by  that  day,  nothing  was  achieved 
but  the  absolute  certainty,  that  by  the  government 
and  the  reactionists  of  the  two  upper  orders  any 
effectual  resistance  to  the  establishment  of  liberty 
could  no  more  be  offered.  The  Assembly,  how- 
ever, thought  exactly  the  contrary,  or  at  least  acted 
as  if  it  thought  the  reverse.  It  deemed  liberty 
conquered,  ^.  e.,  established,  and  saw  its  task  in 
rendering  impossible  its  being  ever  again  wrenched 
from  the  people  by  the  government  and  the  upper 
orders.  Mirabeau,  on  the  contrary,  saw  with  the 
utmost  clearness  that  these  quarters  were  now 
completely  at  the  mercy  of  the  victorious  revolu- 
tion, and  that  henceforth  the  real  danger  lay 
exactly  in  the  opposite  direction.  "  You,"  he  told 
the  Assembly  in  his  great  speech  of  May  22,  1790, 
"you  only  speak  of  checking  the  ministerial 
i  Loni6nie,  Y.  431. 


158  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

abuses,  and  I  talk  to  you  of  the  means  to  repress 
the  abuses  of  a  representative  assembly.  I  talk  to 
you  of  arresting  the  insensible  inclination  of  every 
government  towards  the  dominant  form,  which 
one  impresses  upon  it."  ^  Here  is  the  real  danger, 
because  a  numerous  assembly  "  cannot  be  subjected 
to  any  kind  of  responsibility."  ^ 

From  this  point  of  view,  he  had  in  September, 
1789,  so  strenuously  and  persistently  fought  for 
the  royal  veto,  not,  as  he  declared,  as  a  roj-al 
prerogative  to  which  the  king  had  an  inherent 
claim,  but  because  required  by  the  public  welfare 
as  a  bulwark  for  the  people  against  their  repre- 
sentatives.^   If  these  were  sustained  by  the  people, 

1  CEuvres,  III.  365. 

^  "  On  parle  du  frein  de  Topinion  publique  pour  les  repres- 
entans  de  la  nation  ;  mais  I'opinion  publique,  souvent  egaree, 
meme  par  des  sentiments  dignes  d'eloges,  ne  servira  qu'a  la 
seduire  ;  niais  Topinion  publique  ne  va  pas  atteindre  separe- 
ment  chaque  membre  d'une  grande  assemblee." — CEuvres, 
III.  320. 

2  "  Si  quelque  traces  de  precipitation  et  d'immaturite 
marquaient  deja  I'avenue  legislative  ou  elle  (la  nation)  est. 
entree,  conviendrait-il  de  n'environner  les  legislateurs  d'au- 
cune  barriere  ;  de  ne  leur  opposer  qu'une  resistance  de  forme 
qui  s'evanouit  d'elle-meme  ;  de  leur  livrer  ainsi  sans  defense 
le  sort  du  trone  et  de  la  nation  ? 

"Les  sages  democi'aties  se  sont  limitees  elles-m ernes  ; 
eUes  se  sont  defendues  par  des  precautions  puissantes  contre 
la  legerete  des  actes  publics ;  les  lois  qu'elles  se  donnent  sont 
elaborees  successivement  dans  differentes  chambres,  qui  en 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  159 

the  king  would  anyway  always  have  "  to  obey." 
But,  if  there  arises  a  difference  of  opinion  between 
the  perpetual  representative  of  the  people,  the 
king,  and  its  temporary  representatives  as  to  what 
the  interests  of  the  state  require,  it  is  proper  and 
necessary  that  by  means  of  the  royal  veto  the 
question  be  submitted  to  the  people  for  adjudi- 
cation.i  Lafayette  persuaded  Montmorin  and 
Necker  to  declare  on  the  part  of  the  government 
that  the  king  would  be  satisfied  with  a  suspensive 
veto.     That  was,  as  experience  taught,  ten  times 

examinent  les  rapports,  les  convenances,  le  fond  et  la  foraie; 
ce  n'est  que  dans  leur  parfaite  maturite  qu'elles  sont  portees 
a  la  sanction  populaire.  A  plus  forte  raison,  dans  une  nion- 
archle  ou  les  fonctions  du  pouvoir  legislatif ,  celles-la  meme 
qui  ont  le  plus  d'activite,  sont  confiees  a  une  Assemblee 
representative,  la  nation  doit-elle  etre  jalouse  de  la  nioderer 
de  I'assujettir  a  des  formes  severes,  et  de  premunir  sa  propre 
liberte  contre  les  atteintes  et  la  degeneration  d'un  tel 
pouvoir  ;  car  il  ne  faut  pas  I'oublier,  I'Assemblee  nationale 
n'est  pas  la  nation,  et  toute  assemblee  particuliere  porte  avec 
elle  des  germes  d"aristocratie. 

"  Quelles  precautions  ont-elles  ete  prises,  dans  la  constitu- 
tion qui  se  prepare,  pour  garantir  la  nation  ce  ces  dangers? 
.Nous  voyons  le  pouvoir  executif  surveille,  contenu  de  toute 
maniere ;  et  nous  ne  connaissons  jusqu'a  present  d'autre 
regie  au  pouvoir  legislatif  que  ses  propresluinieres,  d'autres 
barrieres  que  sa  propre  volonte.  En  se  constituant  corps 
unique,  il  est  prive  de  I'avantage  de  se  controler  lui-meme, 
et  de  mlirir  dans  son  sein  ses  propres  deliberations."  Nou- 
veau  coup  d'oeil  sur  la  sanction  royale.— Mem.  VI.  443,  444. 

1  CEuvres,  II.  93,  96,  99,  100,  114. 


160  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

worse  than  iio  veto  j)ower  at  all  would  have  been, 
for  while  it  did  not  give  the  king  the  power,  which 
Mirabeau  demanded  for  him  in  the  interest  of  the 
people,  it  compelled  him  to  make  himself  per- 
sonally the  target  of  the  unbridled  passions  and 
sinister  demagogy. 

But  not  the  king  alone  had  to  pay  dearly  for 
Mirabeau's  defeat.  The  history  of  the  veto  ques- 
tion is  one  of  the  strongest  proofs  that  the  Assem- 
bly was  the  victim  of  a  gross  delusion  in  believing, 
that  to  break  down  the  power  of  the  executive 
was  identical  with  increasing  and  confirming  its 
own  power.  With  Lafayette,  the  ministers,  and 
the  Assembly,  the  decisive  argument  was  the 
wrath  of  Paris.  Not  the  Assembly,  but  the 
clamor  of  the  unreasoning  masses  instigated  by 
irresponsible  agitators,  virtually  decided  the  ques- 
tion. The  Assembly  was  already  far  on  the  high- 
road towards  rendering  "  the  legislator  himself," 
as  Mirabeau  said,  "  nothing  but  a  slave,  who  is 
obeyed  when  he  pleases,  and  will  be  dethroned, 
if  he  shock  the  impulse  which  he  has  given."  ^ 

In  this  case  the  government,  the  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  national  guard,  the  Assembly,  and 
the  people  had  united  in  breaking  the  shield,  with 
'  Corresp.,  II.  445. 


THE   FRENCH  REVOLUTION.  161 

which  Mirabeau  tried  to  protect  at  the  same  time 
the  king,  the  Assembly,  and  the  people.  In  other 
questions  of  equal  import  he  was  compelled  in  a 
way  to  lead  them  himself,  with  open  eyes,  towards 
the  precipice. 

Thus,  above  all,  in  regard  to  the  assignats.  It  is 
as  undeniable  that  to  him  more  than  to  any  one 
else  it  was  due  that  the  Assembly  attempted  by 
this  means  to  avert  bankruptcy,  as  it  is  certain 
that  among  the  levers,  with  which  France  was 
precipitated  into  the  abyss  of  terror,  this  device 
was  one  of  the  most  powerful.  To  acknowledge 
this  is,  however,  by  no  means  to  admit  that  the 
responsibility  for  its  having  this  effect  rests  upon 
him.  "  To-day  bankruptcy,  hideous  bankruptcy 
is  there  ;  it  threatens  to  consume  you,  your  pros- 
perity, your  honor — and  you  deliberate  !  "  ^  Thus 
Mirabeau  closed  his  wonderful  improvisation  for 
instantly  voting  the  extraordinary  income  tax  of 
25  per  cent,  demanded  by  the  government,  and  the 
vast  hall  seemed  to  shake  under  the  convulsive 
applause  elicited  by  the  overpowering  fervor  of 
his  patriotic  appeal.^      Was  bankruptcy  afterwards 

1  CEuvres,  II.  187. 

2  In  a  sense  it  hardly  can  be  called  an  improvisation. 
Nearly  two  years  before,  in  a  letter  addressed  to  Montmorin 

11 


162  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

less  hideous,  less  dangerous  ?  Did  the  facts  not 
prove  with  really  terrible  impressiveness  that  this 
one  word  contained,  as  he  asserted,  all  calamities, 
all  horrors,  that  of  national  dishonor  included? 
And  if  so,  was  it  then  not  right,  nay  an  impera- 
tive duty  to  have  recourse  to  assignats,  although 
he  knew  them  to  be  a  seed,  which  might  be  event- 
ually turned  into  dragon  teeth?  Yes,  he  knew 
that  full  well.  Although  he  saw  and  laid  stress 
upon  the  fact  that  the  assignats  were  most  effect- 
ive weapons  against  the  enemies  of  the  revolution, 
because  whoever  owned  an  assignat  had  a  personal 
interest  in  upholding  it,i  he  avowed  that  the 
measure  had  at  first  "frightened"  him,^  and  in 
his  28th  Note  to  the  Court  he  wrote  :  "  Can  one 
guarantee  the  success  of  the  assignats  ?  I  answer 
frankly,  no.  One  can  guarantee  nothing  in  a 
kingdom  like  France,  and  above  all  in  circum- 
stances, when  so  many  different  passions  and  so 

(Nov.  20.  1787),  he  had  hurled  as  withering  denunciations 
against  bankruptcy  contemplated  at  the  time  by  the  gov- 
ernment as  a  means  to  obviate  the  necessity  of  calling  the 
States-General.  "  Deshonores  au  dehors,  furieux  au  dedans, 
en  derision  aux  autres,  en  horreura  nous-m ernes,  dangereux 
seulement  a  nos  chefs,  tels  nous  allons  etre,  si  le  roi  montre 
seulement  I'intention  de  manquer  a  ses  engagements."  See 
the  whole  letter.— Mem.  IV.  468-477. 

'  CEuvres,  IV.  61,  78.  "^  lb.,  IV.  50. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  163 

many  prejudices  are  engaged  in  perpetual  com- 
bats." ^  But  on  the  other  hand  he  again  and 
again  insists  that  one  is  in  the  vice  of  stern  neces- 
sity— that  there  is  no  choice.^  And  neither  then 
nor  ever  afterwards  has  a  single  one  of  those,  who 
have  condemned  him,  been  able  to  refute  this 
assertion  or  even  but  attempted  to  say,  what  else 
could  have  been  done.  Nor  is  there,  so  far  as  he 
is  concerned,  any  force  whatever  in  the  argument 
that,  while  bankruptcy  would  have  been  a  terrible 
calamity  in  1789  and  1790,  it  became  a  hundred- 
fold more  terrible  calamity  by  being  staved  off  for 
some  years  by  means  of  the  assignats.  The  fact 
is  undeniable,  but  he  cannot  with  any  color  of 
justice  be  held  responsible  for  it.  No  man  in  the 
Assembly  had  a  fuller  and  correcter  conception  of 
the  overshadowing  importance  of  the  financial 
question,  and  therefore  also  no  man  insisted 
earlier,  more  strenuously,  and  more  persistently, 
upon  its  being  treated  in  a  comprehensive  and 
systematic  way.-"^  But  he  preached  to  deaf  ears. 
He  compared  the  emission  of  assignats  to  the 
treatment  of  skilful  physicians  who,  though  they 

'  Corresp.,  II.  155. 

2  CEuvres,  IV.  83,  84,  85,  123,  123,  178. 

3  lb.,   III.  86,  87. 


164  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

do  not  cure,  prolong  life  by  fighting  the  most 
immediate  cause  of  danger,  and  thereby  procure 
a  chance  for  the  healing  forces  of  nature  to  assert 
themselves.!  The  Assembly  acted  as  if  it  deemed 
the  emission  of  assignats  the  financial  salvation  of 
the  state.  He  said :  "  The  interregnum  of  the 
laws  is  the  reign  of  anarchy."  2  The  Assembly, 
in  a  hundred  ways,  protracted  and  aggravated  the 
interregnum  of  the  laws.  He,  conforming  himself 
to  the  ever-changing  circumstances,  devised  means 
after  means  that  could  be  made  conducive  to  a 
condition  of  things,  which  would  render  it  pos- 
sible to  improve  the  prolongation  of  life  attained 
by  the  assignats  to  initiate  by  political  sanitation 
the  gradual  economical  sanitation.  The  Assembly 
not  only  refused  to  do  whatever  would  have  made 
them  fit  means  for  a  great  end,  but  it  and  its  suc- 
cessors directly  perverted  them  into  a  most  effica- 
cious means  to  thwart  his  ultimate  end:  the  re- 
establishment  of  a  real  government.  To  hold 
him  responsible  for  the  mischief  wrought  by  the 
assignats  has  about  as  much  sense  as  to  charge 
the  crimes  of  the  Inquisition  to  the  teachings  of 
Christ. 

Was  he  equally  blameless  as  to  the  equally  per- 
'  CEuvres,  IV.  76.  -^  lb.,  IV.  28. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  165 

nicioiis  consequences  of  his  half-victories  in  the 
church  question?  It  is  certainly  impossible  to 
prove  it,  and  even  to  make  it  plausible  would  be  a 
very  hard  task.  He  saw  from  the  first  that  the 
Assembly,  in  taking  up  the  question  in  the  manner 
it  did,  inflicted  a  wound  upon  the  revolution  so 
deep  and  so  malignant,  that  it  might  easily  j)rove 
fatal ;  and  his  later  systematic  efforts  to  entangle 
the  Assembly  more  inextricably  in  the  suicidal 
policy,  were  a  part  of  his  general  plan  to  discredit 
it  for  the  purpose  of  opening  a  way  to  a  wholesome 
reaction.!  For  these  two  facts  there  is  positive 
and  irrefutable  proof  in  abundance,  and  they  go 
far  towards  proving  that  his  guilt  cannot  be  as 
great  as  it  appears  at  first  sight.  But  they  are\ 
surely  not  sufficient  to  exonerate  him  completely. 

'  Corresp.,  II.  365,  366,  367,  ff.  He  \vi-ites,  Jan.  27,  1791  : 
"  Voila  une  plaie  toute  nouvelle,  mais  la  plus  envenimee  de 
toutes,  qui  va  ajouter  encore  un  foyer  de  gangrene  a  tous 
ceux  qui  rongent,  corrodent  et  dissolvent  le  corps  politique  ; 
nous  nous  etions  fait  un  roi-effigie,  sans  pouvoir  ;  et  un  corps 
legislatif  qui  adminstre,  qui  informe,  qui  juge,  qui  recom- 
pense, qui  punit,  qui  fait  tout,  excepte  ce  qu'il  doit  faire. 
A  present  nous  arrangeons,  le  schisme  religieux  a  cote  du 
schisme  politique  ;  nous  n'avions  pas  assez  de  resistance, 
nous  en  suscitons  a  plaisir  ;  de  dangers,  nous  evoquons  le 
pire  de  tous ;  d'cmbarras,  nous  soulevons  le  plus  inextric- 
able ;  c'est  de  quoi  amener  la  fin  de  tout,  si  I'Assemblee  ne 
se  lasse  pas  bientot  d'obeir  aux  anarchistes."^Mem.  VIII. 
248. 


166  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION 

To  determine  with  exactness  the  extent  of  his 
guilt  is,  however,  impossible,  because  we  are  not 
fully  informed  about  his  motives.  There  is  still  a 
veil  spread  over  this  imjjortant  chapter  of  his  revo- 
lutionary career,  and  it  will,  perhaps,  never  be 
removed.  To  me  it  seems  likely  that  here,  as 
according  to  his  own  confessions  in  many  another 
case,  the  excitement  of  the  moment  and  the  pro- 
vocations of  the  injudicious  stubborn  resistance  of 
the  adversaries  of  the  revolution,  lashed  his  impet- 
uous temper  into  such  a  passion  that,  ere  he  was 
himself  aware  of  it,  he  had  rushed  far  beyond  the 
line  which,  in  his  own  calmer  judgment,  he  ought 
not  to  have  overstepped.  However  that  be,  thus 
much  is  certain,  that  his  course  in  this  question 
raised  a  barrier  between  him  and  the  king,  which 
the  character  and  the  religious  views  of  Louis  XVI. 
rendered  more  insurmountable  than  any  other,  and 
this  was  as  great  a  calamity  for  France  as  some  of 
the  worst  blunders  of  the  Assembly.  The  un- 
breakable chains,  which  a  fatal  concatenation  of 
uncontrollable  circumstances  fastens  to  the  arms  of 
the  giant  of  the  revolution,  are  riveted  by  his  own 
guilt. 


LECTURE  XI. 

Miraheau    and    the  Court. 

Ever  since  unimpeachable  documentary  evi- 
dence was  brought  to  light,  proving  that  Mirabeau 
was  for  a  long  time  the  secret  adviser  of  the  court, 
innumerable  persons  in  France  and  elsewhere  have 
deemed  this  fact  in  itself  incontestable  jiroof,  that 
he  was  a  double-faced  and  douljle-tongued  wretch 
— a  paragon  of  the  vilest  type  of  traitors,  betray- 
ing equally  both  parties  they  pretend  to  serve. 
Mirabeau  himself  in  July,  1790,  when  suffering 
from  an  attack  of  the  disease  which  ended  his  days 
a  few  months  later,  sent  to  l.,a  March  his  papers, 
including  the  notes  to  tlu;  court,  requesting  him 
"  in  case  of  death  to  give  them  to  some  one  taking 
enough  interest  in  my  memory  to  defend  it."  In 
reply  to  La  March's  answer  accepting  the  trust,  he 
wrote  :  "  I  assure  you  that  my  courage  is  greatl}'^ 
revived  by  the  tlionglit  that  a  man  like   you   will 

not  suffer   that   I  be  eiitirclv  inisiudged.      I    sliall 

167 


168  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

either  soon  go  hence,  or  I  shall  leave  in  your  hands 
noble  elements  of  vindication."  ^  Now,  whatever 
else  Mirabeau  may  have  been,  an  idiot  he  was  not. 
It  is,  therefore,  patent,  that  either  those  must  be 
guilty  of  an  absurdity,  who  consider  him  convicted 
of  revolting  depravity  by  the  fact  in  itself  of  his 
bavin Q-  entertained  clandestine  relations  with  the 
court,  or  that  his  moral  vision  must  have  been  so 
abnormal  that  lie,  in  good  faith,  mistook  black  for 
white.  A  moment's  reflection  ought  to  convince 
any  one,  that  not  the  moral,  but  the  historical 
vision  of  those  severe  judges  is  most  strangely 
obfuscated. 

France  was  engaged  in  a  revolution,  but  who- 
ever intimated  that  this  revolution  was  anti-mo- 
narchical, was  at  the  time  universally  hooted  down 
as  a  base  calumniator.  But  if  the  revolution  was 
not  intended  to  be  anti-monarchical,  how  then 
could  it  be  incompatible  to  be  at  the  same  time 
a  sincere  revolutionist  and  the  adviser  of  the 
crown  ?  As  to  Mirabeau  it  is  manifestly  nonsensi- 
cal to  assert  such  an  incompatibility,  for  we  have 
heard  him  declare  before  the  States-General  met, 
that  he  was  determined  to  be  "  very  monarchical." 
He  simply  was  true  to  his  word.  The  fact  in 
'  CoiTesp.,  I.  23. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  169 

itself,  that  he  acted  as  adviser  of  the  crown,  does 
not  cast  a  shadow  of  a  shadow  upon  him.  Tliat, 
however,  is  not  saying  that  he  was  blameless. 
But  whether  he  was  guilty  and,  if  so,  what  the 
character  and  the  extent  of  his  guilt  was,  depends 
entirely  on  the  answers  that  must  be  given  to  the 
following  two  questions  :  what  were  his  motives 
for  advising  the  court,  and  what  advice  did  he 
give  ?  Or  to  put  them  into  a  more  definite  form  : 
was  he  a  mercenary  and  a  recreant  to  the  political 
convictions  he  still  publicly  professed  ?  The  two 
questions  cannot  be  separated.  To  form  an  intel- 
ligent opinion  and  judge  fairly,  all  the  facts  con- 
stituting the  case  and  having  a  bearing  upon  it, 
must  be  known  and  considered  in  their  connection 
as  a  whole. 

Mirabeau  received  money  from  the  king.  That 
is  an  established  fact.  An  equally  undeniable 
fact,  however,  is,  that  for  generations  public  opinion 
— and  more  especially  that  of  tlio  upper  classes — 
considered  it  a  matter  of  course,  that  anybody  wlio 
had  a  chance  to  get  money  from  the  king  should 
improve  it.  If  we  want  to  be  just  judges,  we 
must  keep  this  well  in  mind,  because  Mirabeau, 
like  every  historical  personage,  has  to  be  judged 
by   the    standard    of    his    and    not   of   our    times. 


170  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

Mercy  d'Argenteau,  the  Austrian  ambassador,  and 
La  Marck  were  men  not  only  of  spotless,  but  of 
most  scrupulous  honor,  and  while  they  were  per- 
fectly familiar  with  the  laxity  of  Mirabeau's  moral 
principles  in  money  and  other  questions,  the 
thought  never  entered  their  heads  that  the  fact 
of  Ills  taking  money  from  Louis  XVL  could 
in  the  opinion  of  any  one  throw  the  slightest 
reflection  upon  him.  Nor  were  they  altogether 
wrong,  even  if  he  be  weighed  on  the  more 
sensitive  scales  of  our  times,  for  he  was  paid 
for  work  done  and  services  rendered.  And  the 
work  was  not  only  very  considerable,  but  it  also 
involved  no  small  outlay  for  paying  collaborators, 
agents,  clerks.  If  Mirabeau  had  received  nothing, 
he  would  have  given  not  only  his  time,  but  also 
his  money  to  the  king.  That  was  not  only  more 
than  anybody  had  a  right  to  expect  from  him  ;  he 
could  not  have  done  it  for  tlie  simple  reason  that 
he  had  no  money.  It  is  true  :  by  the  death  of  his 
father  he  had  become  the  legal  owner  of  a  fair 
fortune,  though  the  old  Marquis  had  made  his 
second  son  the  principal  heir — the  legal  owner  of 
a  fair  fortune,  but  he  had  by  no  means  come  also 
into  actual  possession  of  it.  The  great  economist 
had  left   his  affairs  in  such  a  tangled  condition, 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  I7l 

that  unless  Mirabeau  withdrew  entirely  from 
politics  and  devoted  himself  for  some  time  wholly 
to  his  private  interests,  he  remained  exactly  in  his 
former  condition,  i.  e.,  a  bankrupt  with  such  a 
mountain  of  debts  on  his  back,  that  he  had  con- 
stantly all  the  trouble  in  the  world  to  find  to-day 
the'  money  he  absolutely  needed  for  the  morrow. 
For  nearly  a  year  longer  he  submitted  to  this, 
rather  than  to  think  for  a  moment  of  setting  his 
own  affairs  to  rights  and  letting  the  state  take  care 
of  itself.  That  at  all  events  proves  that  hanker- 
ing after  money  was  not  the  dominant  trait  of  his 
character.  The  trouble  was,  in  fact,  that  now  as 
ever  before,  he  was  wholly  destitute  of  a  proper 
appreciation  of  it.  In  a  sense  he  cared  no  more 
for  it  than  for  the  dirt  under  his  feet.  Tliat, 
money  or  no  money,  he  was  to  gratify  his  every 
desire,  was  to  him  a  matter  of  course.  He,  there- 
fore, always  spent  lavishl}- — his  own  money,  if  he 
happened  to  have  any,  if  he  had  none,  that  of 
other  people.  It  may  sound  strange,  and  still  it 
was  so  ;  money  was  no  object  at  all  with  him ;  ^ 
all  he  cared  about  was,  witliout  having  to  think  of 
money,  always  to  do  what  could  not  be  done  with- 

•  See  the  chai'acteristic  story  told  by  Mme.  de  Nchra, 
Mem.  IV.  419,  420. 


1Y2  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

out  having  plenty  of  money.  He  was  therefore 
sorrily  unscrupulous  about  how  he  got  the  monej'- 
he  wanted  to  spend,  but  for  the  same  reason  he 
also  never  even  felt  so  much  as  tempted  to  stoop 
to  means  by  which  he  would  have  lowered  himself 
in  his  own  eyes.^  When  he  had  written  a  de- 
nunciation of  the  Banque  de  Saint-Charles,  he  was 
offered  a  big  sum  for  suppressing  the  pamphlet ; 
he  preferred  to  carry  all  he  had  to  the  Mont-de- 
Piet^,  the  public  pawning  shop  of  Paris.^  Now 
his  creditors,  whom  La  Marck  justly  calls  "  his 
worst  enemies,"  harassed    him  so,  that  he  was  com- 


'  He  was  pelted  by  such  a  shower  of  charges  of  venality, 
that  he  wrote,  with  felicitous  irony  :  "  En  verite,  je  me 
vends  a  tant  de  gens,  que  je  ne  comprends  pas  comment  je 
n'ai  pas  encore  acquis  la  monarchie  universelle." — Lettres  a 
Mauvillon,  473. 

2  Corresp.,  I.  103.  See  his  letter  of  Oct.  4,  1788,  to  his 
father.  Memoires,  IV.  188-191  :  "  Provoque  par  Dupont  lui- 
meme,  que  j'en  atteste,  bafoue  par  lui  de  ne  m'etre  pas  fait 
40,000  fr.  de  rente  dans  les  vertiges  de  I'agiotage,  je  suis 
reste  etranger  a  toute  speculation,  meme  innocente ;  j'ai 
vecu,  petitement  vecu,  de  mon  travail  et  du  secours  de  mes 
amis  ;  mais  je  n'ai  jamais  ni  joueun  ecu,  ni  regu  un  sou  en 
present,  moi  qui  faisait  flechir,  en  quelque  sorte,  a  mon  gre, 
le  balancier  de  la  Bourse  ;  moi  dont  on  aurait  paye  le  silence 
de  tout  I'or  que  j'aurais  voulu  accepter.  .  .  Tant  que  M.  de 
Calonne  n'a  pas  ete  chef  de  parti  et  de  parti  dans  I'agiotage, 
11  a  trouve  cela  tres-bien,  et  m'a  meme  lance  .  .  .  Quand  le 
ministre  a  ete  agioteur,  il  a  voulu  m'imposer  silence,  et  j'en 
ai  parle  plus  haut." 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  1Y3 

pletely  at  his  wits'  ends,  and  might  have  been 
ultimately  driven  to  some  desperate  resolution,  if 
this  friend  had  not  responded  to  his  appeal  for 
help  in  his  dire  distress,  and  yet,  as  La  Marck  says, 
"  he  would  only  have  needed  to  let  the  gold  come 
to  him,  which  the  factions  scattered  about  in  pro- 
fusion." 1  The  extravagant  joy  to  which  Mira- 
beau  gave  demonstrative  expression  upon  learning 
that  the  king's  liberality  far  exceeded  what  he  had 
dared  to  hope  for,  was  more  than  undignified ;  it 
was  revolting.  But  his  circumstances  were  such, 
that  to  say  he  ought  not  to  have  taken  money  from 
the  king,  is  to  say  he  ought  not  to  have  assumed  the 
task  he  did  assume.  This  task,  however,  was  the 
attempt  to  save  the  king  and  the  kingdom.  To 
abandon  them  to  their  fate  would  certainly  not 
have  been  patriotic,  and  I  suppose  that  the  moral- 
ists who,  with  the  zest  of  holy  monks  burning  a 
heretic,  have  nailed  his  memorj^  to  the  pillory  for 
taking  this  money,  will  admit  that  patriotism  ought 
also  to  be  an  article  in  a  statesman's  code  of  morals. 
But  if  Mirabeau  consented  to  be  tlie  secret 
adviser  of  the  court  for  the  sake  of  earning  the 
money,  his  vindication  can,  of  course,  not  be  based 
upon  the  plea  of  patriotism,  even  if  one  be  of  opin- 
iCorresp.,  I.  137. 


174  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

ion  that  liis  counsels  were  in  conformity  with  the 
true  interests  of  tlie  monarch  as  well  as  of  the 
state.  It  can,  however,  be  proved  beyond  the 
possibility  of  contradiction,  that  the  salary  he  re- 
ceived was  but  an  incident,  and  not  his  end. 
Neither  when  he  offered  his  assistance  to  the 
ministers  before  the  meeting  of  the  States-General 
and  in  the  first  weeks  of  the  session,  nor  when,  in 
the  Memoir  of  the  15th  of  October,  he  urged  his 
advice  and  his  help  directly  upon  the  royal  family, 
had  he  intimated  the  expectation  of  any  pecuniary 
remuneration.  In  his  negotiations  with  Lafayette, 
as  we  have  seen,  this  question  had  indeed  played 
no  small  part,  because  he  was  driven  into  a  corner  ; 
but  although  he  was  fairly  hunted  down  by  his 
creditors,  he  had  ultimately  rejected  the  offers  of 
the  ministers  and  of  Lafayette — the  latter  evident- 
ly counting  upon  the  civil  list  of  the  king  to  make 
good  his  promises.  After  the  defeat  of  the  7th  of 
November,  Mirabeau  had  been  for  a  while  in  con- 
nection with  the  Count  de  Provence,  pursuing  the 
idea  of  making  him  the  ostensible  "  pilot  "  with  a 
view  to  being  himself,  under  his  name,  the  real 
commander.  Also  in  this  episode  no  _  mercenary 
motives  can  be  proved.^  He  had  soon  to  give  up 
^  True,  Etienne  Dumont  in  his  Souvenirs  (230)  asserts  : 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  1Y5 

the  project,  because  it  became  too  apparent  that 
the  prince,  though  intellectually  greatly  the  su- 
perior of  his  brother  the  king,  was,  as  to  character, 
wholly  unfit  for  the  part  Mirabeau  intended  him 
to  play.i  After  this  attempt  had  failed,  he  did 
not  again  offer  his  services.  Understood  by  no 
one  and  repulsed  with  insulting  superciliousness 
by  all  whom  he  wanted  to  save,  he  became  equally 

"  Monsieur  s'engageait  a  lui  payer  20,000  francs  par  mois 
jusqu'a  ce  que  ses  affaires  fussent  liquidees,  et  a  devenir  son 
seul  creancier."  I  cannot  attribute  any  weight  to  this  testi- 
mony. In  my  opinion,  the  man  who  knows  of  no  better 
way  to  convince  the  world  of  his  superior  genius  than  to 
write  a  big  book  in  every  way  disparaging  his  dead  friend, 
is  a  witness  less  to  be  trusted  than  an  avowed  enemy. 
There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  Mirabeau  would  have 
made  Dumont  his  confidant,  if  he  had  concluded  such  a  bar- 
gain, and  what  we  know  from  La  Marck  about  his  pecuniary 
embarrassments  at  the  time  proves,  that  he  cannot  have  been 
a  pensioner  of  the  prince.  This  also  disposes  of  the  promise 
of  the  prince,  pviblished  in  Lafayette's  Memoirs,  to  become 
Mirabeau's  sole  creditor.  Let  us  take  the  word  of  the  editors 
for  it  that  the  original  is  in  the  prince's  own  handwriting. 
Does  that  prove  that  IMirabeau  accepted  his  offer  ?  Neither 
would  IMirabeau  have  been  practically  a  beggar  at  this  time, 
nor  would  the  relations  between  the  two  men  have  been  of 
such  short  duration,  if  a  bargain  of  this  kind  had  been 
struck. 

1  On  the  23d  of  Dec,  1789,  Mirabeau  writes  :  "  Au  Luxem- 
bourg (the  residence  of  the  prince),  on  a  peur  d'avoir  peur.'" 
Six  days  later  :  "  II  a  la  purete  d'un  enfant,  mais  il  en  a  la 
faiblesse."  And  on  the  27th  of  Jan.,  1790  :  "  Ce  qui  est  au- 
dessous  de  tout,  c'est  Monsieur.'''' — Corresp.,  436,  440,  460. 


176  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

embittered  and  discouraged.  In  the  Assembly  he 
spoke  but  seldom  and  in  his  letters  he  repeatedly 
complained  of  being  tired  and  feeling  bored.  He, 
who  had  thus  far  always  taken  the  initiative,  had 
no  hand  in  bringing  about  the  change  in  his  rela- 
tions to  the  court.  He  was  even  wholly  unaware 
that  a  change  was  contemplated,  until  he  was  in- 
formed that  on  the  part  of  the  court  it  was  a  fixed 
resolution. 

In  March,  1790,  La  March,  who  since  the  middle 
of  December  was  in  Belgium,  received  an  invita- 
tion from  Count  Mercy  to  return  to  Paris  on  ac- 
count of  matters  of  importance.  He  at  once  com- 
plied, arriving  in  Paris  on  the  16th.  His  first  in- 
terview with  Mercy  took  place  on  the  18th.  He 
expected  to  be  interrogated  on  the  Belgian  affairs. 
Mercy,  however,  forthwith  began  to  speak  of  his 
relations  to  Mirabeau  and  ended  by  requesting 
him  to  serve  as  mediator  between  the  kinar  and 
the  great  tribune.  La  March  consented  under  the 
condition  that  Mercy  should  himself  see  Mirabeau 
and  take  part  in  the  negotiations.  As  Mercy 
could  not  divest  himself  of  his  quality  of  Austrian 
ambassador  he,  very  naturally,  was  loath  to  do  so. 
In  consequence  of  this  difficulty  the  matter  was 
allowed  to  rest  for  a  fortnisrht.     A  second  inter- 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  177 

view  in  the  beginning  of  April  resulted  in  Mercy's 
consenting  secretly  to  meet  Mirabeau  in  La  Marck's 
house.  The  conversation  ran  entirely  upon  the 
political  situation  of  France,  but  Mirabeau  was 
given  no  intimation  as  to  the  ultimate  purpose  of 
his  friend  and  the  ambassador.  Mercy,  highly 
pleased  with  Mirabeau,  told  La  Marck  in  leaving, 
that  the  queen  wished  to  see  him  the  next  day. 
Marie  Antoinette,  who  at  the  end  of  September  or 
in  the  first  days  of  October,  1789,  had  told  La 
Marck :  "  I  trust  we  shall  never  be  so  unfortu- 
nate as  to  be  reduced  to  the  painful  extremity  of 
having  recourse  to  Mirabeau,"  ^  now  commenced 
the  conversation  by  informing  him,  that  for  two 
months  the  king  and  she  had  been  thinking  of 
entering  into  connection  with  Mirabeau.  After  a 
while  they  were  joined  by  the  king  and  it  was 
agreed,  that  La  Marck  should  broach  the  subject 
to  Mirabeau  and  invite  him  to  submit  his  views  on 
it  in  writing  to  the  king.  Mirabeau  received  the 
overtures  with  a  transport  of  delight.  Tlie  idea, 
as  La  Marck  says,  "  to  be  at  last  enabled  to  be  use- 
ful to  the  king,"  elated  him  so  highly  that,  carried 
away  by  his  sanguine  temperament,  the  fearful 
obstacles  in  his  way  were,  for  the  moment,  dwarfed 

'  Corresp.,  I.  107. 
12 


178  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

almost  into  insignificance.  In  a  letter,  dated  May 
lOtli  and  addressed  to  tlie  king,  he  gave,  briefly 
and  succinctly,  as  lie  himself  terms  it,  "  the  pro- 
fession of  faith  which  the  king  has  desired,"  declar- 
ing :  "  This  writing  will  forever  be  either  m}^  judg- 
ment or  my  witness."  This  letter  was  for  some 
time  in  the  hands  of  the  king,  and  as  yet  not  a 
word  had  been  said  about  money  either  by  Mira- 
beau,  or  to  him,  or  even  between  La  Marck  and 
Mercy.  Mirabeau  had  bound  himself  in  a  way 
which,  as  La  Marck  justly  says,  "  was  to  stake  his 
head,"  without  knowing  whether  they  intended  to 
give  him  a  copper  for  it.  Is  that  the  way  a  man 
acts  who  means  to  sell  himself  and  whose  political 
and  general  conscience  is  in  his  pocket?  The 
first  to  speak  of  money  were  the  queen  and  the 
king,  after  telling  La  Marck  that  the  letter  of  May 
10th  was  wholly  satisfactory  to  them,  and  from 
Mercy  came  the  suggestion  to  pay  his  debts,  in 
order  to  enable  him  to  give  his  time  entirely,  and 
without  being  molested  by  his  creditors,  to  the 
great  affairs  of  state.  When  La  Marck  asked 
Mirabeau,  to  give  him  the  figure  of  liis  debts,  he 
very  characteristically  replied  that  he  knew  noth- 
ing about  it,  and  when  he  had  ascertained  that  they 
amounted  to  208,000/,  he  dolefully  said,  that  the 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  179 

king  could  never  think  of  paying  so  much.  Louis 
engaged  to  do  that,  paid  him  beside  6,000Z  a  month 
for  his  current  expenses,  and  gave  to  La  Marck 
four  promissory  notes,  each  for  250,000/,  to  be  paid 
after  the  close  of  the  National  Assembly,  in  case 
Mirabeau  had  been  true  to  his  promises. 

What  were  these  promises  and  how  were  they 
kept?  If  Mirabeau's  accusers  can  convict  him  in  re- 
gard to  these  two  questions,  it  can,  of  course,  avail 
him  but  little  that  as  to  the  money  question,  lie  was 
by  far  not  as  black  as  they  would  make  one  believe. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  they  cannot  make  out  a  case 
against  him  in  regard  to  these  two  questions,  it  is 
evident  that,  though  his  relations  with  the  court 
were  surely  not  altogether  free  from  blame,  his 
own  opinion  of  them  must  be  in  the  main  correct. 
Would  it  be  surprising  if  that  should  be  the  re- 
sult of  an  impartial  examination  of  the  facts  ?  If 
any  man  was  not  disposed  to  judge  him  too 
leniently  it  was  Lafayette,  and  even  he  did  him 
tlie  justice  to  testif}^ :  "  Mirabeau  was  not  inac- 
cessible to  money,  but  for  no  amount  would  he 
have  sustained  an  opinion  that  would  have 
destroyed  liberty  and  dishonored  his  mind."  ^  If 
I  were  asked,  what  chapter  of  his  whole  history 
'  Memoires,  II.  367. 


180  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

redounds,  upon  tlie  whole,  the  most  to  his  honor, 
not  only  as  a  statesman,  but  also  as  a  man,  I 
should  unhesitatingly  answer :  that  of  his  rela- 
tions to  the  court. 

The  "  profession  of  faith  "  ^  is  preceded  by  the 
declaration,  that  his  repugnance  to  playing  farther 
an  active  part  would  be  invincible,  "  if  I  were  not 
convinced,  that  the  restoration  of  the  legitimate 
authority  of  the  king  is  the  first  need  of  France 
and  the  only  means  to  save  her."  The  sight  of 
constantly  growing  anarchy,  horror  at  the  idea  of 
having  "  contributed  only  to  a  vast  demolition, 
and  the  fear  to  see  another  chief  of  the  state  than 
the  king,"  imperiously  bid  him  not  to  stay  shut  up 
"  in  tlie  silence  of  contempt."  Whatever  else  the 
king  might  have  to  expect  from  his  secret  coun- 
sellor, he  certainly  did  not  propose  to  mince  mat- 
ters, but  to  be  terribly  plain-spoken.  Or  was  it 
but  the  cheap  trick  of  an  audacious  political  jug- 
gler to  tell  the  king  to  his  face  that  nothing  less 
than  his  crown  was  at  stake  ?  Did  he  intend  to 
excite  exaggerated  fears  in  order  to  make  his  ser- 
vices in  averting  them  appear  much  greater  than 
they  really  were  ?  The  last  sentences  of  the  letter 
will  answer  this  question  in  no  uncertain  way. 
1  See  the  letter  of  May  10th.— Corresp.,  II.  11-13. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION,  181 

The  profession  of  faith  itself  is  compressed  into 
a  single  sentence  :  "  I  engage  myself  to  serve  with 
all  my  influence  the  true  interests  of  the  king  ; 
and  in  order  not  to  have  this  promise  appear  too 
vague,  I  declare  that  I  believe  a  counter-revolution 
as  dangerous  and  criminal,  as  I  deem  chimerical 
the  hope  or  the  project  of  any  government  in 
France  without  a  chief,  invested  with  all  the  neces- 
sary power  to  apply  all  the  public  force  to  the 
execution  of  the  law."  Another  sentence  expresses 
the  same  idea  in  other  words  :  "  I  am  as  profoundly 
averse  to  a  counter-revolution  as  to  the  excesses 
to  which  the  revolution,  fallen  into  the  hands  of 
bungling  and  perverse  men,  has  conducted  the 
people."  Supposing,  for  argument's  sake,  that  the 
king  and  the  queen  wanted  him  to  assist  them  in 
re-establishing  the  royal  absolutism,  could  the}^ 
after  reading  these  lines,  still  believe  that  they  had 
addressed  themselves  to  the  right  man  ?  Surely,  to 
declare  the  very  idea  of  a  counter-revolution  "  crim- 
inal," was  a  strange  way  of  signifying  one's  will- 
ingness to  become  a  traitor  to  the  revolution. 
Mirabeau's  accusers  have  ever  deemed  it  super- 
fluous to  show  wherein  his  counsels  to  the  king 
were  a  betrayal  of  his  political  past,  because  to 
them  the  assertion  of  compatibility  between  faith- 


182  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

fulness  to  the  revolution  and  serving  the  king  is  a 
self-evident  absurdity :  they  see  in  it  a  contradiction 
in  terms.  Mirabeau  was  of  exactly  the  opposite 
opinion.  Because  he  was  determined  to  be  faithful 
to  the  revolution,  he  accepted  the  king's  invitation 
and  promised  to  serve  him.  In  his  very  first  Note 
to  the  court  he  expressly  declared,  that  by  doing 
so  he  did  not  shift  his  position  by  a  hair's-breadth. 
"  I  shall  be  what  I  always  have  been  :  the  defender 
of  the  monarchical  power  regulated  by  the  laws, 
and  the  apostle  of  liberty  guaranteed  by  the  mo- 
narchical power."  1 

That  was  not  merely  the  announcement  that  he 
would  never  turn  traitor  to  the  revolution.  It  was 
the  formal  declaration  that  he  was  not  to  be  ex- 
pected to  become  in  any  respect  or  to  any  extent  a 
tool.  He  promised  to  serve  the  king,  but  he  explic- 
itly forewarned  him  that  he  would  never  become 
his  servant — never  be  at  his  orders.  "  I  know," 
he  says  in  his  36th  Note  (October  24,  1790), 
defending  himself  against  reproaches  occasioned 
by  the  attitude  he  had  assumed  in  regard  to  a 
certain  question,  "  I  know  that  I  have  promised 
everything,  but  have  I  promised  anything, 
but  to  serve  according  to  my  principles?  Shall 
'  Corresp.,  II.  25. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  183 

I  deceive  in  order  to  please,  or  render  myself 
useless  in  order  to  be  faithful  ?  "  ^  Faithful,  as 
the  court  seemed  to  understand  faithfulness. 
True  faithfulness  required  him  to  serve  only 
according  to  his  principles,  no  matter  how  mucli 
this  might  displease  the  court.  As  early  as  the 
27th  of  January,  1790,  at  the  time  of  his  relations  to 
the  Count  de  Provence,  he  had  written  to  La 
Marck :  "  When  they  have  not  followed  a  single 
one  of  my  advices,  not  improved  a  single  one  of 
my  conquests,  not  turned  to  profit  a  single  one  of 
my  operations,  they  complain,  say  that  I  have 
changed  nothing  in  their  position,  that  one  cannot 
count  very  much  upon  me,  and  all  that  because  I 
do  not  ruin  myself  with  a  light  heart  in  order  to 
sustain  advices,  things,  and  men,  whose  success 
would  inevitably  ruin  them."^ 

Even  if  he  had  intended  and  promised  to  serve 
the  king  primarily  for  his  own  sake,  that  would 
have  been  the  only  course  consistent  with  the  task 
he  had  assumed,  for  the  whole  agreement  was 
based  upon  the  idea  of  the  superiority  of  his  polit- 
ical judgment :  he  was  to  guide,  and  not  to  go  as 
he  was  bid.  But  he  had,  in  fact,  consented  to, 
serve  the  king,  because  he  wanted  to  servei 
1  Corresp.,  II.  265.  «  lb.,  I.  460. 


184  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

royalty,  and  royalty  he  wanted  to  serve,  because  he 
was  convinced  that  to  do  so  was  to  serve  France. 
The  court  possibly  still  considered  the  three  things 
identical,  in  the  sense  that  the  proper  criterion  for 
the  true  interests  of  royalty  and  of  France  was 
what  the  king  deemed  to  be  his  interest.  If  so, 
the  fault  was  not  Mirabeau's.  As  early  as  Decem- 
ber 29,  1789,  he  had  written  to  La  March :  "  Only 
one  thing  is  clear:  they  would  like  to  find  for 
their  service  amphibious  beings  who,  with  the 
talent  of  a  man,  have  the  mind  of  a  lackey.  They 
will  irremediably  be  ruined  by  having  fear  of  men 
and  carrying  always  the  petty  repugnances  and 
fragile  attractions  of  another  order  of  things  into 
this,  where  what  is  strongest  is  not  yet  strong 
enough ;  and  where  even  if  they  were  themselves 
very  strong,  they  would  still  need,  for  the  sake  of 
public  opinion,  to  surround  themselves  with  strong 
people."  1  The  man,  whom  his  just  indignation 
over  the  political  imbecility,  which  frustrated  all 
his  exertions,  drove  to  the  excess  of  calling  the 
king  and  queen  "royal  cattle"  (hetaiT),'^  would 
certainly  not  prostitute  his  talent  and  his  man- 
hood to  the  extent  of  playing  the  j)art  of  a  lackey. 
On  the  4th  of  December,  1790,  he  told  the  king : 
'  Corresp.,  I.  441.  » lb.,  II.  237. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  185 

"  The  question  is  no  longer  merely  to  save  royalty, 
but  to  save  the  public  cause  and  the  kingdom."  ^ 
To  make  this  distinction  was  to  announce  that,  if 
— by  the  fault  of  the  king  or  without  it — an  in- 
compatibility between  serving  the  king  and  sav- 
ing the  public  cause  and  the  state  should  arise,  he 
would  no  longer  be  found  at  his  side.  In  the 
Memoir  of  the  15th  of  October,  he  had  already 
declared  this  most  explicitly  and  empliatically, 
directly  to  the  royal  famil}^,  and  according  to  his 
I'adical  friend  Cabanis,he  repeated  this  declaration 
shortly  before  his  death  in  regard  to  the  same 
eventuality,  the  flight  of  the  king  to  tlie  frontier, 
substituting,  however,  for  the  "  denunciation  "  of 
which  he  had  given  notice  in  the  Memoir,  the  an- 
nouncement that  he  would  "  cause  the  throne  to  be 
declared  vacant  and  the  republic  proclaimed."  ^ 

'  Corresp.,  II.  383. 

^  "  J'ai  defenduelamonarchie  jusqu'aubout ;  je  la  defends 
meme  encore  que  je  la  crois  perdue,  parce  qu'il  dependrait 
du  roi  qu'elle  ne  le  fut  point,  et  que  je  la  crois  encore  utile  ; 
mais  s'il  part,  je  monte  a  la  tribune,  je  fais  declarer  le  trone 
vacant  et  proclamer  la  republique."  (Corresp.,  I.  252.)  La 
Marck  insists  that  Mirabeau  can  have  said  no  such  thing, 
because,  as  we  know,  he  declared  again  and  again  the  depart- 
ure of  the  king  an  absolute  necessity.  I  see  no  difficulty  in 
reconciling  this  fact  with  the  statement  of  Cabanis.  That 
he  writes  simply  "  departs  "  certainly  does  not  preclude  that 
Mirabeau  spoke  or,  at  least,  only  thought  of  a  flight  to  the 


186  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

To  declare  a  counter-revolution  "  criminal "  was 
absolutely  devoid  of  sense,  if  he  did  not  mean  to 
serve  the  king  only  because  and  so  far  as  the  in- 
terest of  the  state  required  it.  To  arraign  him  for 
his  relations  to  the  court  is,  therefore,  simply  ab- 
surd, unless  he  can  be  convicted  either  of  having 
changed  his  mind  as  to  the  criminality  of  a  coun- 
ter-revolution, or  of  having  defined  the  counter- 
revolution, which  he  deemed  criminal  so  narrowly, 
that  achievements  of  the  revolution  were  to  be 
sacrificed,  which  he  had  hailed  or  even  declared 
indispensable. 

If  the  documents  are  studied,  so  to  speak,  only 
from  the  headings,  it  seems  easy  to  convict  him 
out  of  his  own  mouth  of  both  charges.  For  a  con- 
eastern  frontier  with  a  view  to  invoking  the  aid  of  foreign 
powers.  La  Marck's  statement,  tliat  he  communicated  the 
result  of  his  negotiation  with  Bouille  to  Mirabeau,  and  that 
he  (Mirabeau)  expressed  himself  satisfied  with  it,  is  also  not 
incompatible  with  tliis  opinion.  The  sounding  of  Bouille  as 
to  his  wilUngness  to  aid  the  king  in  leaving  Paris  did  not 
necessarily  Imply  just  such  a  flight,  and  La  Marck  does  not 
say,  that  he  told  Mirabeau  that  it  was  this  that  was  contem- 
plated. What  Mirabeau  says  in  the  Memoir  of  the  15th  of 
October  on  this  question,  renders  it  an  impossibility  that  he 
should  have  approved  of  such  a  plan  as  that,  which  the  king 
afterwards  tried  to  execute.  Yet  on  June  4th,  1790,  he 
writes  to  La  Marck  :  "  II  ne  f aut,  en  aucun  cas  et  sous  aucun 
pretexte,  etre  ni  confident,  ni  complice  d'une  evasion,  et 
qvi'un  roi  ne  s'en  va  qu'en  plein  jour,  quand  c'est  pour  etre 
roi." — Corresp.,  II.  34. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  187 

siderable  time  he  goes  to  the  length  of  contending 
that  even  a  civil  war  might  be  resorted  to  to  bring 
about  the  necessary  reaction  ;  and  the  central  idea 
of  the  great  Memoir  of  December,  1790,  is  a  thor- 
ough overhauling  of  the  constitution  and  the 
systematic  discrediting  of  the  National  Assembly, 
because  unless  it  be  ruined  in  the  public  estima- 
tion, the  contemplated  changes  in  the  constitution 
cannot  be  effected.  Thus  he  undeniably  does  ad-  ' 
vocate  a  counter-revolution.  But  if  we  take  the 
pains  to  read  the  whole  Memoir,  and  not  only  to 
read,  but  also  to  study  it,  we  see  that  he  after  all 
persists  in  his  unqualified  denunciation  of  a  coun- 
ter-revolution by  any  illegitimate  means,  and,  above 
all,  by  force  of  arras.  Only  in  the  legitimate  way 
of  revolutionizing,  i.  e.,  changing  public  opinion, 
does  he  want  to  bring  about  a  counter-revolution. 
He  is  satisfied  that  this  is  likely,  if  not  certain,  to 
lead  to  an  appeal  to  the  ultima  ratio.  ^  But  though 
he  sets  himself  most  resolutely  against  the  idea  of 
making  the  sword  the  arbiter  between  the  king 

'  In  this  respect  his  opinions  cliange  with  the  changing 
circumstances.  In  the  December  Memoir  lie  again  assumes 
tlie  possibility  of  attaining  the  end  without  a  civil  war. 
His  principal  reason  for  thinking  that  eventually  a  civil  war 
would  be  "  a  blessing  in  disguise  "  was,  that  it  "  est  le  seul 
moyen  de  redonner  des  chefs  aux  hommes,  aux  partis,  aux 
opinions." — Corresp.,  II.  137. 


188  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

and  the  nation,  the  expectation  that  his  policy  will 
kindle  a  civil  war,  does  not  deter  him  from  advo- 
cating it.  Not  the  king  against  tlie  nation,  but  the 
majority  of  the  nation,  headed  by  the  king,  fight- 
ing the  minority,  which  by  its  factiousness  and 
insane  radicalism  hurries  France  into  perdition — 
that  is  the  civil  war  he  has  in  view.  Closest  alli- 
ance of  the  king  with  his  people  and  sincere  iden- 
tification of  the  king  with  the  true  spirit  of  tlie 
revolution — these  two  maxims  remain  to  the  last 
the  main  pillars  on  which  the  whole  structure  of 
his  policy  rests. 

The  December  Memoir  enumerates  what,  in  his 
opinion,  not  only  ought  to  be  preserved  of  the 
work  of  the  revolution,  but  also  tvill  be  preserved, 
whatever  may  befall  France.  This  list  and  the 
remarks  accompanying  it  not  only  prove  that  he 
never  became  recreant  to  his  original  faith,  but 
they  also  show  that,  though  he  passed  the  severest 
judgmentf  upon  the  political  incapacity  of  the 
Assembly,  he  never  lost  sight  of  the  fact  that  it 
had  done  enough  for  France  to  entitle  it,  in  spite 
of  everything,  to  eternal  gratitude.  Of  the  "  de- 
structions "  of  the  revolution,  he  says  that  "  they 
are  almost  all  equally  beneficial  to  the  nation  and 
the  monarch."     "  I  mean  by  destructions,  the  aboli- 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  189 

tion  of  all  privileges,  of  all  pecuniary  exemptions, 
of  feudalism,  and  of  several  disastrous  taxes.  I 
mean  besides  the  destruction  of  the  provincial 
bodies  of  the  pays  cVetats^  of  the  parliaments,  of 
the  clergy  and  fief-holders  as  political  bodies  in  the 
state.  I,  moreover,  count  among  the  great  advan- 
tages to  be  preserved,  the  uniformity  in  the  assess- 
ment of  taxes,  the  principles  of  a  more  popular 
administration,  the  liberty  but  not  the  impunity  of 
the  press,  the  liberty  of  religious  opinions,^  respon- 
sibility of  all  agents  of  the  executive  power, 
admissibility  of  all  citizens  to  all  employs,  a  less 
arbitrary  way  of  granting  favors  and  pecuniary 
aid,  and  a  stricter  control  in  the  administration  of 
the  public  funds.  In  a  word,  I  admit  into  my  sys- 
tem the  benefits  of  the  revolution  as  well  as  the 
cardinal  elements  of  the  constitution.  .  .  In  fact,  I 
consider  all  the  achievements  of  the  revolution 
and  all  that  must  be  preserved  of  the  constitu- 
tion as  such  irrevocable  conquests  that,  unless  the 
empire  be  dismembered,  no  subversion  could 
destroy  them.  I  even  do  not  except  an  armed 
counter-revolution :     if   the    kingdom    be    recon- 

'  In  the  Assembly  he  had  arduously  contended  against 
mere  religious  tolerance,  insisting  that  the  very  word  toler- 
ance implied  an  unwarrantable  arrogation  of  power. 


190  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

quered,  the  victor  would,  after  all,  have  to  com- 
pose with  public  opinion,  to  gain  the  good  will 
of  the  people,  to  consolidate  the  destruction  of 
abuses,  to  give  the  people  a  share  in  the  legisla- 
tive power,^  to  let  it  choose  its  administrators. 
From  this  observation  I  draw  this  important  con- 
clusion :  if  the  advantages  of  the  revolution  and 
the  true  foundations  of  the  constitution  are  inde- 
structible, it  is  of  little  consequence  whether  the 
National  Assembly  suffers  in  its  popularity,  in  its 
force,  in  its  credit ;  the  nation  can  only  gain  by  it, 
because  all  the  really  useful  decrees  of  this 
Assembly  will  survive  it,  and  only  its  fall,  whether 
it  be  slow  or  precipitate,  will  furnish  the  means  to 
correct  its  work.  Because  this  result  is  well 
assured,  the  true  friends  of  liberty,  those  who  pre- 
fer being  the  saviours  of  their  country  to  the  per- 
fidious popularity  vouchsafing  them  some  praise, 
can  unite  their  efforts  to  attack  the  Assembly,  and 
thereby  fulfill  their  duties  as  great  citizens."  The 
royal  authority  alone  cannot  even  attempt  the 
reorganizing  consolidation  of  the  true  revolution, 
i.  e.,  the  revolution  confining  itself  to  reform ;  only 
in  concurrence  with  an  Assembly  of  the  represent- 
atives of  the  people,  i.  e.,  in  unison  with  the  suc- 
•  "  Qu'il  admit  le  peuple  a  la  confection  de  la  loi." 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  191 

cesser  of  the  National  Assembly,  can  the  arduous 
task  be  accomplished. 

Does  this  programme  propose  the  revivification 
of  the  ancien  rSgime  in  anything  whatever  ?  Is 
anything  lacking  in  it,  that  is  essential  to  a  truly 
liberal  constitutional  monarchy  ?  Is  the  method, 
by  which  the  end  is  to  be  pursued,  not  that  of  a 
strictly  orthodox  constitutionalist  ? 

It  is  neither  possible  nor  necessary  here  to  enter 
upon  the  details  of  his  plan.  La  Marck  and  Mercy 
were  full  of  admiration  for  the  stupendous,  all- 
embracing  genius  Mirabeau  displayed  in  it,  but  at 
the  same  time  they  thought  it  too  vast,  too  com- 
plicated, too  dependent  on  an  army  of  able  and 
trusty  agents  whom  it  was  impossible  to  find,  and 
requiring  too  much  time.  All  that  was  true 
enough.  But  while  it  is  often  comparatively  easy 
to  keep  a  leaky,  storm-beaten  ship  afloat,  if  but  the 
right  thing  be  done  at  the  right  moment,  the  most 
skilful  engineer  cannot  raise  a  sunken  ship  with- 
out great  apparatus,  the  preparation  and  applica- 
tion of  which  is  not  an  affair  of  da3^s  and  weeks, 
but  of  months,  if  not  years.  That  was  now  the 
condition  of  things.  The  task  confronting  Mira- 
beau was  no  longer  to  keep  the  ship  afloat,  but  to 
raise  the  sunken  ship.     It  was  not  due  to  a  lack 


192  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION, 

of  skill  or  energy  on  his  part,  that  she  had  sunk 
in  spite  of  all  his  efforts.  The  hope  that  he  would 
be  able  to  save  her  had  been  revived  in  him  by 
tlie  unexpected  overtures  of  the  court,  because  he 
thought  that  he  would  now  at  last  be  put  into  a 
position  to  act.  That  was  a  gross  delusion,  and 
that  he  allowed  himself,  for  a  little  while,  to  be 
betrayed  into  this  delusion  by  the  consciousness  of 
his  strength,  spurred  on  alike  by  patriotism  and  am- 
bition, is  the  one  mistake  which  can  be  justly  laid 
to  his  charge. 

La  Marck  was  not  a  genius,  but  a  clear-headed, 
sober,  and  judicious  observer.  He  had  not  hailed 
Mercy's  communication  as  the  dawn  of  morning. 
In  his  opinion  they  had  already  waited  too  long, 
and  he  frankly  told  not  only  Mercy,  but  also  the 
king  and  the  queen,  that  he  greatly  doubted 
whether  Mirabeau  would  still  be  able  to  redress 
the  harm  he  himself  had  helped  to  do.  When  the 
king  announced  that  Mirabeau  was  not  to  be  in 
communication  with  the  ministers,  and  even  en- 
joined the  most  scrupulous  secrecy  towards  them 
in  regard  to  the  whole  affair,  the  count's  heart  was 
almost  as  heavy  as  before  Mercy  had  spoken  to 
him.  He  very  justly  writes  :  "  Did  such  means 
not   look   more   like   an  intrigue  than    dexterous 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  193 

and  powerful  measures,  worthy  of  a  government 
and  commensurate  to  the  proposed  end  ?  "  ^  In- 
stead of  paving  the  way  to  the  concert  between 
the  executive  and  legislative  power,  which  Mira- 
beau  deemed  the  primary  condition  for  arresting 
the  downward  course,  the  king,  by  thus  giving 
his  relations  to  Mirabeau  the  character  of  an 
intrigue,  only  paralyzed  the  executive  still  more, 
by  rendering  unity  of  purpose,  will,  and  action 
more  than  ever  impossible.  The  king  was  not 
the  government,  and  to  advise  the  king  was  use- 
less or  even  worse  than  useless,  unless  he  per- 
suaded or  compelled  the  ministers  to  act  as  he 
wanted  them  to.  With  a  man  like  Louis  XVI., 
the  one  and  the  other  was  out  of  the  question. 
If  Mirabeau  gained  sufficient  ascendency  over 
him,  to  make  him  not  only  subordinate  his  own 
opinions  to  those  of  his  counsellor,  but  also  in  a 
measure  to  stand  up  for  these,  the  ministers,  if 
they  happened  to  hold  different  views,  would  only 
conclude  from  it  that  an  irresponsible,  and  there- 
fore in  a  sense  illegitimate,  secret  influence  coun- 
teracted the  influence,  which,  in  consequence  of 
their  constitutional  responsibility,  they  were  not 
only  entitled,  but   in  duty  bound  to  claim ;  and 

1  Corresp.,  I.  147. 
13 


194  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

such  a  well-foimded  suspicion  was  certainly  not 
calculated  to  foster  the  proper  relations  between 
them  and  the  king.  If,  in  conformity  with  the 
tendencies  prevailing  in  the  Assembl}^  they  were 
only  too  much  inclined  to  antagonize  rather  than 
to  serve  the  crown,  any  manifestations  of  such  a 
concealed  power  behind  the  throne  would  be  more 
than  likely  to  drive  them  into  conscious  and 
systematic  hostility.  The  king's  being  in  favor 
of  anything  would  become  in  itself  a  reason  for 
opposing  it,  and  thus  the  hapless  monarch  would 
be  the  more  in  danger  of  turning  the  best  advice 
into  new  sources  of  calamity,  the  more  implicitly 
he  tried  to  conform  to  it.  This  must  be  fully 
understood,  if  justice  is  to  be  done  to  Mirabeau  in 
regard  to  his  truly  desperate  struggle  against 
having  men  devoted  to  Lafayette  called  into  the 
cabinet.  There  is  no  answer  to  what  he  wrote 
October  24th  to  the  court :  "  One  asks  of  me 
counsels  which  I  would  give  uselessly,  if  I  cannot 
concert  with  the  ministers.  Whether  strong  or 
weak  in  fencing,  I  must  have  some  ground  on 
which  to  plant  my  foot.  There  are  many  meas- 
ures, which  neither  the  court  nor  I  can  execute, 
and  which  ministers  in  whom  one  could  confide, 
might  attempt  with  success  and  without  danger. 


THE   FEENCH   REVOLUTION.  195 

What  confidence  could  I  have  in  a  cabinet,  created, 
sustained,  directed  by  my  enemy  ?  "  ^  At  last  a 
direct  contact  was  established  between  him  and 
Montmorin,  that  is  to  say,  he  was  enabled  to  act 
through  the  minister,  and  in  spite  of  the  weakness 
of  Montmorin's  character,  the  connection  was  suf- 
ficiently fruitful  to  prove  that  in  this  way  some- 
thing might  be  achieved.  Mirabeau  virtually 
directed  the  foreign  relations,  and  but  for  him 
the  war-cloud  hovering  on  the  horizon  might 
easily  have  risen  then.^ 

'  Corresp.,  II.  264. 

2  In  the  28th  Note  of  August  17,  1890,  he  writes  in  regard 
to  the  Spanish-English  quarrel  about  the  Nootka  Sound, 
which  threatened  to  drag  France  into  a  war  with  Great  Brit- 
ain :  "  Si  vous  vous  etes  condamnes  a  un  role  passif  a  I'inte- 
rieur,  pourquoi  le  ministere  veut-il  vous  entrainer  a  tm  role 
actif  a  I'exterieur?  Quelle  detestable  politique  est  done 
celle  qui  va  droit  a  transporter  sur  Leurs  Majestes  la  respon- 
sabilite  qui  ne  pent  que  resulter  d'une  perilleuse  alliance, 
d'une  guerre  desastreuse,  ou  il  n'y  a  pas  une  seule  chance  de 
succes  ?  Comment  ose-t-on  proposer  au  roi  de  tenter  pour 
TEspagne  ce  qu'il  n'ose  pas  pour  lui-meme?  Comment  com- 
promet-on  son  existence  dans  une  mauvaise  partie  qui  n'est 
pas  la  sicnne  ?  .  .  .  lorsque  I'anarchie  est  arrivee  au  dernier 
periode,  ne  f  remit-on  pas  a  I'idee  de  remuer  les  brandons  d'une 
querelle  exterieure,  qui  ne  peut  qu'allumer  une  guerre  gen- 
erale  et  vingt  guerres  civiles  dans  le  royaume  ?  Tant  d'inco- 
herence  me  passe,  je  I'avoue.  Je  suis  stupefait  de  tant  de 
faiblesse  unie  a  tant  d'audace,  et,  laissant  a  votre  habile 
ministere  sa  politique  profonde,  je  suis  trop  loyal,  je  dois 
trop  a  Vos  Majestes  ce  que  ma  conscience  et  mes  lumieres 


196  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

One  minister,  however,  was  no  more  the  gov- 
ernment than  the  king  was.  In  the  main  the 
character  of  Mirabeau's  relations  to  the  court 
remained  unchanged ;  in  some  respects  it  even 
looked  more  than  before  like  an  intrigue  on 
account  of  one  minister  having  become  a  party  to 
it.  So  long  as  every  possibility  was  withheld 
from  Mirabeau  to  bring  his  superior  mind  and, 
above  all,  his  superior  will  directly  to  bear  upon 
the  government  as  a  whole,  nothing  was  or  could 
be  gained.  He  himself,  as  La  Marck  very  correctly 
says,  had  been  before  in  all  essentials  a  strenuous 
defender  of  monarchical  principles.  As  to  him- 
self, therefore,  the  court  obtained  by  the  May 
agreement  only  what  it  substantially  had  had  from 
the  beginning.  In  form,  however,  the  change  in 
his  relations  to  the  court  was  so  radical,  that  to 
some  extent  inevitably  even  positive  harm  had 
to  result  from  it,  if  in  essence  no  corresponding- 
change  in  his  political  position  was  effected.  The 
change  in  form  was  of  sucli  a  character,   that  it 

m'indiquent  comme  la  verite,  je  suis  trop  avide  du  retablisse- 
ment  de  I'ordre,  pour  ne  pas  soutenir,  dans  le  comite  des 
affaires  etrangeres,  que  nous  ne  pouvons  nous  meler  que  de 
nous-memes,  et  que  nous  ne  devons  cherclier  qu'a  nous 
maintenir  en  paix  avec  quiconque  est  en  paix  avec  nous. " — 
To  the  last  he  remained  of  this  opinion. 


THE   FRENCH  REVOLUTION.  197 

compelled  liim  to  act  as  if  a  corresponding  change 
in  essence  had  taken  place  in  his  position,  and  this 
not  being  really  the  case,  it  forced  him  again  and 
again  into  momentary  changes  of  attitude,  injur- 
ing the  court  and  detrimental  to  his  influence 
upon  it.  By  insisting  upon  its  remaining  a  secret 
to  the  cabinet,  the  king  had  implanted  an  element 
of  untruthfulness  into  the  relation,  and  untruth- 
fulness, as  it  rarely  fails  to  do,  yielded  a  rich  crop 
of  poisonous  fruit. 

Mirabeau  never  knew  what  the  court  would 
do  with  his  advice,  and  having  to  act  perfectly  in 
the  dark,  he  could  not  alwaj^s  act  consistently 
in  his  double  role  of  secret  adviser  of  tlie  king 
and  member  of  the  Assembly.  Experience  soon 
taught  him  always  to  expect,  that  from  indolence, 
weakness,  or  fear,  the  king  would  ultimately  do 
what  the  ministers  wanted  him  to  do.  But  as 
representative,  citizen,  and  patriot,  he  was  not 
absolved  from  responsibility  as  to  what  was  done 
by  telling  what  ought  to  be  done.  His  having 
assumed  the  latter  obligation  liad  only  put  him 
under  heavier  bonds  as  to  that  older  and  jDara- 
mount  duty.  Argument  proving  inefficient,  he 
had  to  try  comj^ulsion,  and  compulsion  could  be 
exercised  only  by  exciting  fear.     This  he  could 


198  THE   FRENCH  REVOLUTION. 

do  any  moment  from  the  tribune  of  the  Assembly, 
for  every  day  offered  not  only  an  opportunity,  but 
also  a  temjDtation  to  indulge  in  a  flight  of  his 
revolutionary  eloquence.  Though  he  well  knew 
that  this  was  wielding  a  double-edged  weapon,  he 
did  it  more  than  once,  and  not  only  when  he 
really  had  no  other  choice.  The  court  compelling 
him  to  have  recourse  to  it  sometimes,  his  hot 
temper  betrayed  him  into  using  it  oftener  and 
striking  harder  with  it  than,  according  to  his  own 
confession,  he  ought  to  have  done.  This  secret 
connection  with  the  court  often  acted  upon  him 
more  as  a  lash  than  as  a  curb,  for,  on  the  one  hand, 
as  La  Marck  wrote  to  Mercy,  "  He  will  not  con- 
sider himself  seriously  engaged,  so  long  as  he 
only  furnishes  simple  notes  and  suggests  ideas 
which  one  does  not  follow,"  ^  and  on  the  other,  he 
was  determined  to  do  everything  in  his  power 
really  to  become  what  the  king,  by  logical  im- 
plication, had  requested  him  to  be :  the  directing 
mind  and  will  of  the  government. 

In  January,  1791,  Montmorin  complained  that 

when  he  spoke  to  the  king  "  about  his  affairs  and 

his  position,  it  seemed  as  if  one  talked  to  him  of 

things  concerning  the  emperor  of  China."  ^     And 

'  Corresp.,  II.  288.  ^  ji^^^  jjl.  30 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  199 

in  October,  1791,  La  Marck  wrote  :  "  Louis  XVI. 
is  not  fit  to  reign — by  the  apathy  of  his  character 
— by  that  rare  resignation  which  he  takes  for 
courasre  and  which  renders  him  almost  insensible 
to  the  danger  of  his  position — and,  finally,  by  that 
invincible  repugnance  to  the  labor  of  thinking, 
which  causes  him  to  divert  every  conversation, 
every  reflection  on  the  dangerous  situation."  ^ 
He  was  the  same  man  in  May,  1790,  and 
therefore  there  is  no  doubt  whatever,  that  he  had 
never  so  much  as  tried  to  render  himself  an  ac- 
count of  what  his  invitation  to  Mirabeau  implied. 
But  it  is  fully  as  certain  that  the  king  and  the 
queen  would  have  deemed  it  an  absurdity  as  well 
as  an  indignity,  if  anybody  had  told  them  that  it 
implied  the  request  to  take  full  charge  of  the  helm, 
"  It  is  evident,"  says  La  Marck,  "  that  fear  alone 
had  driven  them  to  court  this  formidable  tribune."  ^ 
No  one  knew  that  better  than  Mirabeau  himself, 
and  he  thought  it  best  to  tell  his  royal  clients  at 
once  very  plainly  that  he  was  fully  aware  of  it. 
In  the  second  Note  to  the  court,  he  urges  the 
queen  to  tell  Lafayette,  in  the  presence  of  the 
king  :  "  It  is  evident  that  he  (Mirabeau)  does  not 
want  to  help  ruin  us  ;  one  must  not  run  the  risk 
'  Corresp.,  III.  248.  '  lb.,  I.  147. 


200  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION, 

that  circumstances  compel  him  to  will  it ;  he 
must  be  for  us.  In  order  that  he  be  for  us,  we 
must  be  for  him.  .  .  "We  are  resigned  or  resolved 
to  give  him  the  confidence  of  despair."  ^  But  his 
object  in  telling  this  was  not  to  increase  their  fear 
of  him.^  There  was  a  passage  in  the  Note,  which 
may  have  impressed  the  queen  that  way ;  but  if  so, 
the  day  was  to  come  which  would  undeceive  her 
and  prove  that  those  terrible  lines  had  not  been  an 
attempt  at  intimidation  by  a  demagogue,  betrayed 
by  the  impatience  of  his  ambitious  audacity 
into  preposterous  exaggeration,  but  the  solemn 
warning  of  a  genuine  prophet  of  fearful  clearness 
of  vision.  "  The  king,"  he  wrote,  "  has  but  one 
man,  and  that  is  his  wife.  There  is  no  safety  for 
her  but  in  the  re-establishment  of  the  royal  author- 
ity. I  like  to  believe  that  she  would  not  care 
for  her  life  without  her  crown ;  I  am  perfectly 
sure  that  she  will  not  keep  her  life  if  she  does  not 
keep  her  crown."     No,  he  does  not  want  to  sub- 

>  Corresp.,  II.  42. 

^  This  is  not  mere  conjecture.  There  is  positive  proof  for 
it.  He  says  in  his  18th  Note  :  "  La  derniere  note  que  j'ai  en- 
voy ee  a  cause  de  I'inquietude,  et  presque  de  I'effroi.  Je  le 
regarderais  comme  un  bien  salutaire  effroi,  s'il  eut  produit 
I'activitie  au  lieu  d'aggraver  I'espece  de  torpeur  ou  reduit 
I'infortune.  Mais  comment  ne  pas  s'apercevoir  qu'en  aigui- 
sant  la  crainte,  il  emousse  la  volonte  ?" — lb.,  II.  136. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  201 

jugate  by  intimidation.  His  purpose  is  to  con- 
vince by  opening  the  eyes  to  the  appalling  gravity 
of  the  situation,  that  there  is  but  one  alternative  : 
implicit  confidence  or  perdition.  "  It  is  no  longer 
time  either  to  half-confide  or  to  half-serve.  .  . 
One  must  not  think  that  one  can,  with  the  help 
either  of  accident  or  of  combinations,  get  out  of 
an  extraordinary  crisis  by  ordinary  men  and 
measures." 

He  read  the  characters  but  too  correctly.  If 
anything  at  all  was  to  be  attained,  it  could  only  be 
through  the  queen.  But  neither  was  her  influence 
upon  the  king  strong  enough, ^  nor  could  she  her- 
self be  made  to  see  the  things  as  they  really  were 
and  to  do  with  sustained  resoluteness  what  they 
required  to  be  done.  While  she  understood  better 
than  the  king  the  necessity  of  coming  to  terms 
with  Mirabeau,  implicit  confidence  was  with  her 
even  more  out  of  the  question  than  with  him. 
The  man  was  repulsive  to  her,  and  while  her  pride 
was  great  enough  to  conquer  fear,  she  had  neither 
the  keenness  of  intellect  nor  the  strength  of  will  to 
conquer  aversion.  Besides  she,  too,  shirked  the 
intellectual  and  moral  effort  of  looking  the  fearful 
reality  full  in  the  face  and  pursuing  her  own  re- 
'  Cfr.  Corresp.,  I.  124,  125 ;  II.  287,  288. 


202  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

flections  upon  it  unflinchingly  to  the  end.  The 
second,  time  she  saw  La  Marck  in  regard  to  the 
arrangement  with  Mirabeau,  she  kept  him  over 
two  hours,  but  a  great  part  of  the  time  the  con- 
versation ran  upon  other  topics.  "  The  purpose  of 
my  audience,"  lie  saj^s,  "  was  almost  lost  sight  of ;  she 
tried  to  turn  it  away.  As  soon  as  I  spoke  to  her 
of  the  revolution  she  became  serious  and  sad." 
But  every  time  she  soon  dropped  the  unpleasant 
subject  and  resumed,  "  in  a  tone  of  cheerfulness  " 
and  with  her  customary  "amiable  and  graceful 
humor,"  her  sprightly  chat  on  something  else. 
"  This  trait,"  he  adds,  ^  paints  her  character  bet- 
ter than  all  I  could  say  about  it."  ^  Like  the 
king  she  is  at  bottom  a  votary  of  the  policy  of  the 
ostrich.  Not  only  in  her  conversation,  but  also  in 
her  thinking  does  she  drop  the  unpleasant  subject 
when  it  is  getting  too  unpleasant.  Therefore  she 
never  comes  to  see  the  necessity  of  Mirabeau's 
support.  When  she  has  come  to  the  point  of 
admitting  the  necessity  of  conciliating  him  so  far, 
that  he  refrains  in  future  from  putting  himself  at 
the  head  of  the  column  of  assault,  she  shudders, 
turns  away,  and  deliberately  closes  her  eyes  against 
what  lies  beyond. 

'  Corresp.,  I.  15G,  157. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  203 

This  it  is,  above  all,  that  from  the  outset  dooms 
all  the  efforts  of  Mirabeau  to  utter  failure.  The 
terrific  pressure  of  implacable  cruel  necessity 
might,  perhaps,  after  all,  liave  overcome  the  per- 
sonal distrust  and  aversion,  if  king  and  queen 
had  at  all  been  capable  of  implicit  confidence,  stern 
thinking,  whole-souled  resolutions,  determined, 
consistent,  and  sustained  action.  They  them- 
selves were  the  principal  builders  of  their 
scaffolds,  not,  however,  by  any  imputed  crimes, 
but — to  put  it  bluntly — by  heing  in  most  ex- 
traordinary times,  intellectually  and  morally,  woe- 
fully ordinary  people.  They  are  the  primary  and 
chief  authors  of  their  doom,  but  infinitely  less  by 
Avhat  they  do,  than  first  by  doing  always  the 
wrong  thing  whenever  they  do  anything,  and 
then  by  doing  in  the  main  nothing  at  all,  never 
knowing  either  what,  or  when,  or  whether,  or  how 
to  will.  This  is  the  key-note  of  Mirabeau's  Notes. 
Month  after  month  he  strikes  it  with  greater  force, 
and  finally  witli  the  fierceness  of  despair — ever 
more  and  more  in  vain. 

On  the  17th  of  August  he  writes :  "  It  is  time 
to  decide  between  an  active  and  a  passive  role ; 
for  the  latter,  though  I  think  it  wholly  bad,  is  in 
my  eyes   less    so    than    this    alternating   between 


204  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

attempts  and  resignation,  half-will  and  despond- 
ency, which  excites  distrust,  lets  the  usurpations 
take  root,  and  floats  from  inconsistencies  to  in- 
consistencies." ^  How  much  effect  the  w^arning 
had,  can  be  judged  from  the  following  passage  in 
the  Note  of  September  28th:  "I  confess,  not 
without  regret,  that  I  am  of  very  little  use,  but 
they  impose  upon  me  much  more  the  duty  to 
serve  than  they  give  me  the  possibility  for  doing  it. 
They  hear  me  with  more  kindness  than  con- 
fidence ;  they  are  more  anxious  to  know  my  ad- 
vice than  to  follow  it,  and  above  all,  they  do  not 
sufficiently  realize,  that  the  passive  rSle  of  inac- 
tion, if  it  were  preferable  to  all  others,  does  not 
exactly  consist  in  doing  nothing,  or  letting  only 
those  act  who  do  harm."^  On  the  12th  of  No- 
vember he  writes :  "  The  pest-laden  wind,  which 
can  destroy  at  any  moment  the  king,  the  Assembly 
itself,  the  whole  nation — the  secret  leaven  of 
fermentation,  perpetuating  and  nourishing  the 
devouring  fever,  are  in  the  court ;  in  its  whole 
conduct,  in  its  inaction,  in  its  too  slow  or  retro- 
grade march  ;  in  its  r61e  of  simple  looker-on  which 
it  affects  to  play ;  in  the  perpetuity  of  the  most 
detestable  cabinet ;  in  the  passive  system  of  the 
•  Corresp.,  II.  136.  2 1^^^  n.  196. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  205 

most  bungling  policy  ;  finally,  in  that  sum  of  cir- 
cumstances which,  persuading  the  feeble  minds 
that  the  court  has  secret  projects,  causes  the 
ardent  minds  to  multiply  the  excessive  measures 
of  resistance.  But  the  lightning  is  in  the  cloud."  ^ 
By  the  2d  of  January,  1791,  he  thought  the  court 
wished  to  get  rid  of  him.  and  he  expressed  his 
willingness  to  abandon  the  thankless  task.^  As 
early  as  the  17th  of  August  he  had  written  :  "  I 
shall  wait  for  a  clap  of  thunder  to  break  this 
deplorable  lethargy."  He  had  waited  in  vain,  and 
therefore  he  saw  himself  more  and  more  reduced 
to  preventing  here  and  there,  as  to  this  or  that 
detail,  further  mischief,  since  "  Your  Majesties  .  .  . 
do  not  think  yourselves  in  a  condition  to  attempt 
anything  for  the  public  cause  and  yourselves." 
To  the  "  silence  of  contempt,"  buoyant  hope  had 
succeeded  for  a  moment  upon  the  overtures  of 
the  court,  because  they  seemed  to  offer  an  opening 
for  at  last  putting  the  resources  of  his  genius  and 
the  force  of  his  will  to  the  test  of  action.,  and 
while  every  day  cried  louder  and  more  imper- 
atively for  action,  he  was,  from  first  to  last,  prac- 
tically condemned  to  talk,  talk,  talk — to  the 
wind. 

>  Corresp.,  II.  325,  326.  "^  lb.,  III.  18,  19. 


206  THE   FRENCH   EEVOLUTION. 

Even  of  dull  Louis  XVI.  and  merry  Marie 
Antoinette,  moulded  by  nature  altogether  for  a 
holiday-life,  it  is  not  easy  to  believe  that  they  can 
really  have  thought  but  for  a  minute,  that  anything 
could  come  of  that.  If  they  had,  how  dense  must 
have  been  the  film  over  their  eyes,  when  they 
read  the  letter  of  the  10th  of  May  !  There  Mira- 
beau  had  told  them  plainly  enough  how  he  himself 
viewed  the  prospects  of  the  future,  even  if  he  be 
afforded  every  opportunity  of  making  the  most  of 
all  his  powers  in  action  :  "  I  promise  the  king  loy- 
alty, zeal,  activity,  energy,  and  a  courage  of  which 
one  has  perhaps  no  idea.  I  promise,  in  fact,  every- 
thing except  success  which  never  depends  on  one 
man,  and  which  only  a  very  audacious  and  very 
culpable  presumption  could  guarantee  in  the  ter- 
rible malady  that  undermines  the  state  and  men- 
aces its  chief." 


LECTURE   XII. 

The  End.     A  Unique  Tragedy. 

"  If  this  plan  be  carried  out,  one  may  hope  for 
everything  ;  and  if  not,  if  this  Last  plank  of  salvation 
drift  away,  every  calamity,  from  individual  assas- 
sinations to  pillage,  from  the  downfall  of  the  throne 
to  the  dissolution  of  the  empire,  has  to  be  expected. 
What  other  resources  can  remain  ?  Does  the 
ferocity  of  the  people  not  steadily  increase?  Do 
they  not  more  and  more  foment  hatred  against 
the  royal  family  ?  Do  they  not  openly  speak  of  a 
general  massacre  of  the  nobility  and  clergy  ?  Is  one 
not  proscribed  simply  for  a  difference  of  opinion  ? 
Are  the  people  not  made  to  hope,  that  the  land 
will  be  divided  among  them  ?  Are  not  all  the 
great  cities  of  the  kingdom  in  terrible  perturbation? 
Do  not  the  national  guards  preside  at  all  the  acts 
of  popular  vengeance  ?     Do  not  all  the  magistrates 

tremble  for  their  own  safetv,  without  having  any 

207 


208  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

means  to  provide  for  that  of  others  ?  Finally,  can, 
in  the  National  Assembly,  infatuation  and  fana- 
ticism be  pushed  to  a  higher  degree  ?  Ill-fated 
nation  !  To  this  thou  hast  been  brought  by  some 
men,  who  have  supplanted  talent  by  intrigue  and 
conceptions  by  commotions.  Good  but  feeble 
king  !  unfortunate  queen  !  To  this  fearful  abyss, 
the  floating  between  a  too  blind  confidence  and  a 
too  exaggerated  distrust  have  brought  you  !  One 
effort  is  still  possible,  but  it  is  the  last.  If  it  be 
not  made — or  if  it  fail — a  shroud  will  cover  this 
empire.  What  will  then  be  its  fate  ?  Where  will 
this  vessel,  struck  by  lightning  and  tossed  by  the 
storm,  be  driven  to  ?  I  do  not  know ;  but  if  I 
should  escape  the  public  shipwreck,  I  shall  always 
say  with  pride  in  my  retreat :  '  I  exposed  myself 
to  destruction  in  order  to  save  them  all ;  they  did 
not  want  it.'  "  ^ 

When,  in  December,  1790,  Mirabeau  drew  this 
appalling  picture  of  the  situation  for  the  court,  he 
was  President  of  the  Jacobin  Club.  At  the  time,  the 
man  holding  this  position  had  not  as  yet  necessarily 
to  be  a  conscious  repr-esentative  of  all  the  subver- 
sive tendencies.  The  few  words  which  Mirabeau 
spoke  in  assuming  the  presidency  were  a  pointed 
'  Corresp.,  II.  485,  486. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  209 

rebuke  of  "  licentiousness."^  But  the  presiding 
over  the  Jacobins,  after  all,  implied  a  degree  of  rad- 
icalism which  was  manifestly  not  in  accord  with 
his  position  as  adviser  of  the  court  and  still  less 
with  the  programme  of  the  December  Memoir. 
From  this  incontestable  fact,  however,  is  not  to  be 
concluded  that  he  plays  false  in  the  sense  that  he 
has  no  political  convictions  and  no  programme  ex- 
cept, by  hook  or  by  crook,  to  play  an  important 
part.  But  it  drastically  shows  that,  his  aim  being 
what  it  is,  the  circumstances  irresistibly  force  upon 
him  a  double  part,  which  ultimately  must  def}^  the 
most  consummate  skill. 

In  his  first  great  speech  on  the  mines  he  said : 
"  Abstractions,  which  are  the  best  manner  of  reason- 
ing, are  neither  the  only  nor  the  principal  elements 
of  the  art  of  governing."  ^  The  difference  between 
him  and  all  the  others  simply  consists  in  this,  that 
this  trite  truth  is  fully  understood  by  him  from  the 
beginning,  that  he  draws  all  the  correct  conclusions 
from  it,  and  that  he  knows  what  the   essential  ele- 

'  "  Deja  tous  les  FranQais  sont  auxiliaires  de  la  liberte  :  il 
ne  reste  qu'a  les  rendre  tous  ennemis  de  la  licence  et  auxili- 
aires de  la  paix. 

"  C'est  dans  ces  principes,  Messieurs,  que  je  tacherai  de 
remplir  les  devoirs  de  la  presidence." — Nov.  30,  1790.  Au- 
lard.,  I.  399. 

2  March  21,  1791.     CEuvres,  V.  426. 
14 


210  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

ments  of  the  art  of  governing  are.  He  is  fully 
aware  that  the  most  essential  of  them  all  is  to 
take  the  people  as  they  are,  i.  e.,  that  it  is  not 
sufficient  to  keep  always  in  view  that  one  has 
to  deal  not  with  figures  and  formulas  but  with 
men,  but  that  one  has  besides  to  take  into  con- 
sideration the  specific  intellectual  and  moral  con- 
ditions and  dispositions  of  the  particular  na- 
tion as  historically  evolved  and  as  affected  by 
the  peculiar  circumstances  of  the  time  being. 
This  intuitive  political  judgment,  which  verged 
upon  the  miraculous,  was  to  a  great  extent  at- 
tributable to  his  extraordinary  knowledge  of  men, 
and  this  was  the  one  good  fruit  of  his  wild 
and  checkered  career,  which  had  brought  him 
into  intimate  contact  with  all  classes  and  kinds 
of  people.  The  truly  bewildering  mobility  and 
versatility  of  his  own  mind  and  temperament  en- 
abled him  really  to  understand  them  all,  and  by 
his  uncommon  skill  in  asking,  he  improved  the 
opportunities  thus  offered  him  in  a  degree  no 
other  man  could  have  done.  The  Prussian  Dohm 
writes :  "  He  understood  the  art  of  asking  in  a 
degree  of  w^hich  it  is  hard  to  give  a  conception  if 
one  has  not  been  present  at  his  conversations."  ^ 

'  Quoted  by  Professor  Stern. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOIJJTION.  211 

The  art  to  ask  pertinent  questions  and  to  ask  them 
in  such  a  manner  that  also  pertinent  answers  are 
given,  is,  however,  but  one  way  to  get  at  the  facts, 
and,  as  I  said  in  a  former  lecture,  to  base  his 
policy  upon  the  facts  is  the  first  requisite  of  the 
genuine  statesman.  Among  the  facts  he  has  to 
ascertain,  the  frame  of  mind  in  which  the  people 
happened  to  be  at  the  time  in  regard  to  the  para- 
mount questions  at  issue,  is  always  one  of  the 
most  important,  and  in  a  general  and  all-embracing 
revolutionary  upheaval,  it  is  by  far  the  most  es- 
sential, for  the  ultimate  question  :  what  is  achiev- 
able under  the  given  circumstances  ?  cannot  be 
determined,  unless  the  correct  answer  is  found  to 
the  question :  lioiv  has  one  to  set  about  in  order  to 
attain  tlie  end  ?  And  as  to  this  How,  the  princi- 
pal factor  in  the  condition  confronting  the  states- 
man is  the  frame  of  the  popular  mind.  The  most 
exalted  statesmanship  can  no  more  ignore  it  in 
regard  to  the  manner  of  proceeding,  than  it  can 
overleap  the  limits  set  by  it  as  to  the  What.  In 
both  cases  failure  is  equally  certain,  for  though 
there  is  truth  in  the  old  saying,  that  the  great 
statesman  does  not  allow  himself  to  be  domi- 
nated by  the  circumstances,  but  dominates 
them,  circumstances   can   be   dominated    in  poli- 


212  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

tics  only   by    conforming   to   them   to   a   certain 
extent. 

ISTo  statesman  has  ever  had  a  higher  opinion  of 
his  own  230wers  than  MirabeavT,  but  also  no  states- 
man has  been  more  fully  conscious  of  what  fearful 
fetters  those  immutable  political  laws  were  to  his 
powers.  He  clung  tenaciously  to  the  hope  that  he 
would  ultimately  succeed  in  spite  of  everything; 
but  almost  from  the  first  it  was  a  hope  against 
better  knowledge,  for  he  saw  but  too  clearly  that 
the  frame  of  the  public  mind  was  such  as  to 
render  the  case  a  desperate  one,  with,  at  the  most, 
one  chance  against  nine. 

La  March,  in  one  of  their  discussions,  quoted 
Bacon's  remark,  that  while  a  little  philosophy 
leads  away  from  religion,  much  philosophy  leads 
back  to  it,^  and  contended  that  it  was  applicable 
to  almost  all  human  institutions.  "  There  is  not 
one,"  he  said,  "which  the  shallowest  declaimer 
could  not  attack  with  apparent  success ;  but  this 
success  will  always  be  annihilated  by  the  strono- 
reason  of  the  ready  and  profound  statesman,  who 

'  "  But  farther,  it  is  an  assured  truth  and  a  conclusion  of 
experience,  that  a  little  or  superficial  knowledge  of  philoso- 
phy may  incline  the  mind  of  man  to  atheism,  but  a  farther 
proceeding  therein  doth  bring  the  mind  back  again  to 
religion."— Bacon's  Works,  ed.  Ellis  &  Spedding,  III.  267. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  213 

knows  how  to  defend  the  foundations  of  the  social 
order."  "  Bravo  !  bravo  !  "  exclaimed  Mirabeau  ; 
"but  that  is  now  no  longer  the  question.  No 
single  man  will  be  able  to  bring  the  French  back 
to  saneness ;  time  alone  can  restore  order  to  the 
minds  ;  with  them  one  must  never  either  presume 
or  despair.  To-day  the  French  are  ill,  very  ill  ; 
one  must  treat  them  cautiously."  ^ 

Indeed,  very  ill — and  the  nature  of  the  disease 
rendered  it  imperative  to  admix  a  strong  dose  of 
the  very  virus  with  the  remedies,  so  to  speak,  to 
enwrap  them  in  it.  He  himself  was  surely  one  of 
those  who,  as  he  said,  would  rather  save  the 
country  than  enjoy  "  a  perfidious  popularity,"  but 
to  dispense  with  popularity  was  in  the  strictest 
sense  of  the  word  impossible,  unless  he  renounced 
the  aspiration  to  be  a  determining  force  in  the 
revolution.2  Without  it  he  was  Samson  shorn  of 
his  locks.  In  his  Note  of  November  17th  to  the 
court  he  writes  :  "  To  acquire  tlie  right  success- 
fully to  enter  upon  the  course  when  the  true 
interests  of  the  throne  are  to  be  defended,  it  is, 
above  all,  necessary  that  I  prepare    the  people  to 

'  Corresp.,  I.  208,  209. 

^  Montniorin  told  him  :  "  Voiis  seul  avez  su  vous  depopu- 
lariser  par  courage  et  vous  repopulariser  par  prudence." 
—Corresp.,  II.  391. 


214  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

hear  my  voice  without  distrust,  that  I  dispel  its 
suspicions,  that  I  be  counted  among  its  surest 
friends,  and,  from  this  point  of  view,  my  popular- 
ity, so  far  from  alarming  the  court,  ought  to  be 
deemed  by  it  its  safest  resource."  ^  Popularity, 
however,  could  be  achieved  and  preserved  only  by 
speaking  in  a  tone  which  would  awaken  an  echo 
in  the  breasts  of  the  people,  and,  in  the  actual 
frame  of  the  public  mind,  that  was  a  tone  which 
illy  accorded  with  his  true  programme.  In  the 
garb  of  radicalism,  often  even  strongly  tinged  with 
demagogism,  he  had  to  present  his  moderate  and 
conservative  ideas,  if  he  were  to  have  any  chance 
of  making  them  prevail. ^  Necker's  celebrated 
daughter,  Mme.  de  Stael,  who  was  certainly  not 
disposed  to  judge  him  too  favorably,  writes  :  "  One 
could  not  help  having  pity  with  the  constraint 
imposed  upon  his  natural  superiority.  Constantly 
he  was  compelled  in  the  same  speech  to  act  as 
partisan  of  popularity  and  of  reason.  He  tried 
to  wrest   from   the    Assembly,   with    demagogical 

'  Corresp.,  II.  337. 

2  He  writes  Nov.  26,  1790,  to  La  Marck  in  regard  to  his 
attitude  in  the  church  question  :  "  Ce  n'est  qu'en  se  tenant 
dans  une  certaine  ganime  que  Ton  peut,  au  milieu  de  cette 
tumulteuse  Assemblee,  se  donner  le  droit  d'etre  raisonable." 
lb.,  IL  361. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION  215 

phrases,  a  monarchical  decree ;  and  he  often  let  the 
royalists  feel  his  bitterness,  even  when  he  wanted 
to  carry  one  of  their  points  ;  in  one  word,  it  was 
evident  that  he  had  constantly  to  combat  between 
his  judgment  and  the  necessity  of  success."  ^ 

He  had  by  no  means  a  taste  for  such  equivocal 
tactics.  He  writes  to  La  Marck  :  "  It  makes  more 
trouble  and  requires  more  true  dexterity  (not 
genius)  thus  to  tack,  than  to  fight ;  that  is,  per- 
haps, the  rarest  part  of  talent,  at  least  with  some- 
what distinguished  talents,  for  it  is  the  least 
attractive  and  that  which  lives  on  little  accumu- 
lated combinations,  privations,  and  sacrifices."  ^ 
And  to  the  court :  "  One  must  dissimulate  if  one 
wants  to  supplement  strength  by  dexterity,  as  one 
has  to  tack  in  a  storm.  That  is  one  of  my  princi- 
ples and  purely  based  on  the  observation  of  life, 
for  it  is  entirely  opposed  to  my  natural  character. 
I  must  at  first  take  the  key  of  those  whom  I  want 
gradually  to  force  to  adopt  mine."  ^ 

It  was  indeed  utterly  opposed  to  his  character, 
and  therefore  his  skill  was  all  the  more  to  be 
admired,  for  he  had  to  subject  himself  to  no  little 

'  Considerations  sur  les  principaux  evenemens  de  la  revo- 
lution frangaise,  I.  353,  ed.  1820. 
2  Corresp.,  II.  146.  ^  i^.,  n.  330. 


216  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

constraint.  How  great  this  skill  was,  but  also  to 
what  a  humiliating  degree  he  had  sometimes  to 
submit  to  this  "  tacking "  policy,  is  most  strik- 
ingly illustrated  by  his  attitude  in  the  debate  on 
the  important  question,  what  the  constitution 
should  provide  in  regard  to  a  regency.  He  is 
more  anxious  than  ever  to  see  his  opinion  pre- 
vail, and  yet  he  blandly  declares  that  he  has 
formed  no  opinion  ;  his  argument  is  a  tangle,  but 
thus  much  is  clear,  that  if  it  is  at  all  intended  to  be 
indicative  of  what  his  vote  is  to  be,  he  must  cast 
it  for  an  elective  regency ;  he,  however,  abruptly 
breaks  off  and  dismisses  his  reasoning  with  a  con- 
temptuous kick  by  declaring,  in  a  tone  of  lan- 
guid unconcern,  that  in  his  opinion  the  report  of 
the  committee,  sustaining  the  opposite  view,  might 
be  adopted.  This  is  done,  and  a  heavy  load  is 
taken  from  his  mind.^ 

'  CEuvres,  V.  459-479.  His  true  opinions  are  revealed  by 
the  following  letter  to  La  Marck  :  "  Nous  sommes  dans  un 
grand  danger.  Soyez  siir  que  I'on  veut  nous  ramener  aux 
elections,  c'est  a-dire  a  la  destruction  de  I'lieridite  ;  c'est-a- 
dire  a  la  destruction  de  la  monarchie.  L'abbe  Sieyes  n'a 
jamais  courtise  I'Assemblee,  ni  agiote  une  opinion  comme 
il  le  fait,  et  ses  partisans  sont  tres  nombreux.  Je  n'ai  jamais 
ete  vraiment  effraye  qu'aujourd'liui.  Je  me  garderai  bien 
de  proposer  demain  ma  theorie  ;  je  porterai  toutes  mes 
forces  a  ajourner,  en  critiquant  le  projet  de  decret,  en  prou- 
vant  qu'il  est  insuflfisant,  incomplet,  qu'il  prejuge  de  grandes 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  217 

Mirabeau  once  called  the  Assembly  "  a  restive 
donkey,  which  cannot  be  mounted  without  using 
great  discretion."  ^  This  time  he  had  mounted 
it;  but  to  manage  the  balky  animal,  it  was,  above 
all,  necessary  to  keep  oneself  perfectly  under  con- 
trol, and  this  lie  by  no  means  always  did.     The 

questions,  etc.,  etc.  Certainenient  ma  theorie  ne  passerait 
pas,  et  I'ajournenient  reussira.  Envoyez  chercher  Pellenc 
(his  secretaiy)  immediatement ;  qu'il  etude  dans  le  plus 
grand  detail  le  decret  ;  qu'il  en  recherche  tous  les  dangers 
pour  la  liberie  publique ;  qu'il  I'envisage  sous  tous  les 
rapports ;  qu'il  ne  prenne  que  des  notes  ;  mais  qu'il  de- 
veloppe  assez  ces  notes,  pour  que  je  parle  avec  fecondite. 
II  salt  au  fond  ma  doctrine  a  present,  mais  je  ne  veux  que 
la  laisser  entrevoir  ;  je  ne  veux  pas  la  hasarder  ;  gagnons  du 
temps,  tout  est  sauve.  Je  crois  que  beaucoup  de  gens  desir- 
ent  se  renfermer  dans  une  mesure  provisoire.  Ne  dusse-je 
gagner  que  deux  jours,  j'emmenerai  Pellenc  a  la  campagne 
avec  moi,  et  nous  y  mettrons  toutes  nos  forces.  Soyez  star, 
mon  cher  comte,  que  je  ne  m'exagere  pas  le  danger,  et 
qu'il  est  immense.  O  legere,  et  trois  fois  legere  nation  ! — 
Notre  armee  est,  dans  cette  question,  pour  les  deux  tiers  a 
I'abbe  Sieyes." — Corresp.,I.  245-248.  Oncken's opinion  (Das 
Zeitalter  der  Revolution,  etc.,  I.  344,  345)  that  Mirabeau  was 
no  longer  quite  in  his  right  senses,  is  one  of  those  unaccount 
able  extravagances,  with  which  the  distinguished  historian 
occasionally  surprises  his  readers.  He  needed  to  remember 
only  that  the  committee  on  the  Constitution  and  the  Assem- 
bly were  not  identical  to  find  another  way  out  of  the  diffi- 
culty, which,  as  far  as  he  gratuitously  asserts,  everybody 
admits  to  be  insurmountable.  The  wild  assumption  is,  how- 
ever, only  the  fitting  climax  of  a  series  of  one-sided  and 
exaggerated  criticisms,  in  which  virtuous  indignation  has 
got  the  better  of  political  discernment. 
1  Droz,  Hist,  du  regne  de  Louis  XVI.,  III.  59. 


218  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

government  and  those  who  considered  themselves 
the  only  true  champions  of  the  crown  in  the  As- 
sembly, vied  with  each  other  to  render  it  almost  im- 
possible for  him  to  do  so.^  The  latter,  in  their 
passionate  imbecility  and  blind  hatred  of  Mirabeau, 
more  than  once  succeeded  in  lashing  him  into  such 
a  fury  that,  while  he  had  taken  the  floor  for  the 
purpose  of  calming  and  restraining,  he  ended  by 
sending  one  revolutionary  thunderbolt  after  the 
other  crashing  through  the  hall.^ 

These  provocations  go  much  further  towards 
excusing  him  than  it  might  appear  at  first  sight, 
for  they  usually  involved  much  more  than  a  mere 
personal  question,  as  to  which  he  might  and 
ought  to  have  kept  his  temper.  The  more  he 
wanted  to  keep  the  revolution  within  bounds,  the 

1  "  L'imperitie  et  la  perfidie  du  gouvernement  d'un  cote, 
I'imbecillite  et  la  maladresse  du  parti  ennemi  de  la  revolu- 
tion de  I'autre,  ni'ont  entraine  plus  d'une  fois  hors  de  raes 
propres  niesures  ;  niais  je  n'ai  jamais  deserte  le  principe, 
lors  me  me  que  j'ai  ete  force  d'en  exaggerer  I'application,  et 
j'ai  toujours  desire  rester  ou  revenir  au  juste  milieu." — Cor- 
resp.,  I.  428. 

'^  See  the  most  striking  instance,  lb.,  II.  331. — To  judge  the 
violence  of  his  language  justly,  it  is,  however,  necessary 
also  to  keep  always  well  in  mind  how  true  it  was,  what  he 
had  written  ah'eady  in  1787:  "  Peut-on  regenerer,  peut-on 
meme  reformer  ce  pays-ci,  sans  attaquer  aussi  vehemente- 
ment  les  personnes  que  les  choses  ?  " — Premiere  lettre  du 
comte  de  Mirabeau  sur  I'administration  de  M.  Necker,  7. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  219 

less  he  could  allow  anti-revolutionary  ideas  and 
tendencies  to  pass  unchallenged.  When  reaction 
again  dared  to  raise  its  voice,  sound  policy,  his 
convictions,  his  honor,  and  even  his  personal 
safety  made  it  alike  imperative  upon  him  to 
knock  it  mercilessly  on  the  head  with  his  terrible 
club.^  But,  however  excusable  these  occasional 
unfeigned  relapses  into  the  tone  of  the  radical 
revolutionary  tribune,  they  had  necessarily  the 
effect  of  increasing  every  time  the  dislike  and  the 

'  In  October,  1790,  the  question  of  asking  the  king  to  dis- 
miss the  cabinet  and  to  substitute  in  the  navy  the  tricolore 
for  the  white  pennant,  offered  an  opportunity  for  one  of 
these  passionate  saUies.  Not  only  the  court,  but  also  La 
Marck  was  very  dissatisfied  with  him.  Mirabeau  wrote  to 
his  friend  on  the  following  day  :  "  Hier  je  n'ai  point  ete  un 
demagogue  ;  j'ai  ete  un  grand  citoyen,  et  peut-etre  un  habile 
orateur.  Quoi  ?  ces  stupides  coquins,  enivres  d'un  succes  de 
pur  hasard,  vous  oflfrenttout  platement  la  contre-revolution, 
et  Ton  croit  que  je  ne  tonnerai  pas  !  En  verite,  mon  ami, 
je  n'ai  nul  envie  de  livrer  a  personne  mon  honneur  et  a  la 
cour  ma  tete.  Si  je  n'etais  que  politique  je  dirais  :  '  J'ai 
besoin  que  ces  gens-la  mecraignent.'  Si  j'etais  leur  homme 
je  dirais  :  '  Ces  gens-la  ont  besoin  de  me  craindre  ? '  Mais 
je  suis  un  bon  citoyen,  qui  aime  la  gloire,  I'honneur  et  la 
liberte  avant  tout,  et  certes  messieurs  du  retrograde  me 
trouveront  tou jours  pret  a  les  fovidroyer.  Hier  j'ai  pu  les 
faire  massacrer  ;  s'ils  continuaient  sur  cette  piste,  ils  me 
forceraient  a  le  vouloir,  ne  fiit-ce  que  pour  le  sakit  du  petit 
nombre  d'honnetes  gens  entre  eux.  En  un  mot,  je  suis 
I'homme  du  retablissement  de  I'ordre,  et  non  d'un  retablisse- 
ment  de  I'ancien  ordre." — Corresp.,  II.  251. 


220  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

distrust  of  the  court.  And  the  less  the  court 
became  disposed  to  profit  by  his  counsels,  the 
more  he  had  to  be  bent  on  strengthenijig"  his 
popularity.  The  fact  that  the  Jacobins  elected 
him  President  ^  twice  in  succession,  bears  wit- 
ness to  the  skill  he  displayed  in  this  respect.  In 
spite  of  this  remarkable  success  his  position  was, 
however,  by  far  not  as  strong  as  it  seemed.  The 
leaders  knew  full  well  that  he  was  the  most 
determined,  as  well  as  the  most  puissant  opponent 
of  their  destructive  tendencies. 

The  political  and  social  disintegration  had  by 
this  time  reached  such  a  stage  that  nothing  could 
be  achieved  by  merely  covering  conservative  ideas 
with  demagogical  drapery.  Mirabeau  had  to  step 
down  to  a  much  lower  level  as  to  his  means.  He 
frankly  avows  that  the  central  idea  of  the  great 
December  Memoir,  the  systematic  discrediting  of 
the  Assembly,  is  "  an  intrigue."  He  writes  :  "  If 
the  issue  were  not  a  last  resource  and  the  welfare  of 
a  great  people,  my  character  would  prompt  me  to 
reject  all  these  means  of  a  wily  (^obscure)  intrigue 
and  insidious  dissimulation,  which  I  am  forced  to 
counsel.  But  what  shall  one  do,  what  try  .  .  . 
if  one  has  to  contend  against  intrigue  and  ambi- 
'  Each  time  for  twenty  days. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  221 

tioii,  and  the  instrument  with  which  one  is  at- 
tacked is  the  only  one  with  which  one  can 
defend  oneself  ?  .  .  .  One  must  ruin  the  Assembly; 
the  task  is  to  save  the  finest  empire  of  the  world, 
if  it  still  be  time ;  such  an  end  justifies  all  means, 
as  necessity  no  more  admits  of  a  choice,  and  dis- 
simulation, even  deceit,  is  after  all  better  than  war.^ 
And  a  little  later :  "  One  can  only  save  oneself 
by  a  plan  blending  .  .  .  the  combinations  of  the 
statesman  and  the  resources  of  intrigue,  the  cour- 
age of  great  citizens  and  the  audacity  of  crim- 
inals."^ Such  was  the  direful  situation.  La  Marck, 
whom  no  one  can  suspect  of  the  slightest  inclina- 
tion to  resort  to  means  of  questionable  propriety, 
writes  in  the  same  days  :  "  One  must  not  overlook 
that  we  have  to  contend  against  intrigue,  which 
almost  always  can  be  successfully  met  only  by 
intrigue."^  True  enough.  But  to  expect  salva- 
tion from  an  intrigue  was  a  delusion,  for  no 
intrigue  could  manoeuvre  the  revolutionary  temp- 
est back  into  the  caves  whence  it  had  burst  forth 
and  there  seal  it  up.  The  demagogical  intrigues 
were  primarily  not  a  cause,  but  merely  a  symptom. 
Nevertheless,  nothing  could,  in  fact,  be  done  now 

1  Corresp.,  II.  463,  464.  ^  n, ^  jj  5io_ 

» lb.,  11.  416. 


222  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

but  to  fight  the  devil  with  his  own  fire,  for  al- 
though the  conflagration  could  not  be  put  out, 
a  fresh  attempt  to  get  it  under  control  had  to  be 
preceded  by  beating  the  incendiaries  off,  who, 
systematically  and  with  set  purpose,  fanned  the 
flames  and  poured  oil  into  them.  Even  this,  how- 
ever, was,  under  the  circumstances,  more  than  the 
shrewdest  intriguer  could  accomplish.  The  fear- 
ful ascendency  of  the  demagogues  was  due  to  the 
fact  that,  as  Mirabeau  had  said,  the  French,  i.  e.,  the 
whole  people  were  "  ill,  very  ill  " — too  ill  not  to 
give  always  ten  chances  to  one  to  the  intriguer  for 
worse  against  the  intriguer  for  better,  provided  the 
former  had  but  the  faintest  suspicion  of  the  lat- 
ter's  being  astir.  The  intriguer,  however,  is  surer 
to  scent  the  intriguer  from  afar  than  vultures  and 
ravens  the  battle-field.  Mirabeau  had  repeatedly 
duped  the  demagogues  by  urging  conservative 
measures  with  radical  thunder,  but  as  soon  as  he 
commenced  to  send  Notes  to  the  court,  the  pack 
was  on  his  trail  and  never  again  lost  it  entirely. 
Suspicion  was  at  times  lulled,  but  never  dispelled. 
Nor  could  it  be.  For  as  from  first  to  last  he  was 
compelled  as  a  rule  to  wear  a  half-mask,  so  also 
from  first  to  last  he  never  hesitated,  when  the 
occasion  called  for  it,  to  fling  it  proudly  away  and 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  223 

to  expose  his  true  features  in  all  their  imposing 
force  to  the  maddened  radicals. 

It  is  a  redeeming  feature  in  this  checkered  life, 
that,  in  his  last  weeks,  fate  offered  him  several 
opportunities  to  prove  that  he  could  rise  to  being 
fully  his  better  self,  growing  with  his  opportunities 
morally  also  to  his  full  intellectual  height. 

On  the  1st  of  February,  his  ardent  wish  to  pre- 
side over  the  Assembly  was  at  last  fulfilled,  and 
Lafayette  could  convince  himself  that  France 
would  have  been  none  the  worse  for  his  presiding 
on  the  day  of  the  Federation  festival.  Even  his 
adversaries  had  nothing  but  praise  for  him.  It 
was  universally  acknowledged,  that  no  man  had 
presided  with  greater  dignity  and  understood  better 
to  make  the  dignity  of  the  Assembly  respected. 
If  such  a  firm  and  skilful  hand  had  held  the 
reins  from  the  first  and  permanently,  the  As- 
sembly would  not  only  have  worked  more  expe- 
ditiously and  methodically,  but  it  might  have  set 
an  example  as  to  parliamentary  decorum,  which 
would  not  have  failed  to  exercise  some  salutary 
influence  upon  its  successors  and  those  who 
lorded  it  over  them  from  the  galleries.^ 

'  See  his  graphic  picture  of  the  Assembly's  haphazard  way 
of  working  and  the  consequences  of  it. — Memoires,  VI.  264- 
266. 


224  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

Only  a  fortnight  after  resuming  his  seat  among 
the  members,  he  had  his  fiercest  encounter  with 
the  radicals  and  demagogues.  The  terrors  of  the 
revolution  had  driven  Mesdames,  the  old  aunts 
of  the  king,  from  Paris.  Their  passports  stated 
that  they  were  going  to  Rome.  Without  any 
warrant  of  law,  local  authorities,  backed  by  the 
mob,  repeatedly  opposed  the  progress  of  their 
journey.  These  incidents  brought  the  question  of 
emigration  in  an  acute  form  before  the  Assembly. 
Chapellier,  speaking  in  the  name  of  the  committee 
on  the  constitution,  proposed  that  a  committee  of 
three  be  appointed,  without  whose  permission  no- 
body should  be  allowed  to  emigrate.  Mirabeau 
objected  to  the  reading  of  the  bill,  and  moved  the 
order  of  the  day.  He  insisted  that  it  was  not 
possible  either  to  justify  or  execute  a  prohibition 
of  emigration.!  "Not  indignation,  reflection  must 
make  the  laws,"  he  declared.  The  code  of  Draco, 
but  not  the  statutes  of  France,  would  be  a  fit 
place  for  a  law  like  that  contemplated  by  the 
committee.     Its  barbarity  was  the  best  proof  of 

'  That  was  no  new  theory  with  him.  Repeatedly  and 
ardently  he  had  contended  for  liberty  in  this  as  in  all  other 
respects.  ' '  La  seule  bonne  loi  contre  les  emigrations  est 
celle  que  la  nature  a  gravee  dans  nos  coeurs." — Monarchic 
Prussienne,  I.  20  :  edition  in  4P. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  225 

the  impracticability  of  any  law  against  emigration. 
With  the  most  concentrated  despotism  in  the 
most  ruthless  hands  such  a  law  never  had  been 
executed,  because  in  the  nature  of  things  it  could 
not  be  executed.  "  I  declare  that  I  should  con- 
sider myself  released  from  every  oath  of  fidelity 
toward  those  who  become  guilty  of  the  infamy  of 
appointing  a  dictatorial  commission.  .  .  The  popu- 
larity, which  I  have  had  the  honor  to  enjoy  like 
others,  is  not  a  weak  reed ;  ^  I  want  to  sink  its 
roots  into  the  earth  on  the  imperturbable  basis  of 
reason  and  liberty.  If  you  make  a  law  against 
emigrants,  I  swear  that  I  shall  never  obey  it." 
Applause  and  hisses  interrupted  the  speaker  at 
almost  every  sentence.  The  radical  left  grew 
more  and  more  violent  in  its  demonstrations  of 
disapproval,  until  he  cowed  it  by  hurling  against 
it,  with  the  full  force  of  his  lion's  voice,  that  grand, 
imperious  :  "  Silence  to  those  thirty  voices  !  " — 
A  motion  was  made  and  carried  which  virtually 
amounted  to  an  adjournment  of  the  question  for 
an  indefinite  time,  and  as  long  as  Mirabeau  lived 
no  law  against  emigration  was  passed. 

1  Mejan  (CEuvres,  V.  404)  writes  thus,  and  thus  the  sen- 
tence is  always  quoted.     But  is  it  not  possibly  a  misprint, 
pas  being  substituted  for  git'  :  "  n'est  qu'un  faible  roseau?" 
15 


226  THE   FRENCH  REVOLUTION. 

Mirabeau  had  not  acliievecl  a  victory,  but  merely 
repulsed  an  attack  by  throwing  the  weight  of  his 
influence  and  of  his  masterful  personality  to  the 
last  ounce  into  the  scales.  Whether  he  would  be 
able  to  achieve  even  thus  much  the  next  time  was 
very  doubtful.  Yet  on  the  same  day  the  radicals 
returned  to  the  charge  in  a  personal  onslaught, 
and  on  the  field  on  which  the  wind  and  the  sun 
were  always  wholly  with  them.  Reason  and  true 
liberty  were  by  this  time  at  a  sufficient  discount 
to  warrant  the  hope  that  success  would  crown  a 
vigorous  effort,  completely  and  once  for  all  to 
uproot  the  popularity  of  the  man  whose  presump- 
tuous temerity  went  to  the  length  of  attempting 
to  sink  its  roots  into  this  bed-rock.  The  suspicion 
expressed  by  one  of  his  admirers,  that  a  brutal 
social  affront  was  a  stratagem  with  a  view  to 
stabbing  him  from  behind  in  the  back,  was  prob- 
ably not  without  foundation.  If  so,  the  sorry 
conspirators  were  hoisted  by  their  own  petard  : 
they  only  did  him  a  service  by  giving  him  a 
warning  which  he  did  not  fail  to  understand  and 
to  lieed.  He  had  been  invited  with  others  to 
dine  at  d'Aiguillon's.  When  he  presented  him- 
self at  the  door  he  was  refused  admission.  It 
seems  to  have  been  expected  that  after  this  slap 


THE   FEENCH  REVOLUTION.  227 

in  the  face,  he  would  not  dare  to  show  himself  at 
the  Jacobins.  The  "  silence  to  the  thirty  voices  " 
had  reminded  these  heroes  most  forcibly,  that  it 
was  certainly  very  much  easier  to  slay  this  man 
with  their  venomous  tongues  when  he  was  not 
there  to  answer  them.  Aye  !  They  did  not  know 
the  man  yet.  It  had  not  been  a  vain  boast,  but 
the  plain  statement  of  a  fact,  when  he  wrote  to 
the  king :  "  I  promise  a  courage  of  which  one 
has  perhaps  as  yet  no  idea."  No  surer  means 
could  have  been  found  to  make  him  go  to  the 
Jacobins  than  thus  to  notify  him  hy  a  mortal 
outrage,  that  their  leaders  were  determined  in 
dead  earnest  to  hunt  him  down. 

We  have  a  long  and  spicy  report  from  the  pen 
of  Camille  Desmoulins  on  this  memorable  even- 
ing session  at  the  Jacobins  on  February  28th. 
Camille,  once  the  ardent  admirer  of  Mirabeau  and 
his  exquisite  dinners,  now  draws  his  pen-picture, 
not  with  ink,  but  with  gall  and  sulphuric  acid. 
Oh,  into  what  a  pitiable  and  contemptible  figure 
this  reputed  Titan  of  the  revolution  turns,  if  we 
but  look  at  him  closely  !  There  he  sits,  writhing 
in  impotent  rage  and  in  fear  under  the  lash  so 
mercilessly  applied  by  those  true  giants,  Duport 
and  Alexandre   Lameth.     He    liimself   had  said : 


228  THE   FRENCH  REVOLUTION. 

"  When  I  shake  my  terrible  mane,  nobody  dares 
to  interrupt  me."  ^  And  now — as  with  Christ  on 
Calvary,  says  Camille  —  the  perspiration  drips 
down  from  under  his  mane  in  large  drops,  pressed 
out  by  agony.  And  how  futile  his  embarrassed 
efforts  to  impose  upon  the  clear-eyed  and  straight- 
hearted  patriots  by  his  shallow  sophistries,  hollow 
excuses,  and  pompous  oratorical  flourishes !  It 
is  true :  he  is  not  ejected  from  the  club,  and  when 
he  leaves,  there  is  some  applause.  But  nobody  is 
deceived.  In  acknowledgment  of  past  services 
he  is  allowed  one  more  chance  to  repent  and 
return  to  the  true  faith. 

Happily  there  is  another  pen-drawing  of  this 
evening  session  preserved,  and  it  presents  a  rather 
different  view.  The  Swiss  Oelsner  -  also  tells  us 
what  he  saw  with  his  own  eyes  and  heard  with  his 
own  ears.  Full  justice  is  done  by  him  to  Mira- 
beau's  adversaries.  In  his  reply  to  Duport,  Mi- 
rabeau  seems  really  not  to  have  been  at  his  best, 
and   Lameth's    onset   was    in   fact   terrible.     The 


'  Dumont,  Souvenirs,  382,  283. 

^  Bruchstticke  aus  den  Papieren  eines  Augenzeugen  und 
unparteiischen  Beobachters  der  franzosischen  Revolution, 
1794.  We  owe  the  identification  of  the  authoi"  to  Professor 
Stern.  I  quote  from  Aulard's  translation  of  the  report.  See 
the  original,  Stern,  II.  316-319. 


THE   FRENCH  REVOLUTION.  229 

consummate  adroitness  of  the  attack  was  only 
surpassed  by  its  unfathomable  perfidiousness.^  It 
was  a  master  effort  to  render  Mirabeau  at  the 
same  time  "  odious  and  ridiculous."  So  wildly 
was  the  speaker  applauded,  that  Oelsner  began  to 
fear  that  Mirabeau  was  done  for  and  that  nothing 
less  was  intended  by  his  assailants  than  to  unchain 
the  mob   against   him.     Perhaps   it   would   have 

'  Already  in  May,  1790,  Mirabeau  had  denounced  the 
meanness  and  suipidal  madness  of  the  ever-growing  practice 
of  ti'eating  a  difference  of  opinion  as  a  crime  and  of  substi- 
tuting imputations  and  calumnies  for  ax-gument.  "  On 
dirait  qu'on  ne  pent,  sans  crime,  avoir  deux  avis  dans  vine 
des  questions  les  plus  delicates  et  les  plus  difficiles  de  I'orga- 
nisation  social.  .  . 

' '  On  vous  a  propose  de  juger  la  question  par  le  parallele  de 
ceux  qui  soutiennent  I'afl&rmative  et  la  negative  ;  on  vous  a 
dit  que  vous  verriez  d"un  cote  des  hommes  qui  esperent 
s'avancer  dans  les  armees,  ou  parvenir  a  gerer  les  affaires 
etrangeres  ;  des  hommes  qui  sont  lies  avec  les  ministres  et 
leur  agens  ;  de  I'autre,  le  citoyen  paisihle,  vertueiix,  ignore, 
sans  ambition,  qui  trouve  son  bonheur  et  son  existence  dans 
le  bonJieur  commun. 

"  Jenesuivrai  pas  cet  example.  Je  ne  ci'ois  pas  qu'il  soit 
plus  conforme  aux  convenances  de  la  politique  qu'aux  prin- 
cipes  de  la  morale,  d'affiler  le  poignard  dont  on  ne  saurait 
blesser  ses  rivaux,  sans  en  ressentir  bientot  sur  son  prop  re 
sein  les  atteintes.  Je  ne  crois  pas  que  des  hommes  qui 
doivent  servir  la  cause  publique  en  veritables  freres 
d'armes,  aient  bonne  grace  a  se  combattre  en  vUs  gladiateurs, 
a  lutter  d'imputations  et  d'intrigues,  et  non  de  lumieres  et 
de  talens  ;  a  chercher  dans  la  mine  et  la  depression  les  uns 
des  autres  des  coupables  succes  des  trophees  d'un  jour,  nuis- 
ibles  a  tout,  etmeme  a  la  gloire." — CEuvres,  III.  355,  378. 


230  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

come  to  that,  if  the  President  had  succeeded  in 
his  perfidious  attempt  to  adjourn  the  meeting 
without  allowing  Mirabeau  once  more  to  reply. 
But  when  Mirabeau,  who,  according  to  Oelsner, 
had  not  lost  his  composure  for  a  minute,  again 
had  the  floor,  the  conspirators  had  lost  the  game 
for  this  time.  Oelsner  writes :  "  It  was  a  hot 
combat.  He  put  forth  all  the  resources  of  his 
genius  to  vanquish  his  young  and  agile  adversary. 
He  clutched  him  and  his  companions  with  a  hand 
of  iron  and  of  fire.  He  wrenched  from  them  their 
false  arms  and  struck  incurable  blows.  His  boil- 
ing wrath  gushed  over  all  who  had  impugned  him. 
Truths,  which  no  one  had  ever  dared  to  breathe 
in  the  club,  crashed  like  claps  of  thunder  through 
the  hall.  His  boldness,  his  noble  bearing,  petrified 
the  audience  with  astonishment.  Thus  he  put 
down  the  furious,  and  there  was  not  one  from 
whom  he  did  not  force,  if  not  applause,  at 
least  high  admiration.  Even  in  the  National 
Assembly  Mirabeau  had  never  been  more  mas- 
terful."! 

Mirabeau  finished  his  answer  to  his  assailants 
the  next  day  in  the  National  Assembly,  as  spokes- 
man of  a  deputation  of  the  departmentl  adminis- 
'  Aulard,  Jacobins,  II.  112. 


THE   FRENCH  REVOLUTION.  231 

tration.i  His  attitude  in  the  emigration  question 
was  by  no  means  the  only  grievance  of  the 
Jacobins  against  him.  One  of  Lameth's  principal 
charges  was,  that  in  an  address  of  the  departmental 
administration  to  the  people  drawn  up  by  him,  he 
dared  to  denounce  those  as  the  real  enemies  of 
liberty,  who  constantly  declared  the  constitution 
and  liberty  in  danger.  Mirabeau  now  repeated 
this  charge  more  emphatically,  pointing  more 
directly  to  the  Jacobins.  "From  all  the  frag- 
ments of  the  old  institutions  and  the  old  abuses," 
he  says,  "an  infectious  sediment,  a  corrupting 
leaven  has  formed,  which  is  incessantly  stirred  by 
perverse  men  in  order  to  develop  all  its  poisons. 
I  mean  the  factious  who,  in  order  to  subvert  the 
constitution,  persuade  the  people  that  it  must  act 
by  itself,  as  if  it  were  without  laws,  without 
magistrates.  We  shall  unmask  those  culpable 
enemies  of  its  tranquillity,  and  we  shall  teach  the 
people  that,  if  the  most  important  of  our  functions 
is  to  watch  over  its  safety,  its  post  is  that  of  labor, 
seconded  by  the  peace  of  active  industry  and 
domestic   and   social  virtues."  ^      The    Assembly 

'  In  the  latter  half  of  January  he  had  succeeded  in  having 
himself  elected  to  the  imjiortant  position. 
2  CEuvres,  V.  408. 


232  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION, 

applauded     and     decreed    that     the     address   be 
printed. 

Thus  ended  this  fierce  single-handed  contest  with 
insane  radicalism  and  ruthless  demagogism,  which 
excites  even  in  Mr.  Lomenie  unalloyed  admira- 
tion. Mirabeau's  "  image,"  he  says,  "  appears  in 
it  with  a  character  of  greatness,"  which  it  has  on 
no  other  occasion  to  the  same  degree.^  So  it  is ; 
but  it  is  the  greatness  not  of  the  conquering  hero, 
but  of  the  hero  who,  although  bleeding  already 
from  a  hundred  wounds,  strikes  his  most  powerful 
blow  while  the  deadly  shaft  is  piercing  a  vital 
organ.  Mirabeau  furnished  incontestable  proof  on 
the  1st  of  March,  that  the  Jacobins  had  not  intim- 
idated him  on  the  previous  evening,  but  he  soon 
again  ceased  to  attend  their  meetings.^     Now,  as 

1  (Euvres,  V.  307. 

-  There  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  Lucas  Montigny's  state- 
ment to  this  effect  is  in  the  main  correct,  though  he  is  mis- 
taken in  asserting  that  he  never  again  set  his  foot  into  tlieir 
hall.  He  had  left  it  on  the  28th  saying  :  "  I  shall  stay 
among  you  until  I  am  ostracized,"  and  from  a  letter  of 
March  4th  to  La  Marck  we  learn  that  he  had  been  again  at 
the  club.  But  he  reports  a  defeat :  it  is  true,  a  defeat  with- 
out a  combat,  for  the  scene  which  "  les  a  remontes  au  dia- 
pason de  la  f ureur  "  was  enacted  after  he  had  left,  but  still 
a  defeat.  "  Je  suis  en  verite  tres-decourage,  tres-embarasse, 
tres-fache  de  m'etre  mis  si  seul  en  a,vant,  puisque  tous  les 
coups  de  la  tempete  vont  porter  sur  le  seul  homme  qui  veu- 
iUe  la  chose  pour  elle,  et  qui  ne  soitpas  un  hanneton." — Cor- 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  233 

ever  before,  lie  took  his  stand  on  the  stern  facts. 
As  his  turning  himself  into  a  Jacobin  of  the  gen- 
uine dye  was  out  of  the  question,  he  never  again 
could  exercise  any  influence  there,  and  there  was  a 
fearful  amount  of  truth  in  what  Lameth  had  said : 
"  Only  from  the  midst  of  this  Society  can  Mira- 
beau  wield  the  lever  of  opinion  ;  ^  outside  of  it  all 
his  force  is  of  no  use  to  him ;  as  despised  as  Maury 
he  becomes  as  powerless  (7m?)."  ^  More  and  more 
the  Jacobins  succeeded  in  monopolizing  the  manu- 
facture of  popularity,  and  the  ingredients  of  the 
article  fabricated  by  them  were  unreason  and 
everything  antagonistic  to  true  liberty.  Mirabeau\ 
himself  broke  and  tore  the  roots  of  his  popularity  ' 
by  persisting  in  the  attempt  to  force  them  into  the 
double  rock  of  reason  and  genuine  liberty. 

And  by  doing  this  he  does  not  add  a  single 
grain  to  his  influence  with  the  court.  Only  a 
week  after  this  terrible  hand-to-hand  struggle  with 
the  Radicals,  Count  Fersen,  the  gallant  Swedish 

I'esp.,  III.  78. — Laporte,  intendant  of  the  civil  list,  assures 
the  king,  March  3d,  that  Mirabeau's  breach  with  the  Jacob- 
ins is  irreparable.     Stern,  II.  294. 

'  Mirabeau's  rejoining  the  club  in  the  beginning  of  Oc- 
tober, after  having  stayed  away  from  it  for  many  months, 
was  in  itself  an  acknowledgment  that  there  was  a  great  deal 
of  truth  in  the  assertion. 

-  Aulard,  II.  107,  108 


234  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

knight  of  Marie  Antoinette,  writes  to  his  sovereign, 
Gustavus  III. :  "  His  principles  are  always  bad,  but 
they  are  less  so  than  those  of  the  others.  In  spite 
of  that,  it  is  interesting  not  to  have  him  against 
one."  That  is  all  the  court  cares  for  :  not  to  have 
him  for  an  open  adversary.  And  thus  one  feels 
and  thinks  about  him,  although  one  is  fully  aware 
that,  as  Fersen  expressly  states,  "  he  is  compelled 
to  hide  himself  under  the  forms  of  democracy  in 
order  not  to  lose  all  his  influence."  ^ 

The  part  he  had  played  in  the  revolution,  as  he 
wrote  to  Lafayette  in  April,  1790,  rendered  it 
impossible  to  him  ever  to  be  "  neutral ; "  too 
many  eyes  were  fixed  upon  him  ever  to  admit  of 
his  hiding ;  with  him  even  "  silence  "  was  sure  to 
be  counted  "  a  crime."  ^  And  while  he  is  thus 
forced,  by  his  very  superiority,  always  to  fight  in  the 
forefront,  every  defeat  he  suffers,  every  unequal 
contest  that,  thanks  to  the  valor  of  his  arm,  ends 
in  a  drawn  battle,  nay,  every  victory  he  achieves, 
ultimately  tends  to  isolate  him  more  and  more. 
Higher  and  higher  he  towers  above  all  the  rest, 
but  on  the  right  and  on  the  left  they  equally  fall 
away  from  him.     He  knew  well  what  that  signified, 

'  March  8,  1791.  Klinkowstroem,  Le  Comte  de  Fersen  et 
la  Cour  de  France,  I.  86.  '^  Corresp.,  II.,  3. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  235 

for  he  did  not — complacently  or  cowardly — shut 
his  eyes  against  the  facts  when  they  boded  no 
good  to  him  personally.  This  constantly  progress- 
ing isolation  meant  that  his  every  step  was  a  step 
further  to  the  brink  of  the  Tarpeian  rock,  for  in 
contending  for  the  salvation  of  France  he  was 
contending  against  an  irreversible  decree  of  fate 
— not  that  inscrutable  arbitrary  power  of  the 
ancients,  but  simply  the  necessary  resultant  of 
the  unalterable  given  facts.  No  mortal  has  ever 
issued  as  victor  from  such  a  contest.  Therefore 
nothing  better  could  have  befallen  him,  than  that 
he  was  called  off  on  the  2d  of  April  after  an  illness 
of  but  a  few  days.  Up  to  this  day  many  have 
thought  differently.  More  than  one  eminent  his- 
torian has  declared  it  an  open  question  whether 
he  could  have  reversed  the  wheels.  Why  have 
they  not  gone  to  Mirabeau  himself  for  an  answer 
to  their  question?  He  has  given  it  often  and 
plainly  enough.  What  he  had  told  the  king  in  his 
letter  of  the  10th  of  May,  he  had  repeated  in  a  dif- 
ferent form,  but  fully  as  emphatically  in  his  Note 
of  December  4th :  "  One  can  count  upon  my 
zeal,  but  not  on  an  omnipotence  which  I  do  not 
have."  ^  To  arrest,  single-handed,  the  downward 
'Corresp.,II.  383. 


236  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

course  of  the  revolution  required  nothing  less  than 
omnipotence. 

One  of  the  unalterable  facts  of  no  small  moment 
was  Mirabeau's  own  past.  No  one  knew  better 
than  he  the  tremendous  weight  of  the  chain  that 
was  thereby  riveted  to  his  wrists.  Already  in  the 
fall  of  1789,  he  often  bitterly  exclaimed  in  the 
hearing  of  La  Marck  :  "  Oh,  what  harm  the  im- 
morality of  my  3^outh  does  to  the  public  cause  !  " 
We  have  heard  him  repeatedly  declare  that  char- 
acter is  the  paramount  requisite  for  a  statesman, 
and  that  he — and  he  alone — possessed  it.  The 
first  assertion  is  incontestable,  and  the  second  was 
true  as  to  courage  and  force  of  will.  But  there  is 
a  third  element  indispensable  in  the  make-up  of  a 
genuine  statesman's  character.  The  motives  and 
the  ends  must  be  essentially  moral.  Was  Mirabeau 
possessed  of  this  requisite  ?  Could  it  be  presumed 
that  he  possessed  it  ?  It  was  this  question  that 
rendered  his  past  an  almost  insurmountable  barrier 
between  him  and  success.  Confidence  he  needed 
above  all,  and  just  this  he  found  nowhere.  It  was 
bitter  and  cruel,  but  terribly  true  what  the  father 
had  written :  "  He  gathers  in  what  those  reap 
who  have  failed  as  to  the  basis,  the  morals.  .  .  He 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION  23Y 

will  never  obtain  confidence,  even  if  he  tried  to 
deserve  it."  ^ 

And  it  was  by  no  means  only  the  immorality  of 
his  youth  that  caused  all  to  distrust  him.  The 
kind  of  double  game  which  the  uncontrollable 
circumstances  forced  upon  him,  necessarily  fur- 
nished always  fresli  aliment  to  the  distrust  of  all. 
But  there  is  no  denying,  that  from  first  to  last  he 
also  added  fuel  to  the  fire,  when  he  would  not 
have  needed  to  do  so  and  even  might  have  damped 
it.  Immorality  was  so  deeply  ingrained  into  his 
whole  being,  that  it  would  crop  out  at  the  slightest 
provocation  or  temptation.  Turn  and  twist  as  we 
will,  there   is  as  to  state  affairs — and  especially  in 

^  Lomenie,  IV.  141.  lu  1785  Mirabeau  had  written  in  his 
answer  to  Beaumarchais  :  ' '  IMon  premier  but,  en  me  vouant 
a  la  perilleuse  profession  d'apotre  delaverite,  futde  meriter 
I'oubli  de  mes  longues  erreurs.  Voila  le  seul  interet,  la  seule 
ambition  que  je  connus  jamais  :  et  j'espere  en  obtenir  le  suc- 
ces  :  car  enfin  qu'importent  au  public  les  ecarts  d'lme  foUe 
jeunesse,  si  I'age  miir  lui  j)aie  un  tribut  noble  et  genereux  ? 
Mais  malheur  a  ceux  qui  se  feraient  un  titre  de  torts  des 
long-temps  avoues,  cruellement  expies,  et  peut-etre  suffis- 
amment  repares,  pour  me  refuser  les  egards  que  merite  tout 
citoyen  incessamment  occupe  d'etudes,  de  recherches,  d'ou- 
vrages  qui  interessent  le  bien  general  !" — Memoires,  TV. 
276,  277.  This  time  the  father  proved  to  be  the  better 
prophet. — In  a  letter  to  Soufflot  (Oct.  4,  1787),  Mirabeau 
says  :  "  Les  folies  d'une  bouillante  jeunesse,  ontete  le  prem- 
ier aiguillon  qui  m'a  presse  de  payer  a  mon  pays  un  tribut 
noble  et  genereux." — Mem.,  IV.  449. 


238  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

great  revolutionary  upheavals — some  truth  in  his 
maxim,  that  "  the  petty  morality  kills  the  great 
morality."  But  he  put  a  strong  dose  of  cynicism 
into  it  and  was  ever  lamentably  ready  to  make 
it  a  cloak  for  his  inexcusable  moral  trippings. 
Thereby  he  to  the  last  continues  to  be  his  own 
worst  enemy.  While  his  right  breaks  one  link  of 
the  chain  dragging  down  his  arm,  the  left  is  busy 
putting  a  fresh  rivet  to  another  or  forging  a  new 
one.  He  is  an  assiduous  ally  of  cruel  fate,  denying 
him  the  possibility  of  applying  to  their  full  extent 
the  extraordinary  powers  bestowed  upon  him  by 
nature. 

And  yet  it  surely  might  have  been  different. 
The  moral  pollution  was  certainly  not  only  skin- 
deep.  The  whole  blood  was  vitiated.  But  in  the 
depths  of  this  Titanic  character  lay  a  vast  moral 
reserve  force.^     It  was  doomed  to  remain  latent, 

'  La  Marck,  telling  of  his  offer  to  aid  him  in  his  pecuniary 
embarrassments  in  order  to  put  him  "en  etat  de  conserver 
son  independence  et  de  ne  s'occuper  que  du  bienpubUc  et  de 
sa  gloire,"  writes  :  "  Ilfut  profondement  touche  de  ma  sol- 
licitude  pour  sa  gloire,  et  I'eloquence  naturelle,  mais  entrain- 
ante,  avec  laquelle  il  me  peignit  son  emotion,  me  confirma 
de  plus  en  plus  dans  la  conviction  qu'il  y  avait  de  puissantes 
ressources  dans  le  coeur  d'un  tel  homme.  .  .  Dans  plusieurs 
circonstances,  lorsque  je  fus  irrite  de  son  language  revolu- 
tionnaire  a  la  tribune,  je  m'emportai  contre  lui  avec  beau- 
coup  d'humeur.  .  .  je  I'ai  vu  alors  repandre  des  larmes 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION  239 

but  the  two  magic  words,  Possibility  and  Respcnsi-j 
bility,  might  have  brought  it  into  full  activity  at 
any  moment.  Nothing  less  than  a  task  com- 
mensurate to  his  ambition  and  to  his  powers  could 
bring  his  great  and  good  qualities  into  full  play, 
and  nothing  less  than  the  full  weight  of  supreme 
official  responsibility  could  keep  him  steady.  But 
by  this  stimulus  combined  with  this  ballast,  what 
was  weak  and  vile  in  him  would  have  been  brought 
so  far  under  control,  that  he  would  have  become 
what  he  could  be.  For  the  weak  and  the  vile 
were  in  the  main  but  acquired  qualities,  a  volcanic 
temperament,  miseducation,  the  follies,  vices,  and 
crimes  of  a  rotten  political  system  and  a  rotten 
society,  and  a  tangle  of  untoward  accidental  cir- 
cumstances concurring  in  planting  the  germs  and 
nursing  them  into  luxuriant  growth.  The  great 
and  good  were  inborn  and  therefore  ineradicable, 
though  dross  be  piled  ever  so  high  over  them. 
Nature  had  made  an  uncommon  effort  in  moulding 
this    man,  and  life  had  made  an  uncommon  and 

comme  iin  enfant,  et  exprimer  sans  bassesse  son  rcpentir 
avec  une  sincerite  sur  laquelle  on  ne  se  pouvait  troinper.  II 
faut  avoir  eu  avec  un  pareil  homme  des  relations  aussi 
suivies  et  aussi  intinies  que  les  miennes,  pour  connaiti*e  tout 
ce  que  la  pensee  a  de  plus  eleve  et  le  coeur  de  plus  attacli- 
ant."— Corresp.,  I.  108,  109. 


240  THE   FRENCH  REVOLUTION. 

most  persistent  effort  to  corrupt  nature's  master- 
work.  There  was  but  one  incentive  powerful 
enough  to  arouse  him  to  the  supreme  effort  re- 
quired for  terminating  the  contest  between  nature 
and  life  by  a  glorious  victory  of  tlie  former :  by 
putting  him  to  the  highest  test,  in  allowing  him 
to  contend  for  the  highest  prize,  he  could  be  in- 
duced to  conquer  himself. 

He  knew  it,  for  he  said  so.  In  the  Note  of 
June  20th,  he  charges  the  queen  to  tell  La- 
fayette :  "  He  needs  a  great  aim,  a  great  danger, 
great  means,  a  great  glory."  ^  There  is  nothing 
"  inexplicable  "  about  him,  if  one  but  grasps  the 
tremendous  import  of  these  words,  and  sees  that 
they  are  the  main  Jkey  to^his.  character^.  What  an 
awful  pathos  they  impart  to  his  whole  career ! 
Yes,  he  needs  a  great  aim  and  a  great  glory.  His 
becoming  truly  great  depends  on  having  a  chance 
accorded  him  to  be  very  great.  It  was  denied 
him,  and  a  life  which  nature  had  intended  to  be- 
come an  enduring  blessing  and  the  glory  of  a  great 
nation,  was  rendered  but  a  tragical  incident  in  its 
history,  bearing  no  fruit  and  leaving  no  trace. 
What  Mirabeau  had  been  foremost  in  destroying 
and  what  had  to  be  destroyed,  would  have 
'  Corresp.,  II.  42. 


•  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  241 

crumbled  into  dust  though  he  had  never  lived. 
As  to  the  positive  tasks  confronting  France,  he, 
however,  was  "  the  party  of  one  man."  He  alone 
was  able  to  construct  pari  passu  with  the  destroy- 
ing, and  thus  to  construct,  that  the  new  structure 
would  be  adapted  to  the  true  nature  and  actual 
condition  of  things.  But  he  was  condemned  to 
spend  all  his  forces  in  checking  and  abating  as  to 
this  or  that  detail,  the  blunders  of  all  the  rest,  in 
numberless  cases  amounting,  as  to  their  effects, 
to  irredeemable  crimes.  Not  enough  that  doctri- 
narianism  and  prejudice,  indolence  and  passion, 
obtuseness  and  perversity  prevent  him  from  arrest- 
ing the  universal  pressing  on  towards  chaos  and 
anarchy ;  his  very  devices  for  doing  so  are  per- 
verted into  battering-rams  for  breaking  down  the 
last  bulwarks,  and  more  than  once  he  is  compelled 
to  assist  the  madmen  himself.  Never  had  France 
stood  in  greater  need  of  a  pre-eminent,  constructive 
statesman,  never  had  she  had  to  boast  of  a  greater 
political  genius,  never  had  a  statesman  yearned 
more  ardently  to  rescue  her,  though  it  cost  the 
last  drop  of  his  heart's  blood,  and — as  he  himself 
said — he  had  only  pre-eminently  contributed  to  a 
vast  destruction,  which,  as  he  predicted  again  and 

again,  would  irresistibly  go  on  so  long  as  anything 
16 


242  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

was  left  to  be  destroyed.  That  was  an  infinitely 
more  tragical  fate  than  that  of  being  assassinated 
like  Caesar  for  being  too  great,  or  that  of  suffering 
like  Louis  XVI.  a  felon's  death,  at  the  hands  of 
an  ungrateful  people  for  having  been  too  small. 

As  early  as  January,  1790,  Mirabeau  bitterly 
complained  :  "  Always  restricted  to  advise,  never 
able  to  act,"  I  shall  probably  have  the  fate  of  Cas- 
sandra :  "  I  shall  always  predict  truly,  and  shall 
never  be  believed."  ^  Like  all  his  prophecies,  the 
prediction  was  fulfilled  to  the  letter.  Nor  would 
he  have  escaped  this  sad  fate,  if  there  had  been  no 
taint  upon  his  character.  "  Falling  myself,  and 
probably  one  of  the  first,  under  the  sickle  of  fate," 
he  writes  in  his  Note  of  August  17th,  "  I  shall  be 
a  memorable  example  of  what  is  reserved  to  men 
that  are,  in  politics,  ahead  of  their  contempo- 
raries." 2  Yes,  his  being  ahead  of  his  times  was  the 
primary  and  principal  cause  why  all  his  construc- 

'  Corresp.,  I.  449. 

'^  Corresp.,  II.  138.  It  is  interesting  to  note  in  this  connec- 
tion La  Marck's  opinion,  that  Mirabeau  would  "  unquestion- 
ably "  have  ended  on  the  guillotine,  if  he  liad  not  died  a  nat- 
ural death,  ere  Master  Samson,  the  executioner  of  Paris, 
became  the  greatest  equalizer  of  France.  Of  Mirabeau's 
determination  ' '  de  sauver  le  roi  dans  le  bouleversement 
general,  et  de  I'arracher  aux  mains  des  anarchistes,  qui  ne 
pouvaient  pas  manquer  de  devenir  bientot  ses  bourreaux," 
LaMarck  says  :  "  C'etait  risquer  sa  vie." — lb.,  I.  151,  152. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  243 

tive  political  genius  ^  could  bear  no  other  fruit  than 
dismal  prophecies,  which  stand  unparalleled  in 
truthfulness  and  unerring  minuteness. 

When  his  supreme  hour  had  come  the  distant 
boom  of  cannon  drew  from  him  the  proud  ques- 
tion :  "  Are  these  already  the  funeral  rites  of 
Achilles?"  And  one  of  his  last  words  was:  "I 
take  with  me  the  shroud  of  the  monarchy ;  after 
my  death  the  factions  will  fight  over  its  shreds." 
So  they  did,  becoming  more  and  more  convinced, 
that  to  demolish  not  only  royalty,  but  government, 
was  to  establish  liberty.  The  mortal  remains  of 
Mirabeau  were  the  first  to  be  deposited  in  the  Pan- 
theon, which  the  National  Assembly  consecrated 
to  the  ashes  of  the  greatest  sons  of  France.  When 
that  revolutionary  version  of  the  gospel  of  liberty 
had  attained  full  sway,  they  were  cast  out  and 
those  of  Paul  Marat,  who  had  demanded  the 
highest  gallows  for  him,  put  in  their  place ;  where 
they  now  mingle  with  the  dust,  nobody  knows 
nor  ever  will  know.  Thus  the  Terrorists  were  the 
last  to  confer  a    mark   of  honor  upon  him.     For 

'  To  obtain  an  adequate  idea  of  Mirabeau's  fei'tility  in  pos- 
itive and  constructive  ideas,  it  is  indispensable  to  consult 
those  also  of  his  writings,  which  most  of  his  biographers 
have  not  deemed  worthy  of  any  attention.  See  for  instance 
the  M6moires,  IV.  91-104. 


244  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION. 

"who  will  deny  that  it  was  an  honor,  even  in  the 
coffin,  to  be  ostracized  by  those  who  made  terror  the 
foundation  of  liberty,  canonized  the  guillotine, 
and  kicked  God  Almighty  out  of  His  temples  to 
make  room  for  the  goddess  of  Reason.  Most  of 
those  who  had  done  the  best  to  bring  this  about, 
learned  how  holy  the  guillotine  was  when  they 
were  made  to  ascend  its  fatal  steps  themselves. 
Those  who  survived  saw  the  red  cap  of  Liberty 
expand  and  stiffen  into  a  military  cocked  hat. 
Even  in  the  first  year  of  the  revolution  Cas- 
sandra— Mirabeau  had  foretold  this  transformation 
as  explicitly  as  the  end  of  the  king  and  the  queen. 
Is  eloquence  a  source  whence  such  predictions 
can  spring  ?  The  French  historians  have  read 
and  registered  these  and  all  his  other  prophecies, 
verified  by  the  facts,  but  with  most  of  them,  the 
superabundance  of  a  whole  century's  stern  lessons 
have  not  sufficed  to  open  their  eyes  to  the  fact  that 
his  claim  to  greatness  cannot  chiefly  rest  upon  his 
oratory.  He  himself  declared,  in  so  many  words, 
that  in  his  own  estimation  he  was,  above  all,  states- 
man, and  only  in  the  second  place  orator  and 
writer.^  In  quantity  and  in  quality,  the  work  done 
by  France  since  the  establishment  of  the  third 
'  Aug.  26,  1790,  to  La  Marck.     Corresp.,  II.  146. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  245 

republic  in  regard  to  the  history  of  the  revolution 
challenges  the  highest  admiration.  Is  it  neverthe- 
less to  last  another  century  ere  she  is  prepared  to 
do  full  justice  to  her  greatest  son  of  the  greatest 
period  of  her  history  ?  Who  can  tell  ?  Mere 
knowledge  of  the  facts  does  not  suffice.  Her 
judgment  upon  this  chapter  of  her  past  must  be 
warped  so  long  as  she  flinches  from  probing  the 
present  to  the  quick ;  and  much  as  the  third 
republic  has  done  for  the  intellectual  and  political 
advancement  of  the  nation,  it  has  as  yet  not  pro- 
duced that  supreme  moral  courage  required  by  the 
precept  of  the  Greek  sage  :  "  Know  thyself !  " 

THE   END. 


INDEX. 


Aix,  Mirabeau's  suit  against  his  wife  at,  316. 

American  war,  effects  of,  101. 

Ancien  Regime,  political  structure  under,  2  ff .  ;  system  of 
justice  under,  6,  211  ;  self-government  under,   13 
over-government  under,  14  ;  sale  of  offices  under,  15 
financial  embarrassments  under,  19  ;  estate  under,  20 
clergy,   20  ff .  ;  nobility,  26  ff .  ;  destroys   itself,    124 
utter  bankruptcy,    126  f.  ;  many-headed  opposition 
to,  129  flf.  ;  destroyed  by  Louis  XIV.,  132;   has  dis- 
integrated people,  152  ;  inconsistency  of,  210  f. 

Archives  Parlementaires,  II.   108,  109 ;  confusion  as  to 
Blin's  speech,  II.  112  (note). 

Army,  practically  dissolved,  II.  152  ;  Mirabeau  proposes 
reorganization,  II.  153. 

Arneth,  74  (note)  ;  78  (note)  ;  90  (note). 

Arnold,  Matthew,  75. 

Assignats,  II.  161  ff. 

Attroupements,  biU  against,  II.  67  ;  II.  84. 


Bachaumont,   on  the  economists,   148  ;  on  Rousseau's 

Contrat  Social,  158. 
Bacon,  II.  212  and  note. 
Banque  de  Saint  Charles,  denunciated  by  Mirabeau,  II. 

173. 
Bar,  156  (note). 
Barante,  on  optimism,  237. 

247 


248  INDEX. 

Barentin,  opening  speech,  243. 

Bastille,  stormed,  II.  21  ;  effects  of  storming  of,  II.  43. 

Beaumarchais,  Mirabeau's  letter  to,  II.  237  (note) 

Berthier,  murdered,  II.  23. 

BesanQon,  intendant  of,  on  sentiment  in  his  province, 
239. 

Besenval,  opinion  of  M.  Antoinette,  87  (note) ;  testifies 
as  to  elasticity  of  marriage  bond,  181  (note). 

Blanc  Louis,  on  Mirabeau's  position  in  Assembly,  II.  7. 

Blin,  speech  against  Mirabeau,  II.  110. 

Bouille,  on  nobility,  27  ;  on  financial  ruin  of  nobility,  67, 
232  ;  conduct  at  Nancy,  II.  152. 

Bourgeoisie,  apish  vanity  of,  43  ;  attitude  toward  prole- 
tariat, 51  f  ;  Robespierre  against,  53  ;  disintegration 
of,  during  rev.,  55  ;  improving  material  conditions  of, 
56  ;  intellectual  conditions  under  a7ic.  reg. ,  56 ;  en- 
gage in  discussion  of  polit.  problems,  150. 

Brienne,  116  ;  dismisses  notables,  116  ;  is  dismissed,  125. 

Buffiere,  Pierre,  name  of  Mirabeau  at  school,  195. 


Cabanis,  quotes  Mirabeau  as  to  action  after  flight  of  king, 
II.  185. 

Cafe  Foy,  resolutions  of,  II.  45  (note). 

Caisse  nationale,  suggested  by  Mirabeau,  II.  103. 

Calonne,  on  penalties  from  gabelle,  37,  103  ;  appointed 
controleur  gener^al,  106  ;  his  debut,  107  ;  his  financial 
policy,  107  fi" ;  takes  up  Turgot's  reform  programme, 
109  ;  has  assembly  of  notables  called,  110. 

Campan,  Mme,  on  appointment  of  Maurepas,  90  (note). 

Cassagnac,  112  (note). 

Champford,  77  (note). 

Chapellier,  proposes  committee  on  emigration,  II.  224. 

Chatelet,  Marquise  du,  treatment  of  canaille,  52. 

Choquard,  Abbe,  one  of  Mirabeau's  teachers,  195. 

Christianity,  seriously  undermined,  136. 

Church,  s.  clergy  ;  intolerance,  133  ff  ;  loses  religious  con- 
tent, 136  ;  merely  privileged  class,  136. 


INDEX.  249 

Cice  (archbishop),  acts  as  go-between  for  Mirabeau  and 

Lafayette,   II.    87 ;    intrigues  against   Mirabeau  on 

Nov.  7,  II.  118. 
Clement  XL,  133. 
Clergy,   taxes  levied  by,   22  f  ;  upper  and  lower,   28  f  ; 

riches    of,    23    and    note ;    poverty    of    lower,    24 ; 

luxury  of    higher,    24  ;    delusions    of    rev.    leaders 

about,  25. 
Clergy  of  France,  20  ;  form  of  contribution  to  state,  21  ; 

conditions  attached  to  grants  by  Ordinary  Assembly 

of,  22  ;  political  activity  of,  22. 
Clugny,  96. 
Colbert,  101. 

Compte  rendu,   103  ;    limitations  of,  104 ;    political  im- 
portance of,  105  ;  success  of,  106. 
Condorcet,  delusion  about  the  nature  of  man,  158. 
Conseil  du  roi,  10. 
Controleur  general,  11. 
Constitution,  to  be  made,   253  ff  ;  untoward  conditions 

for  making  of,  257  f . 
Corvee,  35  ;  abolished,  94 ;  re-established,  98. 
Cour  pleniere,  122. 

Courrier  de  Provence,  II.  22  :  II.  46  ;  II.  84  ;  II.  86. 
Court,  s.   Versailles  and  nobility  ;    d'Argenson  on,  72 ; 

charm  of,  74  ff . 
Croupes,  71. 


D'AiauiLLON,  Mirabeau  refused  admission  at,  II.  226. 
Daire,  102  (note). 

D'Antraigues,  Mirabeavi  praises  moderation  to,  236. 
D'Aragon,  Marquise  (Mirabeau's  niece),  II.  87. 
D'Argenson,  on  court,  72  ;  on  study  of  public  law,  143  ; 

on  anti-monarchical  opposition,  145. 
De  Biauzat,  Gaulthier,  II.  149. 
De  Castries,  II.  148. 
December  Memoir,  II.  188  flf. 
De  Fleury,  106. 


250  INDEX. 

De  Lamoignon  (Guillaume),  view  of  power  of  States- 
General,  220. 

De  la  Tour,  on  optimism,  237,  238. 

De  Pailly  (Mme.),  becomes  Marquis  Mirabeau's  misti'ess, 
184  ;  character,  185  ;  as  a  mischief-maker,  185. 

Desmoulins,  Camille,  praise  of  mob-rule,  256  ;  judgment 
on  5th  of  Oct.,  II.  41  ;  on  necessity  of  lying,  II.  50 
(note) ;  II.  53  ;  describes  insurrection  of  women,  II. 
55  f.  ;  on  Lafayette,  II.  59  ;  describes  attack  at 
Jacobin  club  on  Mirabeau,  II.  227  f. 

Despotism,  Essay  on,  s.  Mirabeau,  212. 

D'Espremenil,  119  (note). 

D'Estaing,  Louis'  letter  to,  II.   51  and  note  ;  II.  64. 

Dictionnaire  pMlosophique,  147. 

Dohm,  on  Mirabeau's  masteiy  of  art  of  asking,  II.  210. 

Don  gratuit,  21  ;  voted  by  Ordinary  Assembly,  31. 

D'Ormesson,  106. 

Droz,  quoted,  II.  217. 

Dubarry,  Madame,  88. 

Dumont,  assertion  concerning  connection  of  Mirabeau 
with  Monsieur,  II.  174  (note). 

Dupont  de  Nemours,  109. 

Duport,  11.  227  f. 

Duroveray,  II.  149. 

Economists,  147 ;  a  sect,  148. 

Edict  of  Nantes,  revocation  of,  132. 

EUiott,  Grace  D.,  on  Duke  of  Orleans'  share  in  events  of 
Oct.,  II.  61  (note). 

Estates,  character  of  two  upper,  20  ;  privileges  of,  20 ; 
first  estate,  20  f  ;  second  estate,  26. 

Etats  Generaux,  published  by  Mirabeau,  II.  18 ;  sup- 
pressed, II.  18. 

Etiquette,  of  Versailles,  64  ff.  ;  as  to  money-affairs,  67,  68. 

Federation  Festival,  II.  5. 
Fersen,  Count,  on  Mirabeau,  II.  234. 


INDEX.  251 

Feudalism,  in  France  and  Germany,  29  ;  in  France,  29  f.  ; 
shattered,  II.  24. 

Fifth  of  October,  Lecture  VIII.  ;  origin  of  insurrection 
of,  II.  47  flf.  ;  a  well-laid  plot,  II.  55  ;  effects  of,  II.  65. 

Finances,  under  anc.  reg.,  19  ;  embarrassments  because  of, 
19  ;  example  of  bankruptcy  of  court,  69  ;  Necker  at 
head  of,  100. 

Flour-war,  97. 

Foreign  clergy,  21  (note). 

Form,  as  first  law  of  Ufe,  74  ff.  :  drawback  of,  76. 

Fourth  of  August,  called  an  "  orgy,"  II.  24. 

France,  ancien  regime  (which  see) ;  resources  of,  19  ;  at- 
titude toward  Mirabeau,  258 ;  fails  to  appreciate 
Mirabeau,  II.  244  f. 

Francois  (baker),  murdered,  II.  84. 

Frederick  the  Great,  absolutism  compared  with  that  of 
Versailles,  63  ;  again,  72. 

Frederick  William,  72. 

French  idealism,  258. 

French  literature  of  18th  century,  not  a  cause  but  a  symp- 
tom, 142  ff.  ;  is  revolution  in  abstract,  152. 

Frochot,  II.  139. 


Oabelle,  36  ;  penalties  from,  32. 

Generality,  11. 

Government,  abject  senility  of,  125  ;  drove  intellect  into 

opposition,  131  ;  logical  outcome  of  insistence  on  per 

capita  vote,  247 ;   abdicates  to  States-General,  248, 

257;  II.  48  f. 
Grands  bailUages,  122. 
Grimm,  rosy  view  of  future,  151  (note);  on  prevalence 

of  speculation,  162. 
Guilds,  47  f . ;  proletariat  formed  by,  48. 


H.(EUSSER,  Ludwig,  II.  30. 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  on  nature  of  Man,  157. 


252  INDEX. 

HoUand,  T.  E.,  156  (note). 

Hotel  de  Ville,  mob  cleared  out  of,  II.  63. 

Huguenots,  Turgot's  exertions  in  behalf  of,  134. 

Intend  ANT,  11. 

Jacobin  Club,  Mirabeau  president  of,  II.  208,  220  ;  Mira- 
beau  attacked  at,  II.  227  ff. 

Jansenism,  133. 

Jefferson,  on  king,  95 ;  on  notables,  112  ;  on  Lafayette, 
II.  140. 

Jesuits,  suppressed,  135. 

Joseph  II.,  letter  on  French  government,  73  (note);  criti- 
cism of  French  society,  77  (note). 

Journal  Jiistorique,  93  (note). 

Joux,  Fort,  202. 

Kafp,  206  (note). 

La  Fare,  on  nature  of  privileges,  227  f . 

La  Marck,  75 ;  on  composition  of  States-General,  249 
(note) ;  II.  5  ;  on  Lafayette  in  Versailles,  II.  63  f .  ; 
testifies  to  Mirabeau's  innocence  concerning  Oct. 
events,  II.  67,  68,  81 ;  gives  memoir  of  15th  Oct.  to 
Count  of  Provence,  II.  79  ;  charges  Cice  with  defeat 
of  Nov.  7th,  II.  118 ;  is  charged  with  Mirabeau's  de- 
fence, II.  167 ;  acts  as  mediator  between  court  and 
Mirabeau,  II.  176  ;  laments  incompleteness  of  con- 
nection, II.  192  f.  ;  on  Louis  XVI.,  II.  199  ;  on  Marie 
Antoinette,  II.  202,  212  ;  on  necessity  of  intrigue,  II. 
221  ;  on  Mirabeau's  moral  character,  II.  238  (note). 

Lafayette,  II.  8,  23  ;  attitude  on  5th  Oct.,  II.  56,  58 ff.  ; 
lapses  of  memory  in  his  "  Recollections,"  II.  60  ;  his 
treachery  to  Mirabeau,  II.  126,  136 ;  in  Versailles, 
II.  63  ;  history  of  attempted  alliance  with  Mirabeau, 
II.  88  ff.  ;  his  poht.  creed  considered,  II.  126  (note) ; 


INDEX.  253 

his  great  power  after  Oct.  events,  II.  133  flf.  ;  reasons 
why  he  does  not  accept  alliance  with  Mirabeau,  II. 
134  fif.  ;  his  vanity,  II.  138  ff.  ;  defeats  Mirabeau's 
ambition  to  be  president  during  federation  festival, 
n.  138  f .  ;  his  indecision,  II.  143  ff .  ;  sources  of  power, 
II.  145  ff.  ;  action  in  veto-question,  II.  159 ;  denies 
Mirabeau's  venality,  II.  179. 

LaUy-ToUendal,  II.  23. 

Lameth,  Alexandre,  124  (note);  wounded  in  duel,  II.  148  ; 
attacks  Mirabeau  at  Jacobins,  II.  227  f .  ; 

Lamoignon,  114  (note). 

Lanjuinais,  speech  against  Mirabeau,  II.  112. 

Lantern,  as  means  of  execution,  II.  56. 

Law  (financier),  103. 

Le  bailli,  s.  Le  chevalier  de  Mirabeau. 

Le  TeUier  (Jesuit),  133. 

Lemontey,  131. 

Lettres  a  Mauvillon,  quoted  in  notes. 

Lettres  de  cachet,  198,  199  ;  work  by  Mirabeau  on,  214. 

Levrault,  Mirabeau's  letters  to,  II.  11. 

Limousin,  Turgot  intendant  of,  98  ; 

Lit  de  justice,  9  ;  of  March,  1776,  94. 

Louis  XVI.,  slave  of  etiquette,  65  (note) ;  education  and 
character,  84,  85  ;  La  Marck's  opinion  of,  85  (note) ; 
expects  great  things  of  notables,  113  ;  sees  through 
Parliament,  117  (note)  ;  on  States-General  in  1776, 
120  (note) ;  speech  at  opening  of  States-General,  240  ; 
plays  a  passive  part  on  5th  and  6th  Oct.,  II.  51  ;  during 
6th  Oct.,  II.  64  ;  appoints  ministers  from  Assembly, 
II.  108  ;  chargeable  for  failure  of  Mirabeau's  plans, 
II.  193  ;  characterized  by  Montmorin  and  La  Marck, 
II.  198  f. 

Louis  XIV.,  maxim  of  Fitat  c^est  moi,  3  ;  sale  of  oflBces 
imder,  16  (note),  26  ;  Versailles,  creation  of,  62 ; 
prominence  of  court,  63  f .  ;  called  le  roi  soleil,  64  ; 
demoralization  of  France  through,  71  ;  hated  by 
people,  81  ;  destroys  anc.  rig.,  132  ;  his  church  policy, 
132  f .  ;  results  of  church  policy,  134. 


254:  INDEX. 

Louis  XV. ,  principle  of  government,  3 ;  as  grain-specu- 
lator, 71 ;  despised  by  people,  81  ;  apres  nous  le  de- 
luge, 82  and  note. 

Longo,  Marquis,  172. 

Lomenie,  103  (note),  186  (note) ;  on  Mirabeau's  education, 
195 ;  injustice  of,  198,  199  ;  calls  Mirabeau  "  inex- 
plicable," II.  2 ;  criticism  of  work  of,  2  ff.  ;  sees 
only  orator  in  Mirabeau,  II.  6  ;  criticism  of  speech 
of  Nov.  6th,  II.  96  f.  ;  refutation  of  criticism  of,  II. 
99  f .  ;  praises  Mirabeau  for  conduct  at  Jacobins,  II. 
232. 

Loustalot,  II.  49 ;  on  preparations  for  5th  Oct.,  II.  55 
(note),  57. 

Louvois,  101. 

Lowell,  E.  L.,  13  (note) ;  on  feudal  burdens,  29  ;  on  rural 
classes,  30  ;  on  material  prosperity,  38. 

Lying,  in  the  revolution,  II,  50. 


Mably,  on  danger  of  executive  power,  II.  36. 

Malesherbes,  91,  105  (note). 

Malouet,  advice  to  Necker,  233 ;  on  Mirabeau's  clear- 
sightedness, II.  11  ;  on  interview  with  Mirabeau,  II. 
33,  66. 

Manuel,  233  (note). 

Marat,  damns  Mirabeau,  II.  37  ;  in  Pantheon,  II.  243. 

Marie  Antoinette,  Mirabeau's  favorable  opinion  of,  85  ; 
character  of,  85  ff.  ;  Besenval's  judgment  on,  87 
(note) ;  contributes  to  Turgot's  overthrow,  95  ;  dur- 
ing 6th  of  Oct.,  II.  64  ;  suspects  Mirabeau,  II.  81, 
177  ;  proposes  to  win  Mirabeau,  II.  177  ;  Mirabeau 
calls  her  the  one  man  at  court,  II.  200  ;  no  trust  in 
Mirabeau,  II.  201 ;  characterized  by  La  Marck,  II. 
202. 

Marignane  (Miss),  marries  Mirabeau,  200 ;  character, 
201 ;  the  hailli's  opinion  of,  201  (notes) ;  her  adultery, 
202. 

Marriage,  character  of,  under  anc,  reg.,  180  f.,  184,  204. 


INDEX.  255 

Masses,  their  condition,  238  f .  ;  attitude  toward  bour- 
geoisie, 239  ;  support  sought  by  Nat.  Assembly,  254, 
255  ;  direct  Nat.  Assembly,  255. 

Maupeou,  83. 

Maurepas,  89  ;  history  of  appointment,  89  (note) ;  opposes 
Turgot,  92  ; 

Mauvillon,  II.  8  and  note,  9,  26  (note) ;  Mirabeau  on  his 
own  moderation  to,  II.  27. 

Mejan  (editor  of  Mirabeau's  speeches),  4  (note) ;  II. 
118. 

Memoir  of  15th  of  October,  its  origin,  II.  68  ;  analysis  of, 
II.  69  ff . ;  its  failure,  II.  79  ;  its  penetrating  insight, 
II.  79  f. 

Mending,  by  government  of  Louis  XVI. ,  83. 

Mercure  de  France,  II.  53. 

Mercy  d'Argenteau,  85  (note) ;  assists  in  negotiations  be- 
tween court  and  Mirabeau,  II.  176  ff.,  192. 

Mesdames  (daughters  of  Louis  XV.),  table  expenses,  69  ; 
influence  appointment  of  Maurepas,  89  and  note ; 
incident  connected  with  their  flight,  II.  224  f. 

Metra,  on  pol.  inexperience  of  States-General,  250. 

Mirabeau,  Jean  Antoine,  in  wars  of  Louis  XIV.,  167; 
Mirabeau  genuine  grandson  of,  215. 

Mirabeau,  Victor  Riquette,  Marquis  de,  on  agriculture,  31; 
on  Paris,  61  ;  prophesies  as  to  result  of  Necker's  sys- 
tem, 103  ;  aversion  to  son,  164  ff .  ;  sows  his  wild  oats, 
169  ;  settles  down,  170  ;  bis  economical  labors,  170  ; 
his  moralizing  tendency,  170  f.,  177;  humanitarian, 
171 ;  believer  in  blue  blood,  171 ;  want  of  balance, 
172,  173  ;  devotion  to  mother,  172 ;  son  of  anc.  reg., 
174 ;  sensitiveness,  175  (note) ;  family  ambition,  176  ; 
failure  of  speculations,  177 ;  stubbornness,  178 ; 
scribomania,  179 ;  paternalism,  180  ;  marries,  180  f.  ; 
takes  a  mistress,  184 ;  guilt  apportioned,  187 ; 
threatens  to  send  son  to  Dutch  colonies,  197  and  note, 
198  ;  uses  lettres  de  cachet,  199  ;  requests  to  have 
Mirabeau  locked  up,  205  and  note  ;  sends  son  to 
Vincennes,  207  ;  reasons  for  releasing  him,  208  ;  tes- 


256  INDEX. 

tifies  to  son's  oratory,  216  ;  destroys  his  son's  career, 
218. 

Mirabeau,  chevalier  de  (le  bailli),  on  Paris,  57  (note) ;  on 
flour-war,  97  (note) ;  most  estimable  character,  168  ; 
his  wild  youth,  168  and  note ;  on  his  brother,  175 
(note)  ;  on  brother's  speculations,  177 ;  on  Mme.  de 
Pailly,  186  (note)  ;  on  Mirabeau's  wife,  201  (notes)  ; 
on  his  brother's  treatment  of  son,  209,  210  (note),  II. 
25  ;  on  his  nephew's  intelligence,  II.  68. 

Mirabeau,  Marquise  de,  marriage,  180  f .  ;  character,  182  ; 
adultery,  183  ;  her  lawsuit,  183 ;  Mirabeau  champions 
her  cause,  205. 

Mirabeau,  4,  10,  24  (note),  27 ;  on  Paris,  45  ;  on  money- 
favors  of  court,  70  ;  under  speU  of  form,  75  ;  opinion 
of  M.  Antoinette,  85  ;  reason  for  Calonne's  failure, 
109  (note) ;  view  of  Calonne's  end,  110  ;  reason  for 
joy  at  convocation  of  Notables,  113  ;  claims  to  have 
advised  convocation  of  Notables,  113  (note) ;  on  par- 
liament, 117  (note),  118  and  note ;  on  necessity  of 
summoning  States-General,  126  (note) ;  his  birth,  164  ; 
sensuahty,  182  and  note  ;  influence  of  household  on, 
188 ;  father's  treatment  of,  189,  190  S.  ;  natural  in- 
telligence, 189,  190  ;  charm  exercised  by,  192  and 
note  ;  degraded  to  common  rank,  195  ;  in  army,  197  ; 
nature  of  guilt,  197  ;  tendency  to  contract  debts,  200  ; 
marries,  200  ;  falls  in  love  with  Sophie,  202  ;  flight 
and  sentence,  203  f .  ;  his  manner  against  his  father, 
205  ;  at  Vincennes,  206  f .  ;  released,  207  ;  tribute  to 
his  father,  208  :  sufferings  at  Vincennes,  210  ;  essay 
on  Despotism,  212  ;  on  Lettres  de  Cachet,  214 ;  polit. 
importance  of,  214, 217  ;  announcement  of  pol.  creed, 

215  ;  returns  to  prison  voluntarily,  215  ;  his  oratory, 

216  ;  Uterary  excellence  of  writings,  217  ;  necessity 
of  States-General,  234  ;  joy  over  convocation,  235  ;  his 
moderation,  236  ;  his  disgust  with  Necker,  236  f.,  245 ; 
on  Necker's  speech,  241  f . ;  on  inexperience  of  States- 
General,  250  ;  on  French  national  character,  251 ;  on 
unwieldiness  of  Assembly,  252 ;  on  control  of  As- 


INDEX.  257 

sembly  by  masses,  255  ;  II.  23,  46  ;  on  untoward  con- 
ditions for  making  constitution,  257  ;  is  hissed,  II.  1 ; 
selfislmess  not  mainspring  of  activity,  II.  4f.,  39  f.  ; 
forms  party  of  one  man,  II.  7 ;  opinion  of  his  own 
statesmanship,  II.  8  (note) ;  his  practicality,  II.  9,  10, 
23,  24,  25  f.,  31,  211  ;  his  programme,  II.  11, 13, 17  f.  ; 
his  clear-sightedness,  II.  12 ;  on  23d  of  June,  II. 
14  f .  ;  on  4th  of  Aug.  24  f .  ;  his  revolutionary  spirit, 
II.  14  f.  ;  his  royalism,  II.  12,  29  ;  his  moderation,  II. 
17,  19,  27  f.,  33  ;  debate  on  assuming  name  of  Nat. 
Assembly,  II.  20  ;  predicts  despotism,  II.  22 ;  fears 
despotism  of  Assembly,  II.  30 ;  his  foresight,  II.  33, 
35,  67,  79  ;  his  interview  with  Necker,  II.  34 ;  pro- 
gramme proposed  to  Montmorin,  II.  34  f.  ;  insists  on 
strong  executive,  II.  36  f.,  66;  his  courage,  II.  37, 
38 f.,  85  ;  conduct  on  5th and  6th  Oct.,  II.  66 f.  ;  ques- 
tion of  participation  in  Oct.  events,  II.  67  f . ,  80  f.  ; 
Memoir  of  the  15th  Oct.,  II.  68  ff.  ;  his  plan  for  sal- 
vation, II.  75  ff.  ;  his  character,  II.  83  f.,  237  (note), 
238  and  note  ;  attempts  to  form  alliance  with  Lafa- 
yette, II.  88  ff .  ;  is  offered  ambassadorship,  II.  89  ; 
great  speech  of  Nov.  6th.,  II.  96  ff.  ;  analysis  of 
speech,  II.  100  ff .  ;  considers  means  to  establish  con- 
cert between  executive  and  legislative,  II.  104  ff.  ; 
moves  to  give  ministers  seat  in  Assembly,  II.  108  ; 
his  speech  of  the  7th,  II.  113  ff.  ;  his  defeat,  II.  117  ; 
his  noble  patriotism,  II.  119  and  note,  121  ;  on  neces- 
sity of  reconsidering  decree  of  Nov.  7th,  II.  120  f . ;  was 
he  without  a  consistent  policy  ?  II.  128  ff.  ;  absolute 
necessity  of  winning  or  destroying  Lafayette,  II. 
133  ff .  ;  shares  blame  of  defeat,  II.  134  ;  strictures  on 
Lafayette,  II.  142  ff.  ;  analyzes  sources  of  Lafayette's 
power,  I.  145  ;  proposes  to  put  Nat.  Guard  under 
order  of  king,  II.  149 ;  proposes  reorganization  of 
army,  II.  153 ;  attitude  on  question  of  peace  and 
war,  11.  154  f .  ;  attitude  on  question  of  royal  veto, 
II.  158  f .  ;  attitude  on  question  of  assignats,  II. 
161  ff.  ;  attitude  on  church  question,  II.  165  ff.  ; 
17 


258  INDEX. 

measure  of  guilt  for  evil  effects,  II.  166  ;  question  of 
guilt  of  connection  with  court,  II.  169  ;  mitigating 
circumstances,  II.  169  ff . ;  carelessness  about  money, 
II.  171  f .  ;  is  not  venal,  II.  172  f . ,  178  ;  his  connection 
with  3Ionsieur  after  Nov.  7th,  II.  174  f.  ;  history  of 
connection  with  court,  II.  176  ff.  ;  joy  at  overtures, 
II.  177  ;  his  prof ession  of  faith  of  May  10th,  II.  178  f., 
181  ff .  ;  the  pecuniary  agreement,  II.  178  f .  ;  faithful- 
ness to  revolution  and  to  king,  II.  182 ff.,  188 ff.  ;  de- 
prived of  influence  on  executive,  II.  193  f.  ;  connec- 
tion between  him  and  Montmorin,  II.  195  ;  his  am- 
biguous position,  II.  197,  203  ff.,  209,  214  ff.,  219,  242  ; 
President  of  Jacobins,  II.  208, 220  ;  his  means  become 
less  reputable,  II.  220  ;  President  of  Assembly,  II. 
223  ;  defends  right  of  emigration,  II.  224  f .  ;  attacked 
at  Jacobins,  II.  227  ff.  ;  his  death,  II.  235,  243;  the 
weight  of  his  past,  II.  236  f,  ;  personal  causes  of 
failure,  II.  236  ff.  ;  constructive  statesman,  II.  241  ; 
suffers  fate  of  Cassandra,  II.  242  ;  France  unable  to 
do  justice  to  him,  II.  244  f. 

Mirabeau-Tonneau  (younger  brother  of  former),  172  (note). 

Mirabeau's  wife,  s.  Marignane. 

Monnier,  Sophie  de,  Mirabeau  falls  in  love  with,  202, 
203  ;  relations  to  husband,  203. 

Monsieur,  s.  Provence,  Count  de. 

Montesquieu,  defends  sale  of  offices,  17  (note);  on  Paris, 
59. 

Montigny,  172  (note);  on  Marquis  Mii'abeau,  179  ;  II.  232 
(note). 

Montlosier,  II.  87  ;  speech  against  Mirabeau,  II.  112. 

Montmorin,  118  (note),  270  ;  warned  by  Mirabeau,  II. 
32  f . ;  refuses  to  see  Mirabeau,  II.  34  ;  connection  be- 
tween him  and  Mirabeau,  II.  195  ;  on  Louis  XVI.,  II. 
198. 

Morris,  Gouverneur,  on  the  French  masses,  238  ;  on 
Necker's  opening  speech,  241  ;  on  Barentin's  speech, 
243 ;  on  reception  given  Mirabeau  in  Assembly, 
259. 


INDEX.  259 

Mounier,  leads  deputation  of  women  to  king,  II.   63  ; 
answer  to  Mirabeau,  II.  66. 


Napoleon,  II.  79, 

National  Assembly,  s.  States-General ;  moderate  charac- 
ter of,  242  ;  wanting  in  practical  statesmanship,  II.  9, 
117  ;  does  too  much,  II.  13  f.;  prospective  slavery  of, 
II.  32  ;  disagreement  with  Paris,  II.  43  ;  invaded  by 
women,  II.  62  f . ;  inconsistent  course  in  question  of 
interdependence  between  legislative  and  executive, 
II.  108  ff. ;  decrees  itself  infallible,  II.  124 ;  thanks 
Bouille,  II.  152  ;  destroys  executive,  II.  155  ff . : 
adopts  suspensive  veto,  II.  159 ;  self-destructive 
effects,  II.  160. 

National  Guard,  is  assurance  of  order,  II.  44,  57,  58 ; 
Mirabeaas  plan  respecting,  II.  149  ;  compromise- 
measure  adopted,  II.  149 ;  degeneration  of,  II.  150  f. 

Necker,  18  (note),  19  ;  at  head  of  finances,  100  ;  view  of 
ability  of,  100  f.;  foolish  poHcy,  101  ff.  ;  reforms 
effected  by,  103  ;  his  comjite  rendu,  103  fi.;  dismissed, 
106  ;  reappointment  of,  125 ;  on  proposed  perma- 
nence of  States-General,  229  ;  leaves  everything  to 
haphazard,  230;  has  no  programme,  233  f.;  speech 
at  opening  of  States-General,  241 ;  effect  of  dismissal. 
II.  21  ;  interview  with  Mirabeau,  II.  34 ;  judgment 
of  Mirabeau  on,  II.  69 ;  Oct.  interview  with  Mira- 
beau, II.  92. 

Nobility,  26  ff.;  transformed  into  a  privileged  class,  26; 
character  of  lower,  26  f.;  Mirabeau  on,  27;  higher, 
27  f . ;  humanitarian  spirit  of,  31  ;  position  as  class  in 
state,  32  f . ;  no  moral  right  to  claim  immunity,  32  ; 
direct  and  indirect  taxation  of,  33  f.;  blue  blood 
theory  of,  41  ;  petition  of  peers  of  1717,  42  ;  at  Ver- 
sailles, 65 ;  wealth  of,  67  (note);  appeals  to  king  for 
money,  68  ;  offices  created  for,  69. 

Notables,  assembly  of,  110  ;  composition  of,  110 ;  Ca- 
lonne's  plan  with  regard  to.  111  ;  sarcastic  reception 


260  INDEX. 

of,  113 ;  their  single  reform,  112 ;  political  import- 
ance of,  114. 

Octroi,  54. 

Oelsner,  on  Mirabeau's  defence  at  Jacobins,  II.  228. 
Oncken,  94  ;  doubts  Mirabeau's  sanity,  II.  217  (note). 
Optimism,  epidemic,  237. 

Orleans,  Duke  of,  relation  to  events  of  Oct.,  II.  61  and 
note. 

Palais  Royal,  II.  41  ;  assists  in  regeneration  of  France, 
II.  45,  53. 

Pantheon,  Mirabeau's  remains  deposited  in,  II.  243. 

Paris,  Mirabeau  on,  45,  58  (note);  necessity  of  under- 
standing, 45  f . ;  complex  nature  of,  46  ;  masses  of, 
46  f.;  view  of  le  bailli  on,  57  (note);  upper  orders  in, 
58  ;  growth  of,  59  ;  ascendency  of,  59 ;  Montesquieu 
on,  59 ;  Mirabeau's  father  on,  61 ;  position  criticised 
by  Mirabeau,  II.  71. 

ParUaments,  8  ;  character  of  legislative  power,  8  ;  origin 
of  legislative  power,  8  (note);  crushed,  122  ;  reply  of 
Parliament  of  Toulouse,  122  ;  claim  to  be  represent- 
ative, 144  ;  of  Rouen  demands  account  of  revenue, 
145  (note);  of  Aix  condemns  a  papal  brief,  147. 

Parliament  of  Paris,  attitude  toward  guilds,  47  ;  recalled 
from  exile,  92,  93 ;  later  attitude,  116  ;  opposition 
for  its  own  sake,  117  ;  escapes  from  exile  by  bargain, 
119  ;  its  declaration  of  principle,  120  ;  crushed,  122 ; 
sudden  unpopularity  of,  231. 

Patriots,  succeed  economists,  149  ;  their  object,  149. 

Pays  d'etat,  5. 

Pays  (Selection,  6. 

Peasantry,  condition  of,  29  ff . ;  s.  clergy  and  nobility. 

Pensions,  s.  nobility  ;  amount  of,  under  Necker,  70. 

Per  capita,  vote  by,  243. 

Philadelphia  Convention,  compared  with  Nat.  Assembly, 
253. 


INDEX.  261 

Philosophers,   constituting   opposition,    138 ;     compared 

with  reformers  of  16th  century,  138  ;  leave  one  tenet 

of  anc.  reg.  untouched,  142. 
Philosophic    spirit,    s.    philosophers ;    in    cabinet,    148 ; 

complete  victory  of,   152  ;  does  not  base  on  fact, 

153  flf. 
Pierre-en-Cise,  211. 
Place  de  Greve,  II.  56. 
Pompadour,  Mme.,  89. 

Pontarlier,  202  ;  Mirabeau  returns  to  prison  in,  215. 
PortaUs,  pitted  against  Mirabeau  at  Aix,  216. 
Press,  liberty  of,  granted,  232. 
Privileges,  s.  clergy  and  nobility  ;  moral  disintegration 

caused  by,  39,  ff.  ;  consequences  of  destruction  of, 

44  ;  in  domain  of  labor,  47  ;  upper  orders  cling  to, 

227  f.  ;  Mirabeau  against,  II.  11,  12. 
Proletariat,  48,  49 ;  pauperism  of,  49 ;  growing  despair 

and  lawlessness  of,   50  f.  ;    becomes  sovereign  of 

France,  II.  65. 
Provence,  Comte  de,  receives  memoir  of  15th  Oct. ,  II. 

79  ;  connection  with  Mirabeau,  II.  174  and  note. 
Provence,  claims  to  being  a  distinct  "nation,"  6  ;  effect 

of  hot  sun  of,  167. 
Provinces,  dependence  on  I^aris,  60  ;  Young's  experience 

with,  60. 
Public  opinion,  infallibility  of,  141 ;  Necker's  tribute  to, 

141  (note). 


QUESNAY,  170. 


Rabaut  Saint  Etienne,  on  possessions  of  nobihty,  67 

(,note). 
Reason,  dominant,  139 ;  dogmatism  of,  140  ;  defects  of, 

154. 
Resources,  s.  France. 
Republicanism,  at  court,  78  ;  confused  nature  of,  79. 


262  INDEX. 

Revolutionary  spirit,  how  far  Mirabeau  was  identified 
with,  II.  14. 

Rights  of  man,  discussion  of,  II.  23,  24. 

Robespierre,  on  bourgeoisie,  53. 

Rocquain,  on  recall  of  Parliament,  93  (note) ;  on  flour- 
war,  97  (note) ;  on  expulsion  of  Jesuits,  135,  137,  151. 

Roland,  Mme.,  epigram  on  liberty,  163. 

Rosen,  court  duties  of,  65. 

Rouen,  chosen  as  retreat  for  king,  II.  76,  77. 

Rousseau,  34  ;  influence  on  society,  78  ;  effect  of  writings 
on  bourgeoisie,  150  ;  on  constitution  of  society,  153 
and  note  ;  his  doctrine  of  equality  tested,  155  f.  ;  his 
doctrine  of  man's  nature  considered,  157  f.  ;  does  not 
consider  himself  a  practical  statesman,  159  ;  poison 
in  teachings  of,  160,  161. 


Saillant,  du,  208  (note). 

Saillant,  Mme.  du  (Mirabeau's  sister),  II.  119  (note). 

Salons,  engage  in  polit.  discussion,  149. 

Sansculottes,  53. 

Seance  royale,  120  ;  of  23d  of  June,  II.  14  f. 

Seguier,  152  (note). 

Segur,  on  republicanism  of  ^ciety,  80. 

Seven  Years'  War,  effect  of  disasters  of,  144. 

Sieyes,  on  reign  of  terror,  55 ;  on  third  estate,  57  ;  on 
science  of  politics,  158  ;  does  not  propose  to  put  doc- 
trines into  practice,  159  ;  rebuked  by  Mirabeau,  II.  10. 

Soulavie,  95  (note),  111  (note),  118  (note),  121  (note). 

Spontaneous  anarchy,  240. 

St.  Antoine,  52,  61. 

St.  Marceau,  52,  61. 

St.  Huruge,  Marquis  de,  heads  mob  for  Versailles,  II.  44. 

Stael  (Mme.  de)  testimony  as  to  repub.  spirit  of  Paris, 
150,  232  (note)  ;  repeats  Necker's  conversation  with 
Mirabeau,  II.  92  ;  on  Mirabeau,  II.  214. 

States-General,  convened  last  in  1614,  41 ;  term  becomes 
popular,  119 ;  inevitableness  of,  126  and  note ;  de- 


INDEX.  263 

manded  by  clergy,  137  ;  negative  import  of,  219 ; 
belong  to  anc.  reg. ,  219  and  note ;  hist,  views  of  power, 
220  ;  task  assigned  them  by  government,  221  ;  in- 
definiteness  of  task,  221  fif.  ;  inevitable  disagreement 
of,  224,  225  f .  ;  question  of  vote  by  orders  discussed, 
228  f.  ;  obstinate  on  vote  jjer  capita,  244  ff.  ;  com- 
position of,  248 ;  no  political  experience,  249  flf.  ; 
want  of  unity  of  aim,  251  f.  ;  size,  252  ;  bears  char- 
acter of  constituent  Assembly,  253,  256  ;  situation  at 
meeting  of,  II.  10  f.  ;  constituted  Nat.  Assembly,  II. 
20  f. 

States-General  (Holland),  surrender  Mirabeau,  206. 

Stephens,  H.  M.,  on  deputies  to  States-General,  248  ;  on 
Mirabeau's  statesmanship,  II.  9. 

Stock-jobbing,  under  Necker,  102. 


Taille,  34. 

Taille  noble,  227. 

Taine,  on  aristocracy  before  rev. ,  32  ;  en  blocs  thinking  of 
peasantry,  38,  39,  58  (note) ;  on  Versailles  imder 
anc.  reg.,  62,  77  ;  on  revol.  before  revol.,  151  ;  on 
import  of  cry  of  return  to  nature,  153  ;  "  spontane- 
ous anarchy,"  240  ;  II.  62  (note). 

Talleyrand,  113. 

Talon,  II.  94  ;  attempts  to  bring  Lafayette  to  a  decis- 
ion, II.  95. 

Taxes,  inequality  of,  20  ;  method  of  levying,  35  ;  inequal- 
ity of  province  in  regard  to,  36. 

Terray,  83,  117  (note). 

Third  estate,  s.  under  clergy,  nobUity,  and  peasantry ; 
position  toward  other  two,  41 ;  demands  recogni- 
tion of  equality,  227  ;  double  number  of  representa- 
tives, 230  and  note. 

Thouret,  Mirabeau  replies  to,  II.  30. 

Tocqueville,  view  on  centralization,  10  ;  view  on  new 
provincial  assemblies,  123  (note). 

Toulon,  murdered,  II.  23,  38. 


264  INDEX. 

Troyes,  parliament  at,  119. 

Turgot,  on  villages  under  anc.  reg.,  12,  13  ;  reforms  in 
taxa.tion,  36,  47 ;  on  selfishness  of  cities,  54  ;  as  con- 
troleur  general,  91 ;  opposition  to,  91,  93  ;  attitude 
toward  exiled  parliament,  93,  and  note ;  dismissed, 
94,  95  ;  his  reforms  annulled,  96  ;  effect  of  dismissal, 
98  f.  ;  warns  king  against  American  war,  101  (note), 
105  (note),  109  ;  article,  "  Fondation,"  148  ;  optimist 
237. 


Unigenitus  (bull),  133,  134. 
United  States,  II.  103. 


Vauvenargues,  on  Marquis  Mirabeau,  179. 

Vassan  (Miss),  marries  Marquis  Mirabeau,  180  f . 

Versailles,  focus  of  ancien  regime,  62  ;  ruins  nobility,  67  ; 
mob  starts  for,  II.  53  ff. 

Vincennes  (dungeon),  198,  307. 

Voltaire,  in  Bastille,  43  ;  ecrasez  Vinfame,  138  (note) ;  as 
apostle  of  reason,  140  ;  predicts  growing  opposition 
of  parliament,  144  ;  article  on  grain,  147  ;  on  de- 
structive spirit  of  philosophers,  163. 

Von  Gleichen,  on  Marquis  Mirabeau's  treatment  of  son, 
191. 

Von  Sybel,  40. 


Weber,  114  (note) ;  on  Brienne's  campaign  against  priv- 
ileged orders,  333  (note). 
Women,  insurrection  of,  s.  5th  of  October. 


Young,  Arthur,  on  activity  of  Paris,  60. 


I4i 


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